[MD] Consciousness & Moq.

Fri Aug 20 14:37:24 PDT 2010

http://discovermagazine.com/2009/feb/13-is-quantum-mechanics-controlling-your-thoughts
good article to read


2010/8/20 David Thomas <combinedefforts at earthlink.net>

> The idea for this thread started with my question here:
>
> > [Dave in Theocracy, Secularism, and Democracy]
> >DMB,
>
> > As sarcastic and mean-spirited as we both can be, I have a real question
> for
> > you? And don't take this the wrong way. Since you are one of keepers of
> the
> > semi-official party line translation of Pirsig's work, "What about
> > consciousness?"  I'm just starting David Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind".
> > A brief word search of both of RMP's works seems to indicate that he
> takes
> > it a given and with his resolution of the mind/body problem he solves
> "the
> > problem of consciousness" Even though I'm only 4 pages into the book I
> can
> > tell that Chalmers would disagree, immediately and vigorously, that RMP's
> > approach just sweeps it under the rug.
> >
> > Think on it and later on maybe we can try to discuss it semi-civically in
> a
> > separate thread.
> >
> > Dave
>
> And then in what has to be some weird yet undiagnosed Freudian suppression
> of past sexual abuses David Buchanan is unable to now talk directly to me
> but channels Steve:
>
> > Steve said to dmb:
> > ... I have a real question for you?  "What about consciousness?"  ...
> "the
> > problem of consciousness" ... RMP's approach just sweeps it under the
> rug.
> >
> >
> > dmb says:
> > Not sure you've asked an actual question here. What is the problem of
> > consciousness, exactly? What's being swept under the rug by RMP's
> approach?
> >
> > But let me remind you that James' Essays in Radical Empiricism basically
> > consists of two central essays and all the rest are expansions and
> > qualifications of those two main essays. One of them is titled "Does
> > Consciousness Exist?" and in it James answers "no", not if you mean a
> thing,
> > an entity that has the thoughts. There is no Cartesian self, no mental
> > substance. And then you see how subjects and objects are demoted from
> primary
> > ontological categories to secondary concepts at the end of chapter 29 in
> Lila.
> > As you're reading Chalmers ask yourself if he's operating with the
> > subject-object metaphysical assumptions. Do you think you could spot such
> a
> > thing? It'll probably mean reading between the lines just because
> assumptions
> > are like that. They tend to go without saying. If anyone is likely to be
> > explicit about such a thing, it'll be a philosopher. But still.
> >
> > By the time James was all pumped up about radical empiricism in 1904 and
> 1905,
> > a period of explosive creativity for James, he was also very excited
> about a
> > philosophical wild man named Gustav Fechner. (Krimel is gonna love this.)
> An
> > idea of his that James found very appealing was "the view that the entire
> > material universe, instead of being dead, is inwardly alive and
> consciously
> > animated ..in diverse spans and wavelengths, inclusions and
> envelopments".
> > This isn't too far from the MOQish notion that the laws of physics are
> better
> > conceived as patterns of preference. Even the physical is inwardly alive
> and
> > consciously animated to some extent. The "its" count as one of the spans
> and
> > wavelengths in this living universe. As James himself put it, "..it is
> easy to
> > believe that consciousness or inner experience never originated, or
> developed,
> > out of the unconscious, but that it and the physical universe are
> co-eternal
> > aspects of one self-same reality, much as concave and convex are
> >  aspects of one curve."
> >
> > You see what these guys are saying?
> >
> > If you're a scientific materialist and you hear James explain that
> > consciousness as an entity, as a Cartesian self, does not exists, you're
> > likely to take James as being somewhere in the brain-mind identity camp.
> You'd
> > think there is no such thing as consciousness per se because the mind is
> just
> > what the brain does, more or less. Most people in this camp will back off
> just
> > a bit and make some qualification, but that's the basic idea. But when
> you
> > read this Fechner-inspired stuff you realize that James had a whole
> different
> > deal in mind. Instead of thinking that the mental is a product of the
> > physiological, which is a product of the physical, you see that it's more
> like
> > the physical and the mental have grown up and evolved together as two
> aspects
> > of the One. In fact, James's biographer, Robert Richardson, says the
> quote
> > above is the best statement about the many and the One that James ever
> > produced (page 447).
