[MD] in defence of the "relative"
Ham Priday
hampday1 at verizon.net
Fri Nov 13 13:41:34 PST 2009
Hey, John --
[Ham, previously]:
> I didn't say "difference" was the fundamental reality, but only that
> it is the "primary characteristic" of existence.
[John]:
> Oh, I see. A man who is careful with his word. I like that.
> Except now I'll have to think hard about the difference
> (or my preference) between "primary characteristic of existence"
> and "fundamental reality"; after all, fundaments and primarys
> both mean "first things" and "existence" and "reality" are also
> very similar so it's not an easy task to untangle them
> from each other to see what you mean.
[Ham]:
> There must be difference in order to have a preference.
[John]:
> However, you must have a pre-thought out preference first in order
> to see the difference. Differences are not all that fundamental.
> For instance, I don't see a difference between existence and reality,
> but you, evidently do. Thus your preferences dictate the differences you
> see.
Let me try to make this difference clearer for you, John.
All that we know is derived from experience, and the mode of experience is
differential (i.e., relational) in nature. Therefore, difference is primary
to being-aware. The primary relation is one between value-sensibility and
otherness (objective reality). However, neither the self (subject) nor its
existence is "fundamental". What is fundamental is the Uncreated Source,
whose Value is what we sense.
When we talk about Creation -- the created universe, becoming aware,
space/time experience, and value preferences -- we are describing this
relational system called "existence". Since our knowledge and understanding
of existence is derived from experience, reality for us is empirical rather
than metaphysical.
Philosophers who seek understanding beyond empirical reality apply logic,
intuition and sensibility to the challenge of coming up with a metaphysics
of "ultimate Reality." It is not sufficient to simply posit "Source",
"God", "Creator", "Goodness", "Spirit", etc., as a metaphysical reality. A
metaphysical thesis must provide a paradigm for the epistemology of
creation, including the origin of difference and awareness, as well as
(ideally) the purpose or meaning of existence.
I name the unknowable primary source "Essence". Rather than attempt to
describe the ineffable, I follow the tradition of Occam's razor which states
that the simplest answer is preferred, that "entities should not be
multiplied unnecessarily." Thus, there is no reason to assume a "cause" for
Essence, nor impute to it any condition of existential reality, such as
beingness, differentiation, evolution, or relations. (Although some have
charged that I'm defining "nothingness"; I'm actually naming the antithesis
of nothingness in the Eckhartian sense of "absolute IS-ness") Any perceived
"other", then, is a "reducted? appearance" of the absolute Source or its
Value relative to the subject. This is why the material world is often
described as existing in the shadow of illusion.
There's more to this philosophy, of course, but you'll have to read my
Creation thesis at www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm#Essence because it's
too involved to post here.
> Values Relativism! Danger! Danger! Danger! I'd say rather that
> individuals are relative to the values which define them. This is usually
> where we part ways, Ham. I say Value is absolute and you say the
> individual is. That pretty much sums up the conflict between the Moq
> and SOM, eh?
No, John; I do not say the individual is absolute. The individual is
literally nothingness (a 'negate') whose existence is supported only by the
being-aware dichotomy. Like it or not, I can only repeat what I said at the
outset of this discussion: Existence is a relational system of appearances.
Each experience (appearance) is differentiated from, and relative to, every
other. Each self relates to every other self. We are all relativists.
Absolute Essence is the only entity that knows no other.
Thanks for the opportunity to state my opinion.
Best regards,
Ham
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