[MD] The One True MOQ

[Arlo Bensinger]

[Matt]
What you are pointing out about our debates is that interpretive 
issues are (sometimes) taken to be the only ground on which 
philosophical debate can
happen: my version of THE MoQ has become THEE MoQ.  THEE best 
philosophy to hold is an admirable goal, but not when you can only 
talk about THE MoQ (if you catch my drift).  So you suggest talking 
about "a MoQ" to get to thee best philosophy.

[Arlo]
Well I avoid "the" and "thee" in any sense other than convention, and 
instead think its better to talk about "betterness". This has been my 
entire point to Bo all along, and the SOLites, but all they continue 
to hear is "stifling free speech" or other such nonsense. This is 
because, I am convinced, they are trapped by the "THE". Their entire 
edifice is a grab for sole legitimacy, not a declaration of 
betterness. And as such are bogged down by demanding that everyone 
else (including Pirsig) is "wrong" about THE MOQ, rather than saying 
"A MOQ that says... is better than A MOQ that says..."

[Matt]
Switching to isms, however, presents something a little different 
rhetorically, I think.  I could say "THEE pragmatism says...," but it 
would be redundant from saying, "Pragmatism says..." because implicit 
in the assertion is your command of the core of just what "pragmatism says."

[Arlo]
Interesting. So if we had an umbrella "ism" that could refer to a 
general structure of agreement (maybe even only DQ/SQ, IBSI levels) 
then we could use that to build the common ground, but then 
differentiate on specific disagreements. Something like "Qualityism 
says there are four static levels. Bo's Qualityism holds the 
intellectual level to SOM, while Pirsig's Qualityism considers SOM to 
be one of many intellectual patterns."

Am I understanding you correctly? Not sure I like "Qualityism" 
though, maybe "Valueism"?

[Matt]
The interpretation of what the core of any ism is is just as 
contentious, if not fundamentally interminable, as interpretation of 
a particular person.

[Arlo]
Sure. But I think contention over defining "common ground" is 
different from contention over whose ground is the One True Ground. 
This is moving the dialogue to better ground, as opposed to ending it 
or watching it flail about in the mud.

[Matt]
Mr. Buchanan and I's discussions _were_ fundamentally about 
pragmatism sans authorial modifier.

[Arlo]
I can't really comment on your discussions with DMB, mostly because I 
haven't fully dissected them for the nuances you mention, and even 
more so because I have much unfamiliarity with the authors you 
mention. As such, I can't really say one way or the other, except to 
say you are both passionate about advancing Pirsig's ideas and as 
such I admire you both.

[Arlo previously]
If someone kept writing "Robert Pirsig says... Robert Pirsig says... 
Robert Pirsig says...",  we'd see that for what it is. But the same 
person writing "the MOQ says... the MOQ says... the MOQ says..." this 
is kinda placed behind a veil.

[Matt]
That makes sense.  I think I'm willing to say that, while optimism or 
pessimism about conversation _actually_  getting better is still in 
play, this particular  recommendation would expose the issue more 
clearly and at least make _this_ area of difficulty less 
likely.  Good show.  Now we just need to get everyone to adopt it 
without thinking that they're conceding an important philosophical issue.

[Arlo]
I, personally, have begun trying to purge use of the narrative "the 
MOQ" from my posts. I think for many the hard part will be the 
habituated convention of using this to MEAN "Pirsig says...". I look 
back and in a few recent posts its popped up in my writing, always 
though synonomous with "Pirsig says...". And the funny thing is its 
not a philosophical issue at all. As I said to Mary, who actually 
think "the MOQ" speaks? Of course it does not. Its a narrative device.

So when I say something like "the MOQ reserves the social level 
exclusively for humans, but I think it's better to formulate the 
social level to allow non-human biological patterns", I mean "Pirsig 
reserves the social level exclusively for humans, but I think it's 
better to formulate the social level to allow non-human biological patterns."

Or even, "Pirsig's MOQ reserves the social level exclusively for 
humans,  but Arlo's MOQ formulates the social level to allow 
non-human biological patterns".

