[MD] suspended in language

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Ron,

Matt said:
My short re-coloring of the situation (leaving correct 
interpretation of Pirsig to the side) is that: 1) some of the 
classical pragmatists some of the time would have agreed 
with you about "pre-intellectual or raw experience" as an 
"arbiter," but not all of the time and 2) there is still 
disagreement today about just what role "raw experience" 
plays for pragmatism, but the brand of pragmatism that I 
like (exemplified by Rorty and Stout) doesn't think there 
_is_ a "spectre of bias and prejudice" and so we need no 
arbiter.  I think this "spectre" you speak of is the same 
Platonic scarecrow I spoke of.  That's the short thought.

Ron said:
My own short thought is that it may be something 
unavoidable If thats what you mean.

Matt:
The odd thing in a debate between the two us, I take it, 
is that you don't think the "spectre of bias and prejudice" 
is avoidable, whereas I agree that bias and prejudice is 
unavoidable, but I also don't know why we are calling it a 
"spectre," or even pejorative terms like "bias" and 
"prejudice."  All I think unavoidable biases and prejudices 
are are, as I called them in a post to Marsha, sets of 
considerations.  The Platonic bit, so goes this train of 
thought, is not the unavoidable part, but dressing it up as 
a "spectre" (and thinking there's an "arbiter").

Ron said:
my reading has been limited to James in relation to his 
Pragmatic method.  I probably need to do some heavy 
reading of Rorty Dewey and Royce to meet you on your 
own understanding so perhaps talking about my opinions 
is an underdeveloped effort on my part, I am certainly 
open to being schooled on the subject. 

Matt:
Well, let's not go crazy--you're assuming you _need_ to 
meet me on my own understanding, when mine is just as 
underdeveloped as anyone's.  Rorty's _my_ spirit-father, 
but he's one of a number of late 20th century pragmatists 
(like Hilary Putnam, Richard Bernstein, John McDermott, 
Morton White, Sidney Hook).

If I were going to make recommendations, I would--over 
John Carl's protests--bump Royce from the reading list in 
favor of Santayana (given we're already peremptorily 
bumping Peirce, which I don't feel too bad about).  If 
you're going to read Royce, try the Spirit of Modern 
Philosophy rather than the World and the Individual.  I 
personally find it easier to understand systematic 
philosophers when they are telling stories about the 
history of philosophy--it at least gives you a third partner 
(the "history of philosophy") in which to figure out what 
their jargon could possibly mean to you.  Santayana: 
Character and Opinion of the United States is a 
tremendous feat of life philosophy.

With James and Dewey and classical pragmatism's 
relationship to Pirsig, there are two stratified opinions on 
where the center of gravity is in them: me and DMB.  To 
not unduly weight my suggestions, I can suggest what 
DMB might recommend, too.  The basic difference with 
respect to James is that I think the center of gravity is in 
earlier James rather than later: I prefer the Will to Believe 
and Pragmatism, whereas I think Dave would commend a 
Pluralistic Universe and Essays in Radical Empiricism.  With 
Dewey, Dave I think would center him in Experience and 
Nature, whereas I would commend above all the Quest for 
Certainty, and also Reconstruction in Philosophy and 
Human Nature and Conduct.  The latter of which, 
considering you were wondering about social justifications 
and the like, has a series of sections like:

Part One - The Place of Habit in Conduct
sec. 4: Custom and Habit (Human psychology is social; 
habit is conservative; mind and body)
sec. 5: Custom and Morality (Customs as standards; 
authority of standards; class conflicts)
sec. 6: Habit and Social Psychology (Isolation of 
individuality; newer movements)
Part Two - The Place of Impulse in Conduct
sec. 1: Impulses and Change of Habits (Present interest 
in instincts; impulses as re-organizing)
sec. 2: Placticity of Impulse (Impulse and education; 
uprush of impulse; fixed codes)
sec. 3: Changing Human Nature (Habits the inert factor; 
modification of impulses; war as social function; economic 
regimes as social products; nature of motives)
sec. 4: Impulse and Conflicts of Habit (Possibility of social 
betterment; conservatism)

Ron said:
I guess to be more precise, what I have read of 
Pragmatism has been more an explaination of meaning. 
While I tend to understand Pirsig as having certain 
justifications for particular types of meaning. If I'm that far 
off base, than I have a way to go in understanding 
Pragmatism more comprehensivly.

Matt:
James' Pragmatism might be usefully reduced to an 
extended meditation on how humanity generates meaning, 
including appropriate digs at the "tradition of philosophy" for 
coming up with bad descriptions of that process.  But I'm 
not sure why that might preclude James, or a pragmatist in 
general who did give such an explanation (does not Pirsig 
give one?), from making "justifications for particular types 
of meaning."

Matt
 		 	   		  
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