[MD] Essentials for target practice

[John Carl]

Greetings Ham:


[John]:
>
>  Makes sense to me. I like that last line, Value is the ghost
>> that creates existence.  Nice.
>> Are you sure you're not a Pirsigian?
>>
>

> Ham:
>


>  Actually, John, it was YOUR metaphor:
>
>
No wonder I liked it.

Ham:


The point I was trying to make is the principle that existence = appearance,
> as distinguished from Essence = Reality.  You and I are 'existents', but we
> are not 'essential'.  To exist is to be as an "other".  What is the
> appearance of being for you is an object for another.  Essence has no
> otherness.  Thus, as I said, "If being  and nothing are the only true
> contingencies for you, then existence is your reality."  (My meaning here is
> that existence is not True Reality.)
>
>
John:

I see.

I think.

Seeing that I think, I infer an existence.

Thinking that I see, I infer an essence.

Being and nothingness are attributes of existence or appearance.

Sounds a bit like percepts and concepts to me.


John:


>
>  Not quite sure here.  If the whole doesn't have parts, then
>> how can the self be cast off from it?
>>
>
>
Ham:


> That's the two million dollar question, and it sure beats trying to
> overcome S/O duality.;-)  I think we've discussed this before, John.  For
> me, the only possible answer is that the individual self is a negate that
> exists only as a differentiated "reflection" of the essential whole.
>  Analogically speaking, if Essence is the "gem of reality", then we as its
> negated agents are the sparkle of that gem.  I cover this negation theory in
> more detail at www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm#essence.
>


Since I've gotten into pondering Absolutes lately Ham, I wonder whether you
see your "Essence" as essentially, an absolute.  And if so, how does that
compare in the continuum between Royce's Absolute, and Bradley's.  To wit:

 For Bradley, the self is appearance and not reality. The Absolute is not a
self, and is without selfhood. For Royce, the self is an individual within
the Absolute Self, and the Absolute must have selfhood.

Royce says that Bradley’s Absolute cannot be aware of itself, because this
would mean being aware of itself as appearance, and not as a reality. Royce
says that this is an aspect of inconsistency in Bradley’s philosophy.

Royce also describes Bradley’s Absolute as a self-representative system. A
self-representative system represents itself together with the other
elements that it represents. Royce argues that Bradley’s Absolute brings the
whole world of Appearance into a unity of Absolute Reality. Thus, Bradley’s
Absolute must have selfhood.




>
> [Ham]:
>
>  Sensibility determines the individual's being, not its essence, and being
>> is only provisional (as we discussed before).  Only the Value of Essence
>> can be realized, and this requires an independent agent   The essence
>> of an individual is the value realized in a lifetime.  It complements the
>> value realized in all lifetimes which, in turn, is complemented by the
>> Absolute Value of Essence.
>>
>
> [John]:
>
>  I think I mainly agree.  I think sensibility is the birth of being.
>> Naming is fundamental to being.  Does that jive?
>>
>
> Ham:


> I would say differentiation or delineation is fundamental to being.  And it
> involves the appearance of both being and nothingness.
>
>
John:

Naming is differentiation.  In nature, we pick apart those aspects of
difference that catch our attention, and label them creatively.  Thus the
fabled Inuit's hundred different words for "snow", whereas I only see
snow.    In other words, I see no functional difference between
differentiation and naming.

In other words, I agree.


Ham:


> Value is the primary relation of S to O.  It is "fundamental" inasmuch as
> it is the inextricable link between them.  We are bound to Otherness (being)
> by its value to us.  But this is a provisional relationship, for both self
> (subject) and other (object) are negated essents.  Value sensed is
> existential; value as "the absolute whole" is Essence.
>
>

John:

Ok, that sounds to me like  a variance of Royce and Bradley's Absolute
Idealism indeed - with different labels.




>
>>
>> The whole meaning, which is the world, the Reality,
>> will prove to be, for this very reason, not a barren Absolute,
>> which devours individuals, not a wilderness such as Meister
>> Eckhart found in God, a*Stille Wüste, da Nieman heime ist*,
>> a place where there is no definite life, nor yet a whole that
>> absorbs definition, but a whole that is just to the finite aspect
>> of every flying moment, and of every transient or permanent
>> form of finite selfhood,-a whole that is an individual system
>> of rationally linked and determinate, but for that very reason
>> not externally determined, ethically free individuals, who are
>> nevertheless One in God.
>> It is just because all meanings, in the end, will prove to be
>>
>> internal meanings, that this which the internal meaning most loves,
>> namely the presence of concrete fulfilment, of life, of pulsating
>> and originative will, of freedom, and of individuality, will prove,
>> for our view, to be of the very essence of the Absolute
>> Meaning of the world.
>>
>
> Evidently this is "juicy and meaty" prose for you, but I haven'r read
> enough of Royce to know what it means.  He seems to equate "the world" with
> Reality in that ponderous first sentence.  If, instead, he's referring to
> existence, can it even have an "absolute meaning"?  Internal vs. external
> meaning? "Concrete" fulfillment?  "Essence of the Absolute Meaning of the
> world"? Isn't "essence of absolute meaning" a redundancy?
>
>
John:  I believe so, with the way you use "Essence", it is indeed.

Ham:


> Just how do you interpret this statement, John?  I could always get an
> editor's synopsis of Royce's philosophy from Wikipedia, but I'm sure you
> could summarize it in a more understandable fashion for a non-academic like
> me.
>
>
John:

Non-academic Ham?  Perhaps socially you're a non-academic, but
intellectually you certainly Qualify.

As far as Interpreting Royce, I'll get back to you.  I've been meaning to
read his supplementary essay to The World and the INdividual which is
entirely a commentary and criticism of F.H. Bradley.  After I've got that
under my belt, I'll feel more confident in explaining Absolute Idealism from
the American AND British side.

Although I recently learned one interesting bit of philosophical trivia
concerning Bradley's philosophy, that might explain Pirsig's affinity a bit
for his Absolute Idealism as a "middle way":



"In a way the Bradleyan Absolute is a model of the official ideal of the
British Empire - a unity which manifests itself in an indefinite plurality -
and so it provided a vehicle through which Indian philosophers could make
contact with the imperial culture without sacrificing their own traditions.
And Bradley's philosophy was close enough to the main themes of the
Vedantist traditions, so that he could be used as a bridge between modes of
thought by Indian philosophers who wanted to show Englishmen that their own
traditions much in them from which Europeans might learn.

But in a very precise way Bradley, in fact addresses some traditional
concerns within Indian philosophy.  He could be used by those seeking a
middle ground in the ancient controversy between the followers of Sankara
and the followers of Ramanjus - between the Absolute monists an those who
wanted to allow a measure of pluralism."


Philosophy after F. H. Bradley:  A collection of Essays.

Leslie Armour