[MD] Waving goodbye to particles

[John Carl]

I'm gonna try and boil this down to the most essential points of contention,
Arlo.  And focus on them. For like I said previous, I think it's a crucial
discussion and germane to other issues on MD.

For if the MoQ is primarily artifactual in nature, as you claim, then there
is a good reason for those voices of rejection and disappointment that have
been heard on this list.  As a given metaphysical system, it has holes, I'm
sure.  Ask Ham.  He knows better than me.

But if it is primarily processional in nature, as I claim, then it's
weaknesses and inadequacies are open invitations to improve it, to make it
better and to actively keep it evolving. And thus, in a way, even its
strenght.   Other than the fundamental existence of Value,  I think this is
the most important point of the MoQ.

On Wed, Aug 11, 2010 at 10:45 AM, Arlo Bensinger <ajb102 at psu.edu> wrote:

> [John]
>
> But my point then about the MoQ being specifically open-ended and receptive
> to evolution, means that it explicitly leans toward the process/DQ aspects,
> rather than the SQ/artifact side.
>
> [Arlo]
> My greater points are that (1) ALL intellectual patterns are equally
> dynamic, they are ALL evolving dialogically, (2) the voice of the author
> does not hinder this, but it encourages it, (3) the ideas expressed in
> Pirsig's metaphysics are stable patterns emanating from the wake of, call
> it, "metaphysicing".
>


(1)  That's the equivalent of saying that all intellectual patterns are
equally valuable.  That's the same thing as saying value is value-less.  If
you really believe this, you've been handed too many memos ordering you to
go along with the "i'm unique, you're unique, we're all unique together"
school of affirmation for everybody.

(2)  The voice of the author has many functions, some helpful, some
hindrance.  It's a tricky job, but don't worry, you don't have to do it.

(3) Call it metaphysicing?  Let's not.  You did get the memo on kludge, I
know.

But more to the point, there is probably no such thing in the whole world as
a truly "stable" pattern.  And this is even moreso with intellectual
patterns.  But there is a formation of a growing pattern, that is dynamic,
and yet continues the pattern started, but is changing and evolving.   More
than ripples expanding on a pond, more like seeds growing into trees.  In a
way, that's a very stable change, but it's also dynamic.  There's nothing
more stable than a tree.  Yet a tree is way more than a big seed.

The evolutionary growth of intellectual patterns, develops quite slowly at
times, to our human eyes.  Royce famously said that it might take a thousand
years to completely understand a philosopher's thought, in the height of his
powers and concentration.  And the thought that all philosophy is a footnote
to Plato, illustrates at least how long-reaching and far-going these trees
of thoughts can grow.

So I think it's pragmatically more useful to think of a tree as an artifact,
and the MoQ as a process.  And I certainly don't agree that other
metaphysical systems are equally open-ended to their own evolutionary
growth.  In fact, I think that's somewhat rare.  Science is like that, but
only because it doesn't question its own metaphysical underpinnings much.



> If we see the overall "activity towards Quality", or the "pursuit of
> Quality", as the active context/process for receptiveness to DQ, then the
> ideas that emanate from this are stable patterns of value.
>


Yes, that scans right to me.  The pursuit of Quality leaves ideas in its
wake, that are stable patterns of value.  Tho, like I say, stable in the way
a tree is stable, yet growing.   Not truly static and unyeilding.  The
simple facts of meaning require all patterns to be in a kind of intellectual
flux which is generated in conversation and interpretation, all the time.
 There is no ultimately fundamental way to force or capture meaning.




> When we talk about "levels", or even the ideas of "Dynamic Quality and
> static quality", or the relationship of the levels, or any of these "ideas",
> we are engaged in a process informed by these stable value patterns.
>
> I'm sorry, John, I really think you are confusing the "metaphysics" with
> the "Quality" it seeks to describe.




Heck, no apology needed Arlo.  That's the gist of my point.  We have the
opportunity to get clarity in conversation.

I understand that the metaphysics of Quality assures me that my quest is
meaningful - that Quality is real.  There is a way to access betterness in
the moment through realization and conversation.  It's by no means an
automatic process, but like most things in life, the effort and care you put
into it reflects the quality you extract.  Or, the love you take is equal to
the love you make, in lennon/mccartney terminology.

That's my metaphysics OF Quality.    A metaphysics is a definition, and
Quality is defined only in experience, not words.  I think I've got it
pretty straight.

But a metaphysics is sometimes more than a mere definition.  The MoQ is such
an one.  It's not just an intellectual exercise, but claim to try and do
more than merely be a correct artifact in philosophological academe.  The
MoQ is also about saving the world from SOM, - a reactionary movement away
from the predominant paradigm, that tries to steer a clear middle way
between overly-intellectualized complications, and eastern mumbo-jumbo
mystic brou-hah-ha.

And help you with cuts of meat and motorcycle maintenance a bit too.

Not an artifact.  A process.  A tool.




