[MD] Natural Law

[John Carl]

Steve:
> The Euthyphro Dilemma comes to mind. Should we go in the direction
> evolution seems to be pulling because it is good, or do we call the
> direction good because that is the way evolution is pulling?
>

John:

I don't see the dilemma, Steve.  Aren't the two options functionally the
same?

I take two fundamentals and work from there. Choice/Quality.  Either is
meaningless without the other, so that's a given duality in my book.

Now, take any given ethical dilemma, and according to these fundamentals I
posit, I have a choice, and there is a better one.  I can move away from the
vector, or toward it.  If I want to make the right choice, but I make a
mistake and choose the wrong one, well...

"There's still time to change direction on the road you're on."  The urge of
the moral compass that nudges us back in the good direction, if we choose to
heed it.





> > John:
> > What you seem to be saying, Steve, is that Quality is valueless without
> > intersubjective agreement.
>
>
>
> Steve:
> What I am saying is that "Both are moral arguments. Both [Arlo and
> Platt] can claim the MOQ for support."
>

John:

But there are some points upon which both Platt and Arlo would agree.  The
fact of their dialogic combat,  lends more credence to their agreements than
would occur if Arlo were a mere  follower of Platt. Or vice versa.

However, the fact of conflict within the MoQ, does not obviate the use of
the MoQ to deduce morality.  It's a process, Steve.



 John:

> > I see Pirsig offering exactly what I define.  A way of playing the game,
> > with hope of a goal.  Rather than just randomly running around in a field
> > without lines.  It takes people to play, and they have to be in
> opposition.
> > It doesn't work when all are going "ommmm" in harmonic perfection all the
> > time.
>
> Steve:
> But Pirsig says that the MOQ has no teleology. It doesn't say which
> side of any moral conflict _ought_ to win. It just helps us better
> understand the conflict in terms of different types of value patterns.
>
>
John:

Part of that I label "process" is working these things out.  Given two
conflicting patterns, the one that is more moral is the one that satisfies
on different levels simultaneously.  Pirsig didn't say that, but it's
obvious, eh?  A social pattern that allows the most intellectual freedom,
while supporting the highest biological good (biological good is not an
individual good, but an environmental good -- biodiversity) is the most
moral social pattern.  The one with the least inter-level conflict "wins'.

And of course, what these might look like, and how they relate, are matters
of debate.  But that's what we're here for!




>
> > John:
> > Yes, I agree.  When the field of play is intellectual formulation, the
> > goalposts are infinitely distant.  BUT there is a direction.  The field
> of
> > play provides a context, a way of knowing whether you are relatively
> closer
> > or more distant than an other.  Sometimes it's not real obvious, because
> you
> > are both real close.  And the roaring of the crowd might confuse one or
> the
> > other, because from the crowd's static position on the sidelines, your
> > opponent has inched ahead of you.  But they could be wrong in this.  And
> > even if right, keep racing, racing, racing and you'll catch up and surge
> > ahead.
> >
> > Because you know which way to run.
> >
> > See how knowing which way to run, by defining a field of play, is
> > pragmatically useful to actually getting somewhere?
>
>
> Steve:
> I don't think the MOQ tells us which way to run except for the
> hypothetical "all things being equal" scenario where we ought to favor
> the more dynamic. (When are all things equal????) As Pirsig pointed
> out. Even in cases where a social pattern runs up against an
> intellectual pattern, we can't always say that the intellectual
> pattern ought to always win since we are on that boat I mentioned...
>

John:

Well I do agree that there is no rigid system which automatically hands us
answers on a plattitudinous platter.  Early on I stated that sometimes it IS
more moral for a germ to kill a doctor.  If it's Dr. Mengele!   But that's
not the normal case.

Intellectual tools must be wielded with care.  If you don't have caring, you
won't get Quality.  Dialogue, debate, openess to other viewpoints, I see as
key to the process of divining morality.  An expert mechanic can do more
good with a crappy wrench, than a crappy mechanic can do with an expensive
wrench.




> "We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship
> but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is
> taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest
> of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams
> and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by
> gradual reconstruction."
>
> Social patterns support intellectual patterns, so to undermine a
> social pattern may be to lose support for intellectual patterns even
> though the intellectual pattern in question is considered to be on a
> higher moral level than the social pattern in question. Reconstruction
> (evolution of static patterns of value toward undefined betterness)
> has to be gradual enough so as not to sink the ship.
>
>

John:

Well said by a good mechanic, wielding a quality tool.

Yay Steve.