> >
> > Now think about that pithy little radically empirical slogan. Experience
> and
> > reality amount to the same thing.
> >
> > Hmmmm. Consciousness. Maybe I'll give it some thought.
> >
> > What was the question? Can you state it very specifically?
>
> Which then jumps to this:
>
> > [Krimel]
> > Thanks for this grab bag of illustrations.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #1: The one size fits all explanation...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [Steve asks dmb a question
> > ... I have a real question for you?  "What about consciousness?"  ...
> "the
> > problem of consciousness" ... RMP's approach just sweeps it under the
> rug.
> >
> > [dmb responds:]
> > Not sure you've asked an actual question here. What is the problem of
> > consciousness, exactly? What's being swept under the rug by RMP's
> approach?
> >
> > But let me remind you that James' Essays in Radical Empiricism...
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > There it is. The answer to every question. The wielding of the only tool
> in
> > Dave's tool box.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #2: The steel trap mind slamming shut...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > As you're reading Chalmers ask yourself if he's operating with the
> > subject-object metaphysical assumptions. Do you think you could spot such
> a
> > thing? It'll probably mean reading between the lines just because
> > assumptions are like that. They tend to go without saying. If anyone is
> > likely to be explicit about such a thing, it'll be a philosopher. But
> still.
> >
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > It is hard to see how anyone interested in the idea of consciousness
> could
> > ignore or dismiss Chalmers but for dmb it's not a problem. Rather than
> > engage the issues raise he slaps on the label: SOM and "Presto" no need
> to
> > read, no need to engage the issue, time to just sit back and feel self
> > righteous.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #3: Appeal to authorities then embarrass them...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > By the time James was all pumped up about radical empiricism in 1904 and
> > 1905, a period of explosive creativity for James, he was also very
> excited
> > about a philosophical wild man named Gustav Fechner.
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > Here we see dmb's sense of history mangled. James talks extensively about
> > Fechner in his Principles of Psychology because Fechner was among the
> first
> > and best at trying to quantify the senses. James got "all pumped up" to
> > write and introduction to Fechner's pamphlet "The Little Book of Life
> After
> > Death" originally published in 1836 under a pseudonym. I think it would
> be
> > difficult to find thinkers from the 19th century able to divorce
> themselves
> > from animistic, spiritualist thinking. Surely at a century and a half's
> > remove we ought to be able to forgive them. But dmb instead prefers to
> cite
> > them as justification for a continuing adherence to these quaint
> > misconceptions.
> >
> > Holding Fechner and James up as giving authority to animism and
> spiritualism
> > does them both a disservice. It assumes that those positions are
> unaffected
> > by a century of research and discourse. More knowledge of the physiology,
> > cause and effects, and abstract metaphysical thinking on and about the
> brain
> > and consciousness have take place in the past 25 years that in the whole
> > span of history leading up to Fechner and James' time. It insults them
> both
> > to think that their idea are unaffected by this progress.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #4: Letting the bathwater leak in through the backdoor...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > This isn't too far from the MOQish notion that the laws of physics are
> > better conceived as patterns of preference. Even the physical is inwardly
> > alive and consciously animated to some extent. The "its" count as one of
> the
> > spans and wavelengths in this living universe.
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > Rather than altering our notions of "preference" to include a
> probabilistic
> > view of causality; dmb sees Pirsig retreating into this kind of spiritual
> > animism.
> >
> > It has is an ongoing mystery how one can make a claim for a universe that
> is
> > "...inwardly alive and consciously animated" and yet deny that one's
> > position is not supernatural, even theistic. I'm not even sure that stuff
> > qualities as bathwater. After you stuff a towel under the back drop why
> > don't you try shaking the handle?
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #5: The bumper sticker grab bag...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > You see what these guys are saying?
> >
> > If you're a scientific materialist and you hear James explain that
> > consciousness as an entity, as a Cartesian self, does not exists, you're
> > likely to take James as being somewhere in the brain-mind identity camp.
