[MD] (Fwd) Re: John Carl Critiques Pure Experience:INST01

[John Carl]

On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 12:57 AM, <skutvik at online.no> wrote: (to Ron)

You seem one of the few persons on this site who still care for the
> MOQ. For the rest it's all and sundry thinkers EXCEPT Pirsig. Rorty
> has long circulated with Matt, and after DMB started his PhD career
> we have had a whole academical y gallery. With John, Royce and
> Krueger are included in the menagerie. All saying "the same" only
> deeper, higher, "faster" in an "Annie, get your Gun" style.


Annie Get Your Gun?  Well I'll concede I like "Doin' What Comes Naturally",
but I'm not sure what you mean by "deeper, higher, faster"

I'll also concede an intense interest in Royce because of his positive
stance on philosophy -its not just a game for brainiacs, it has useful
purposes - and his metaphysical similarity and relevance to Pirsig.   But
Kreuger I don't even know.  I just needed some sort of explanation of Pure
Experience that I could rail against and his came up and served the purpose
well.

I sure won't concede that all are saying the same.  Au Contraire!


>
>
> To your "objection" which is so embarrassing that it makes me wonder
> if there is no limit. "Ideas" (mind patterns) what the MOQ rejects as its
> opening move. But of course with the elderly Pirsig introducing ideas
> you are justified. As said the MOQ must be the strangest case ever: A
> thinker starting out with a revolutionary system and then abandoning
> its  revolutionary part. to get inside academy.  See what he got, a
> whole lot of of thinkers "saying the same" only better.


Perhaps my mental picture of this process is skewed, but I see an exciting
opportunity to flesh out fully the philosophical implications of a Quality
Metaphysics in the dialogic commons, and the shotgun approach is always
guaranteed to get some pellets in the target.

We can't all be Annie Oakley.


>
>
> > "The second of James' two main systems of philosophy, which he
> > said was independent of pragmatism, was his radical empiricism.
> > By this he meant that subjects and objects are not the starting
> > points of experience. Subjects and objects are secondary.
> > They are concepts derived from something more fundamental
> > which he described as 'the immediate flux of life which
> > furnishes the material to our later reflection with its
> > conceptual categories.'
>
> Right, the subject/object "aggregate" is DQ's first static "fallout" (in
> ZAMM) but there's nothing about these being secondary due to their
> being concepts. Jesus, what's not conceptual if we enter THAT as an
> issue? How can DQ be kept out of the conceptual vortex except
> James (and  the elderly Pirsig) saying so ... by use of language. Don't
> be outright stupid! Language must be kept out of any philosophy lest it
> ends in absurdity.
>


Well one doesn't need to be ANY sort of Annie Oakley to take a potshot at
that last statement.  How the heck do you talk about keeping language out of
philosophy?   Talk about absurd.   If you ask me, what we need around here,
besides a good disambiguation of "value"  is a good definition of "concept".


Reality is a concept.  Concepts are part of reality.  The Jamesian
proposition that the two are ALWAYS discontinuous is of little intellectual
Quality,  In my opinion.  And I don't say "humble" opinion because I am
nothing but a humble woodcutter and all my opinions are humble.

John