Or best, "Arlo believes that A metaphysics of Quality where the 
social level is open to non-human biological patterns is better than 
A metaphysics of Quality that reserves the social level exclusively 
for humans".

All these say the same thing, but you can see as they progress that 
the latter ones are articulated much better.

[Matt]
That's good stuff.  I absolutely agree about branding as 
community-forging.  And your example of Ham (properly constituted for 
use in this example only) moving to, say, a general philosophy forum 
and passing for a Pirsigian because he is close enough though the 
"Pirsigian community" rejects him (one could apply this example to 
Rorty's relationship to Dewey) is excellent.

[Arlo]
Thanks.

[Matt]
My only difference, I think, may be that I think that while we _can_ 
(and should) distinguish between social-community-commitments and 
intellectual-content-values, we can only do so _from within_ an 
already constituted community.

[Arlo]
I agree with this.

[Matt]
This means that there is no "social realm" distinct from an 
"intellectual realm" where one could have a pure value apart from the 
other.  This is my criticism of the social/intellectual distinction 
(one I haven't talked about in a long while, I think now because I've 
been a long time coming to this newer understanding of what I was 
trying to say).

[Arlo]
Hmm. I am going to have to think about this a bit. My first reaction 
is to say "of course", as Pirsig wrote "our intellectual description 
of nature is always culturally defined". But I think you mean 
something more than this foundational wellspring uniting these two 
"realms", no?

I agree with Bakhtin that knowledge is dialogic, that "intellect" 
evolves by virtue of its dialogic construction. And once here, it is 
hard deconstruct dialogue into specifically "social" and specifically 
"intellectual" fragments. Indeed, the very words of the dialogue are 
social building-blocks that constrain and enable the dialogue.

So I think, yes, I agree that you can never have a purely 
intellectual realm apart from a social realm, this would be like 
suggesting a purely biological realm that exists apart from the 
inorganic realm. Just as inorganic components form the foundational 
basis for cells and bodies, social patterns form the foundational 
basis for ideas and knowledge.

[Matt]
To the first, I think it punches up how we are committed to _more 
than one_ community at all times, fluctuating memberships that are 
instituted by our continually changing conversation partners.  I 
think it is perfectly reasonable to expect the same metonym 
("Pirsigian" or "Deweyan") to be used in slightly different ways 
depending on the discourse-community involved.

[Arlo]
Emphatically agree. Discourse communities never stand in isolation, 
there is always a plurality of involvement. And I'd further say that 
the use of metonyms in one community impacts our use of that in 
others. I, in another forum, may be less inclined to consider Ham a 
"Pirsigian" there even though others there might, because of my 
experiences here.

[Matt]
To the second, I think I can still see the value in your comment 
about "battling for a label," and how this truly does happen and 
signify lack of intellectual interest, but that it does not require 
us to see two distinct realms, but rather requires the two "realms" 
to be entwined in the way I've specified: to feel this signal, one 
must count up the number of intellectual commitments shared between 
two people arguing about it _and_ set a bar for what the required 
ones are to get one in the door of a particular community.

[Arlo]
Agree. I'd add only that I see these labels as being conferred, not 
necessarily demanded. I "accept" you as a Pirsigan, for example, 
based on your participation and knowledge I experience here. Its not 
so much you coming to me and saying "I am a Pirsigian". In this way, 
the title is more or less the "diploma" for gaining acceptance into a 
discourse community, and often it is unspoken, evidenced only by the 
way the community accepts your participation. This is not to imply 
its a passive process, though, as gaining acceptance (by virtue of 
participation) is something actively sought (or at times actively resisted).

You sound very familiar with Lave's and Wenger's theories on LPP, 
Duality, and Communities of Practice. Interesting stuff there.

[Matt]
You and I, Arlo, don't often discuss each other explicitly, but it's 
always seemed as if we hold a lot in common on a number of 
fronts.  What do you think about the above?

[Arlo]
I too think we are largely in agreement. As with John, Ron and few 
others, the only disagreements I see many times are very minute or 
nuanced ones, certainly not much in the larger areas.