[MD] A larger system of understanding

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Sun Jul 18 11:15:59 PDT 2010


Greetings, Magnus --

To recap...

You had asked:
> Why would everybody agree that physics, chemistry and
> biology are different, if they metaphysically aren't?

I responded:
> Because they ARE different fields of investigation, established for 
> different objectives.

You now say:
> The question was rhetorical. I know they are, I was trying
> to hint that a metaphysics should respect that.

I don't understand your point.  Why should metaphysics concern itself with 
the empirical views of objective science?  As I asked before, what is 
"metaphysical" about a hierarchy of existential levels, and how is it a
more "enlightened" worldview than the subject/object duality which it was 
designed to replace?

> I have also been doubting certain aspects of the four levels for quite 
> some time, such as the pretty unspecified border lines. But other aspects 
> are still very appealing to me, such as the dependency and discreteness, 
> and I've been trying to work around my doubts by starting with the 
> appealing aspects and work from there.
>
> The metaphysical aspect of it is actually starting to be useful now. As 
> you may have seen, in the computer thread, Andy and I have been talking 
> about different stacks, or instances, of the levels. It seems there isn't 
> just one universal instance that can be used for every thinkable occasion. 
> There is of course one originating from the physical universe we see 
> around us, the one physicists is trying to make heads and tail of. But 
> then there's another one inside a computer for example. No gravity there, 
> or electromagnetism, there are only ones and zeros and digital operations 
> like "and" and "or" for the programs and computer viruses living in that 
> universe. Also, it seems Bo is using a human instance, where the first 
> level is simply how a human (or possibly some lower animal) perceives the 
> inorganic world around it.
>
> If we can learn to move about between those different stacks freely, with 
> our language, then we might really start getting somewhere here.

By "getting somewhere" do you mean learning (from computers) what the nature 
of cognizance or intellection is?  Don't you see that humanly programmed 
digital devices churn out data to correspond with the human perspective of 
reality?  The old maxim "garbage in--garbage out" still applies to 
nanotechnology.  We're not going to acquire more knowledge from a computer 
than we feed it.

> I would also like to point out that the subject/object world view does not 
> put any real value on biological experiences like taste and smell. 
> According to SOM, the only realness in a smell experience is the 
> underlying inorganic reality of it. The problem I see with such a view is 
> that an inorganic reality is only real until we find a new, lower, reality 
> that explains the inorganic reality. So for example when we know how a 
> smell experience works inorganically, the only reality of it is the 
> inorganic event, but when we later learn how that is supported by quantum 
> physics, we only accept that explanation as really real, and so on.

You see, Magnus, looking for support for a metaphysical theory from quantum 
physics is like confirming that New York exists by consulting a roadmap.  A 
product of human thinking can never tell us more about reality than the 
humans who thought it up.  Quantum physics is founded on the same human 
perspective as any philosophy must necessarily be.  The only differences are 
the conclusions for which we have no proof.  For those I put no more 
credibility in physical science than I do in philosophy or mysticism.

> Did you read the link Marsha sent us a few days ago about gravity? That's 
> a good example of that. We've always been pretty sure that gravity is real 
> and it keeps us on the ground, we formulated formulas for it and so on. 
> Gravity is real by itself. But now this guy has explained what gravity is 
> in terms of lower processes. In SOM-land, that means that gravity would 
> lose its status as real, but in the MoQ, it doesn't. We can still treat 
> gravity as inorganically real, even though we now know how it is 
> connected, or depends, on the level below.

Yes, I read the article on "weak" and "strong" complementarity and 
entanglement, admittedly without comprehending most of it.  But I fail to 
see how connecting gravity to all four MoQ-defined levels advances our 
metaphysical understanding.

Here's what I believe, Magnus.  The world of appearances that we call 
"existence" is intelligently designed, evolutionary in development, and 
consistent with intellectually derived laws and equations.  The reason for 
this universal harmony and analytical consistency lies not in an objective 
"otherness" but in Sensibility itself.  We relate to the symmetry and 
intelligent design of phenomena because these are attributes our sensibility 
reponds to.  Sensibility is "valuistic", which means that we are drawn to 
those aspects of existential reality that have value to us.  As "the cutting 
edge of reality", human experience actualizes its reality to represent the 
values and relations which have meaning for mankind.  But because value 
sensibility is subjective, the precise appearance of the reality so 
objectivized is different for each individual.

So you can talk about computers and speculate on the cognitive potential of 
"artificial intelligence" all you want, but it isn't going to bring us any 
closer to metaphysical truth than intuitive concepts and logically 
constructed premises.

And "that is good", in my opinion, because it leaves us free to think and 
act in accordance with our proprietary value-sensibilities.

Essentially speaking,
Ham




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