> Or perhaps the "ideas" Pirsig developed with the act of "thinking" in the
> first place. Its "The Metaphysics (SQ) of Quality (DQ)" (in this sense). The
> ideas expressed that form the structure of the metaphysical system are
> "stable patterns of value" emanating from Pirsig's pursuit of Quality (DQ).
>
> These stable value patterns are never fixed, whether you are talking
> Pirsig, Peirce or Poincare, and in turn inform and shape the ongoing pursuit
> of Quality.
>
> [John]
>
> These terms illustrate my point about the most apt label for what you term
> "stable pattern of values"  And I really wonder at that "stability".
>
> [Arlo]
> Well I think there is stability or else we would not even be here talking
> about this. By its very definition, it continues to "persist" (in some form)
> and so it has stability. This does not mean "it" is not evolving (and by
> "it" I mean the body of thinking related to Pirsig's Quality thesis), but
> let's be appreciative it HAS stability, or else you would never of even
> heard of Pirsig.
>
>

John:

Well when I clarify stable to include organically growing, then I'm in
agreement with you.  So I don't think we'll need to argue that one.



> [John]
>
> I think if we take the MoQ as an artifact, it's failings, as Krimel and
> Dave T have pointed out (and Bo, for that matter) outweigh it's strengths.
>
> [Arlo]
> I think we take the ideas expressed by Pirsig and others as patterns of
> value and make them part of our active process of (in the case of this
> forum) building a better and better description/definition/analysis of
> "Quality".



John:

I disagree.  We don't really focus on Quality, we focus on metaphysics.  We
focus, quite rightly, on definitions of Quality and treat them as such.  Not
Quality itself.  our metaphysics OF Quality.  We use an understanding of the
existence of Quality, as our conversational fundamental, which is a really
big help.  I mean, how many philosophical systems even get out of the
quagmire of "relative vs absolute value"?  But we don't talk about it.  We
just use it to talk about our metaphysics of it.

clever us.



> For example, the idea of "the levels", a way of dividing SQ as I-B-S-I, is
> a pattern of value that has high quality here (I rarely see people coming up
> with other hierarchies, sometimes extending, sure, but I'd say everyone here
> with few exception holds this "idea" as high-quality) and hence it has a lot
> of "stability".
>
> I really don't think anyone here, unless I have misunderstood them, is
> arguing that Pirsig's metaphysical speculations should be treated as Holy
> Writ. What some of us DO say is that evolution is IMPROVED by clarity, and
> (as Matt has said, if I understood) that knowing precisely what your
> interlocutor is saying is the best foundation for an evolving dialogue.
>
>
Well... This is actually the recursion problem, when you dig into it.
 Because Pirsig did write an awful lot of words explaining what he meant,
and if he needs to write some more words, explaining what his explanation
meant, or anybody else needs to explain what he meant, then he or someone
else is gonna have to write some more words to explain what the explanation
of his explanation meant.

See where this is going?  Nowhere good, that's for sure.

I don't see where the "interlocuter" in this case needs much clarification,
actually.   There are things that Pirsig said that I disagree with, but I'm
sure there are things Pirsig said that Pirsig disagrees with.  I mean,
there's tons of stuff I've said that I disagree with, and I'm not even sure
if I completely agree with what I'm typing right now.

The process....

is endless.

open-ended.  And infinite.

And that's a good thing, lest any mind be encapsulated in a prison of words
and meanings.




> We seem to disagree on the "Papal Bull" issue, and I think you are (as Matt
> mentions in his essay) selling the community short. I want to know exactly
> what Pirsig thinks, not so I can uncritically repeat his words as "Truth",
> but so I know exactly where I disagree and agree and can formulate a precise
> response to his ideas.


You can do that now, Arlo.  In fact you do.  All the time.  You just don't
seem to realize it, for some reason.  You don't need more words from Pirsig.
 You need more realization from inside yourself.  But honestly, the man
wrote tons and tons.  Most people with jobs don't have time to go over it
all.  Why do you think more words would be helpful?  What is it you want?

I'm slow-owly working my way through the Copleston Annotations right now
myself.  But heck, grab a copy of Lila's child.  I don't know how much more
"Exactly what he thinks" you can get.  If you can't formulate a precise
response to the many ideas he's already expressed and communicated, how do
you think more are going to help?




> If Pirsig "could mean" this, or "could mean" that, or "maybe could be
> interpreted to be saying" something else, then how on earth am I supposed to
> know if I agree with him or not. The dialogue ENDS because no one can ever
> be sure what the other person is really saying.
>
>

Pirsig is a joy to read, and clear thinker and communicator.  The places
where he's not sure of himself, he expresses this.  His equivocation on the
issue of where to draw the line between social and intellectual, for
instance, he offers as "well, it seems to me" way that let you know the goal
here isn't to neatly slice and dice and define the cosmos so you can test
your pupils on friday, but to show how to think about reality in a way that
yields better intellectual patterns over time.

The dialogue usually doesn't end when we are unsure of what the other person
is saying.  Just the opposite in fact.  Once there's total agreement,
there's not much left to say.




> And now we are back to my comments on how this turns the entire dialogue
> into an interpretive discussion rather than a evolving field of ideas. I
> WANT Pirsig to clarify his ideas about the sociality of non-human species,
> so that I can either better argue with him, or extend him thoughts, or
> contextualize them, or whatever. Not so I can blindly accept his word as
> truth. As it is, now all we can do is argue whether or not he "meant" this,
> or whether or not "he'd agree". This is Bo's endless morass that has him
> claiming Pirsig is a "weak interpreter" of his pre-hospitalized self. I
> mean, if that does not represent the lowest form this dialogue can take, I
> don't know what does.
>
>

So let's drop it then.  Let's not talk about what Pirsig said.  Let's talk
about what is the best way of saying it ourselves.

But for now, I've said enough.

Thanks for the dialogue, Arlo.  You've made me think.

John