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > No need to engage a different point of view when you can cover your lack
> of
> > breadth and depth with slogans and strawmen. Since dmb engagement with
> > intellectual activity is stunted in the 19th century, the materialist
> > strawman is a Newtonian projection. Although it went up in flames at
> least
> > by the middle of the 20th century it lives for dmb as a kind of fantasy
> > whipping boy.
> >
> > Note also the second example of the bumper sticker approach: "brain-mind
> > identity camp" as though in this label we find a clearly defined group of
> > the slack jawed, oblivious to dmb's keen and exhaustive insights.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustation #6: Spinning to blur distinctions...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > You'd think there is no such thing as consciousness per se because the
> mind
> > is just what the brain does, more or less. Most people in this camp will
> > back off just a bit and make some qualification, but that's the basic
> idea.
> > But when you read this Fechner-inspired stuff you realize that James had
> a
> > whole different deal in mind. Instead of thinking that the mental is a
> > product of the physiological, which is a product of the physical, you see
> > that it's more like the physical and the mental have grown up and evolved
> > together as two aspects of the One. In fact, James's biographer, Robert
> > Richardson, says the quote above is the best statement about the many and
> > the One that James ever produced (page 447).
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > Here again we see the strawmen but some are willing to "back off" if
> "just a
> > bit" no doubt intimidated by the imagined power of dmb's keen
> observations.
> > Unfortunately dmb offers no actual attack on this position just a
> > perfunctory dismissal and retreat into the 19th century. After all, if
> one
> > were to venture into the 21st century it would be really hard to muster
> > enough strawmen on this subject to matter.
> >
> > "The mind is what the brain does..." of course it is and mostly"more"
> rather
> > than "less". The "mind," whatever that is supposed to be, is the outcome
> of
> > the process of the nervous system's engagement with the environment. It
> > takes the sensory input Fechner so painstaking detailed and converts it
> into
> > thought and action. If "consciousness" is a process then the brain is the
> > processor. It is the dismissal of this notion that demands some kind of
> > sustained defense in the 21st century.
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration # 1 redeux: The short form...
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > Now think about that pithy little radically empirical slogan. Experience
> and
> > reality amount to the same thing.
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > Bullshit lite: Less tedium but still impossible to swallow.
> >
> > It might actually be meaningful to say "Experience and one's conception
> of
> > reality amount to the same thing."
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > Illustration #7: The clever signoff or "The Illusion of Cool..."
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [dmb]
> > Hmmmm. Consciousness. Maybe I'll give it some thought.
> >
> > What was the question? Can you state it very specifically?
> >
> > [Krimel]
> > I picture him saying this while polishing his Foster Grant wraparounds
> > simultaneously grinding a Marlboro filter beneath his Chuck Taylors;
> > Bohemian ironic affections trapping him in the amber of the 50s. Refusing
> > the new millennium and feeling really good about it after all color TV is
> > just a fad.
> >
> > Thanks Dave, a truly enlightening post.
> >
> I hope you're not thanking me. I just here in the middle wondering what the
> hell just happened.
>
> I just asked a very simple question of DMB, "What about consciousness?"
>
> Which of course is an insult to "philosophers" who like everything spelled
> out in precise sentences so that they can avoid the question by attacking
> its lack of logical coherence, syntax, grammar, misspelling, anything but
> address the issue. Or maybe the author I mentioned was on his university's
> banned books list and he didn't want to be burned at the stake, I don't
> know.
>
> In his two fictional biographies, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
> Maintenance" and "Lila" author Robert M Pirsig tries to develop a
> metaphysical system based on Quality. This attempt takes its final form in
> Lila and where Pirsig calls it " The Metaphysics of Quality."
>
> Based on what Pirsig calls "MoQ", What commentary, analysis, or conclusions
> does he make about "consciousness" or "conscious experience"?  Is he right?
> How do you know?
>
> I specialize in unconsciousness and have no idea what the other might be so
> have at it.
>
> Dave
>
>
>
>
>
>
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