[MD] All the way down

[david buchanan]

Steve said to dmb:
.... Rather than knowledge being a matter of finding the proper correspondences between sentences and non-language, such linguistic relations go all the way down.

dmb replied:
... you've framed the issue as if there were only two choices; either subscribe to the correspondence theory or say that it's language all the way down. This is a false dilemma ...


Steve replied to the reply:
That's not at all how I frame the issue.  ... "Language all the way down" is a denial of the correspondence theory of truth and a theory of language. 


dmb says:
Dude, you're driving me crazy. I know the slogan is a denial of correspondence. I realize that it's a criticism of empiricism and a theory of language. I'm simply saying that one can deny correspondence AND the slogan. One can object to the slogan without also endorsing the correspondence theory of truth. One can agree with its criticism of empiricism and still be a radical empiricist. (James said the same things a couple generations before Sellars did.)

Steve continued:
...It is NOT an assertion about the nature of reality. The "It" in "it's language all the way down" is "language." There is no denial of non-linguistic reality in Rorty's philosophy. Rorty doesn't think that the nature of reality is even a good topic of conversation. You'll never find Rorty saying that the fundamental nature of reality is this or that or not this or not that or part this and part that.

dmb says:
I don't take the slogan as a metaphysical assertion. I take it as a negative epistemological statement.

The slogan and the recent quote - the quote wherein Rorty says there are no standards except the conventional ones that we create - both assert the negative point that we can't use experience to justify our beliefs because all experience is linguistic. To say it's language all the way down is to deny the possibility of an unmediated access to reality, to reality as it is outside of our linguistic understandings. And that's exactly why you'll never find Rorty talking about the fundamental nature of reality. He doesn't think the fundamental nature of reality is a good conversation topic precisely because this reality is conceived as reality apart from our conventional understandings. If all experience is a linguistic affair, experience can't possibly give anyone access to a pre-verval reality. Thus we should not even talk about the fundamental nature of reality and we shouldn't be doing epistemology either. This is the center of his vision, no? His final stance, if you will, grows out of this linguistic critique of empiricism, no? In any case, that's how I'm reading it.

Steve said to dmb:
You can say that Rorty never addressed some important philosophical problem (the fundamental nature of reality), but that is a different argument than what you are trying to make which is that Rorty takes the wrong side on an important philosophical argument.

dmb says:
No, that's not what I'm saying. My efforts are aimed at untangling a translation problem. There have been some interesting tangents but that's been my main point all along. I'm saying that Rorty's critique of empiricism does not apply to radical empiricism. We have a handy example right here; the fundamental nature of reality means something very different in radical empiricism and it is pre-verbal in a different sense too. I'm saying these terms do not refer to the same concepts or claims targeted in Rorty's critique. 

As I see it, Rorty, James and Pirsig all agree with this critique of traditional empiricism and they all reject of the correspondence theory of truth. They all deny the possibility of objective truth. But Rorty abandons empiricism and epistemology altogether whereas James and Pirsig reconstruct it. Rorty thinks truth isn't the sort of thing about which we should have theories. James and Pirsig have a pragmatic theory of truth, one that's just as empirical as the radical empiricism it goes with so nicely. 

Now, this translation problem is not a general problem in philosophy. It's just about the difficulties that arise when I try to talk about the MOQ with you and Matt, our resident Rortians. So my aim here is to start unpacking the differences between radical empiricism and Rorty's actual target.  



dmb said:
... Pirsig also says that this whole conceptual reality was derived from an non-linguistic reality, which he calls Quality or DQ or the primary empirical reality.  As far as I know, there simply isn't anything comparable to that in Rorty or any other post-analytic pragmatist. And this is where they differ.


Steve replied:
I agree. Rorty never says that. They do differ. Of course they do. .. But what you are reading as a denial of the non-linguistic is a misreading of Rorty.


dmb says:
Huh? Of course he denies the non-linguistic. It's language all the way down. Again, I don't take this as Rorty's description of ultimate reality. I'm simply saying that Rorty's denials are aimed at claims that are not made by radical empiricism and in fact radical empiricism also denies those claims. I'm saying Rorty's critique of empiricism can't right be used against radical empiricism. Obviously I think it's better to re-make empiricism rather than give up on it and I think truth is the sort of thing we should have a theory about. I think that's exactly what pragmatism is; a theory of truth. So there are not only translation problems, the biggest differences are hard to talk about or because Rorty practically prohibits its central terms and because he is so sweeping in his conclusions about epistemology in general. You both seem well convinced that any kind empiricism is pointless, if not impossible.

dmb said:
In this picture, the relation between concepts and reality is never one of correspondence. ... Instead, the relation between concepts and reality is the relation between two parts of experience. James used the same exact terms for these two parts of experience; static and dynamic. This is the heart of the MOQ, the central core of the MOQ.


Steve replied:
I agree. .., dynamic and static experience are terms in Pirsig and James but not in Rorty. That's obvious. Now, the question remains, what philosophical problems do these terms help Pirsig and James deal with better than Rorty?




dmb says:
Well, the philosophical problems are just the things I just wrote about and have been writing about; truth, empiricism and the like. First I want to show that Rorty's critique of empiricism doesn't translate and doesn't prohibit the MOQ's claims. I want to talk about what those claims are and what they mean. But like I said, the main point is to solve a conversational problem. My problem is trying to talk about radical empiricism and the pragmatic theory of truth with two guys who begin with the conclusion that we ought not do epistemology, empiricism is impossible and we shouldn't have truth theories. It's like trying to drunk with a Mormon.