[MD] Consciousness & Moq.

[Krimel]

Dave and dmb,
I am not ready to call Randi yet, but this is pretty close to some kind ESP,
X-Files thingy. I was just thinking of tracing out the sequence of dmb
comments on Chalmers via my conversations with him. But I was also thinking
it would be a total waste of time. So I would like to thank you my psychic
pen pal for wasting your time. 

Just to expand on what you have so artfully layed out: 

As I recall dmb advised caution in your reading the SOMist Chalmers. Then he
reads a few wikis and starts commenting on how nice Chalmers looks in the
right light. 

Before you know it Chalmers has dmb in the backseat and is about steal third
base. 

dmb shot me this about an hour ago: "But it's actually quite audacious of
you to suggest that I need to get as hip as you to Chalmers because he's a
very serious opponent of your view."

Chalmers is rounding third heading for home...

Then I see this in dmb's wiki: 

"Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the
subjective, and criticizes physical explanations of mental experience,
making him a dualist."

All I could think was when dmb wakes up Chalmers is going to look coyote
ugly.

In light of dmb's critique of my choices I find it odd that he chose this
fiasco from the menu of issues I presented him. 

I don't know but I heard arm tastes like chicken, that true dmb?

Krimel

p.s. Dave, yeah, I saw the pattern.

----------------------------------------------

Y'all

See a pattern here:

>> Aug 19 [Dave] 
>> "What about consciousness?"  I'm just starting David Chalmers, "The
Conscious
>> Mind"............
>> A brief word search of both of RMP's works seems to indicate that he
takes
>> it as given and with his resolution of the mind/body problem he solves
"the
>> problem of consciousness"

> Aug 19 dmb responds:
> Not sure you've asked an actual question here. What is the problem of
> consciousness, exactly? What's being swept under the rug by RMP's
approach?
> But let me remind you that James' Essays in Radical Empiricism basically
> consists of two central essays and all the rest are expansions and
> qualifications of those two main essays. One of them is titled "Does
> Consciousness Exist?" and in it James answers "no", not if you mean a
thing,
> an entity that has the thoughts.....
> Hmmmm. Consciousness. Maybe I'll give it some thought.
> What was the question? Can you state it very specifically?

>> Aug 19 Dave restates question
>> Based on what Pirsig calls "MoQ", What commentary, analysis, or
conclusions
>> does he make about "consciousness" or "conscious experience"?

>> Aug 20 Dave said to dmb:
>> Brush up on your "supervenience." what the hell ever that is, it is a big
>>deal  to Chalmers.  ...A clue, supervenience is a kind of dependency
>>relationship.....

>Aug 21 dmb says:
> Yea, I know. This is one of the terms used by those who don't want to go
all
> the way in saying that the brain and the mind are identical. One such
>position, barely distinguishable from the brain-mind identity theory is
known
as "eliminative materialism"....
>I think the MOQ is at odds with this view in a pretty big way.

> Aug 22 dmb says:
> Well, obviously I'm saying that James and Pirsig are both radical
empiricists
> and they both reject the traditional conception of consciousness for the
same
> reasons. James and Pirsig say the same thing. I'm just adding details that
> aren't included in Lila because you supposedly already read that.

>Aug 23 DMB
> But SOM is also Pirsig's version of the long standing mind/body dualism
> debate wherein mental substance and physical substance are two irreducible
> forms of "stuff" which mysteriously interact but are not dependant on each
> other. Pirsig is ultimately always talking about how each of us has and
> makes sense of our individual experience. It is pure phenomenology.

>> Aug 23 [John Carl]
>> Hey!  I made that point recently.  didya notice Krimel?  About the
>> congruence between dmb's interpertation of the Moq and phenomenology -
the
>> most radical of the empiricists?
>> Tha's ok.  Nobody pays much attention to my words, and I don't blame them
a
>> bit.

>>Aug 23 Dave T 
>> And then another hilarious congruence. David Chalmers, who dmb rejects
prior
>> to reading, argues the phenomena is integral to the "hard problem" of
>>conscious experience.

> Aug 25 dmb:
> Actually, it's pretty exciting to find that I have been thinking about the
> "hard problem of consciousness" all along. I just didn't know it had a
name
> and I didn't expect to find such a famous and excellent ally.

Wrong. Don't bother to read Chalmer's book it will at first lift you up,
then burst all your bubbles. If true, particularly your Pirsig ones. He is
developing a theory of consciousness based on what he calls Natural Dualism.
RMP's layer structure would be/is seriously fucked and they rest of it does
not correspond either.

Dave