[MD] All the way down

Steven Peterson peterson.steve at gmail.com
Fri Dec 17 05:28:29 PST 2010


Hi DMB, (Matt)


> Steve replied to the reply:
> That's not at all how I frame the issue.  ... "Language all the way down" is a denial of the correspondence theory of truth and a theory of language.
>
>
> dmb says:
> Dude, you're driving me crazy.

Steve:
Dude, and I mean this in the nicest way possible, you are a total
dick, but that too is entirely beside the point. Why say this sort of
stuff?

DMB:
I know the slogan is a denial of correspondence. I realize that it's a
criticism of empiricism and a theory of language. I'm simply saying
that one can deny correspondence AND the slogan. One can object to the
slogan without also endorsing the correspondence theory of truth.

Steve:
I understand that. The slogan seems to make an assertion that reality
is essentially linguistic. That needs to be denied. If Rorty meant
that he would have been in trouble. (Later you say that there is
something else it seems to say.)


DMB:
One can agree with its criticism of empiricism and still be a radical
empiricist. (James said the same things a couple generations before
Sellars did.)

Steve:
I think that one can be a radical empiricist and dig the slogan just
as you and I dig Pirsig's analogues-upon-analogues or
we-are-suspended-in-language since they can be taken the same way as
"it's language all the way down."


> Steve continued:
> ...It is NOT an assertion about the nature of reality. The "It" in "it's language all the way down" is "language." There is no denial of non-linguistic reality in Rorty's philosophy. Rorty doesn't think that the nature of reality is even a good topic of conversation. You'll never find Rorty saying that the fundamental nature of reality is this or that or not this or not that or part this and part that.
>
> dmb says:
> I don't take the slogan as a metaphysical assertion. I take it as a negative epistemological statement.


Steve:
It's interesting  that you finally seem to understand what Rorty's
beef with metaphysics was and now identify as an anti-metaphysician
and see the MOQ as an anti-metaphysics. His objection was never with
all possible ways of using the word "metaphysics" but rather
metaphysics as Platonism. The same goes for epistemology. The problem
Rorty had was not with the business of talking about knowledge all
together but of trying to "ground" knowledge in some Cartesian way to
achieve the holy grail of certainty.


DMB:
> The slogan and the recent quote - the quote wherein Rorty says there are no standards except the conventional ones that we create - both assert the negative point that we can't use experience to justify our beliefs because all experience is linguistic.

Steve:
This is absurd. Of course we can, say, justify our belief that we have
$2.35 in our pockets by checking our pockets. Do you really think
Rorty would try to intervene and say, whoa there, no fair peeking?


DMB:
To say it's language all the way down is to deny the possibility of an
unmediated access to reality, to reality as it is outside of our
linguistic understandings.

Steve:
I think what he would say is that we don't have non-linguistic
knowledge of the "know-that" variety which is just a tautology. What
you'll find all over the place in Rorty is a denial that language puts
us hopelessly out of touch with reality--a denial of the problem of
lack of access to reality. Instead he says again and again that
language is a tool for _using_ reality rather than getting us in or
out of touch with reality. It seems to me that if you've read ANYTHING
by Rorty you'd understand that much.


> Steve said to dmb:
> You can say that Rorty never addressed some important philosophical problem (the fundamental nature of reality), but that is a different argument than what you are trying to make which is that Rorty takes the wrong side on an important philosophical argument.
>
> dmb says:
> No, that's not what I'm saying. My efforts are aimed at untangling a translation problem. There have been some interesting tangents but that's been my main point all along. I'm saying that Rorty's critique of empiricism does not apply to radical empiricism.

Steve:
How can THAT be the whole point? Matt and I agreed to that from the
beginning. My understanding is that he never thought much of it. He
didn't see anything important to reject about radical empiricism and
saw no reason why he ought to embrace it.Matt can perhaps say more
about what Rorty had to say about radical empiricism.



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