[MD] Essentials for target practice

[Ham Priday]

Ahoy there, John --

[John]:
> I see.
> I think.
> Seeing that I think, I infer an existence.
> Thinking that I see, I infer an essence.

Interesting analysis.  But the premise you should be analyzing is:
Does the precept "I" (as in "I see" and "I think") infer that the essence is 
you?

> Being and nothingness are attributes of existence or appearance.
>
> Sounds a bit like percepts and concepts to me.

And so??  You're talking philosophy, and it's based on precepts and 
concepts.
If it were based on empirical evidence it would not be philosophy.

> Since I've gotten into pondering Absolutes lately Ham, I wonder
> whether you see your "Essence" as essentially, an absolute.  And if so,
> how does that compare in the continuum between Royce's Absolute,
> and Bradley's.  To wit:
>
>  For Bradley, the self is appearance and not reality. The Absolute is
> not a self, and is without selfhood. For Royce, the self is an individual
> within the Absolute Self, and the Absolute must have selfhood.
>
> Royce says that Bradley’s Absolute cannot be aware of itself, because
> this would mean being aware of itself as appearance, and not as a reality.
> Royce says that this is an aspect of inconsistency in Bradley’s 
> philosophy.
>
> Royce also describes Bradley’s Absolute as a self-representative system.
> A self-representative system represents itself together with the other
> elements that it represents. Royce argues that Bradley’s Absolute brings
> the whole world of Appearance into a unity of Absolute Reality.
> Thus, Bradley’s Absolute must have selfhood.

Now you're talking philosophology.  How does Essentialism stack up against 
Bradley and Royce?  Since there can be only one Absolute, I assume the 
"absolutes" you are pondering are really various conceptions of the 
Absolute.

I find 'selfness' somewhat anachronistic in the context of 'absoluteness', 
and generally reserve this term for the proprietary (i.e., differentiated) 
subject.  However, I can empathize with man's tendency to "personalize" God 
or the Creator, as is usually the custom in religion.   I do not regard 
Essence as a "system" for the simple reason that it has no elements or 
components.

If "awareness" infers an object, then it is appearance, and Royce is correct 
about Bradley's notion of "selfhood".  This doesn't mean that Essence is 
insentient, however.  I use the term "Sensibility" existentially and 
essentially to mean "self-awareness" where objective experience is not 
implied.  Value, for example, is a sensibility.  I see no reason why 
Sensibility cannot be considered an attribute of Essence from the individual 
perspective.  From the absolute (unified) perspective, of course, Value, 
Sensibility, and Potentiality are of one nature or essence.  (This is not an 
endorsement for either Bradley or Royce, just an attempt to categorize the 
ontologies as you've presented them.)

> Naming is differentiation.  In nature, we pick apart those aspects of
> difference that catch our attention, and label them creatively.
> Thus the fabled Inuit's hundred different words for "snow", whereas
> I only see snow.  In other words, I see no functional difference
> between differentiation and naming.
>
> In other words, I agree.

Naming is one kind of differentiation, which may suffice for a writer.  But 
unless the object or phenomenon being named is perceptual, that is, viewed 
or experienced independently of nomenclature, it is not differentiated in an 
ontological sense.  For most adults, the Tooth Fairy and Easter Bunny are 
named characters.  This differentiates them in fictional references but not 
as existents.

[Ham]:
> Value is the primary relation of S to O.  It is "fundamental" inasmuch as
> it is the inextricable link between them.  We are bound to Otherness
> (being) by its value to us.  But this is a provisional relationship, for 
> both
> self (subject) and other (object) are negated essents.  Value sensed is
> existential; value as "the absolute whole" is Essence.

[John]:
> Ok, that sounds to me like a variance of Royce and Bradley's Absolute
> Idealism indeed - with different labels.

I suppose Essentialism is a kind of Idealism, mainly due to its absolutist 
premise.  I wonder, though, if Pirsig's Qualityism is not also 
idealistic--despite its "pluralistic" foundation.
What thinkest thou, John?

> As far as Interpreting Royce, I'll get back to you.  I've been meaning to
> read his supplementary essay to The World and the INdividual which is
> entirely a commentary and criticism of F.H. Bradley.  After I've got that
> under my belt, I'll feel more confident in explaining Absolute Idealism
> from the American AND British side.
>
> Although I recently learned one interesting bit of philosophical trivia
> concerning Bradley's philosophy, that might explain Pirsig's affinity a 
> bit
> for his Absolute Idealism as a "middle way":

"In a way the Bradleyan Absolute is a model of the official ideal of the
British Empire - a unity which manifests itself in an indefinite plurality -
and so it provided a vehicle through which Indian philosophers could make
contact with the imperial culture without sacrificing their own traditions.
And Bradley's philosophy was close enough to the main themes of the
Vedantist traditions, so that he could be used as a bridge between modes of
thought by Indian philosophers who wanted to show Englishmen that their own
traditions much in them from which Europeans might learn.

"But in a very precise way Bradley, in fact addresses some traditional
concerns within Indian philosophy.  He could be used by those seeking a
middle ground in the ancient controversy between the followers of Sankara
and the followers of Ramanjus - between the Absolute monists an those who
wanted to allow a measure of pluralism."
 -- Philosophy after F. H. Bradley:  A collection of Essays.

Sounds like a fascinating study, John.  Let me know what conclusions it 
leads you to.

Thanks, and best regards,
Ham