[MD] A larger system of understanding

Magnus Berg McMagnus at home.se
Sun Jul 18 11:55:00 PDT 2010


Sorry Ham

for wasting an hour of my time trying to write a reply to you.

	Magnus



On 2010-07-18 20:15, Ham Priday wrote:
> Greetings, Magnus --
>
> To recap...
>
> You had asked:
>> Why would everybody agree that physics, chemistry and
>> biology are different, if they metaphysically aren't?
>
> I responded:
>> Because they ARE different fields of investigation, established for
>> different objectives.
>
> You now say:
>> The question was rhetorical. I know they are, I was trying
>> to hint that a metaphysics should respect that.
>
> I don't understand your point. Why should metaphysics concern itself
> with the empirical views of objective science? As I asked before, what
> is "metaphysical" about a hierarchy of existential levels, and how is it a
> more "enlightened" worldview than the subject/object duality which it
> was designed to replace?
>
>> I have also been doubting certain aspects of the four levels for quite
>> some time, such as the pretty unspecified border lines. But other
>> aspects are still very appealing to me, such as the dependency and
>> discreteness, and I've been trying to work around my doubts by
>> starting with the appealing aspects and work from there.
>>
>> The metaphysical aspect of it is actually starting to be useful now.
>> As you may have seen, in the computer thread, Andy and I have been
>> talking about different stacks, or instances, of the levels. It seems
>> there isn't just one universal instance that can be used for every
>> thinkable occasion. There is of course one originating from the
>> physical universe we see around us, the one physicists is trying to
>> make heads and tail of. But then there's another one inside a computer
>> for example. No gravity there, or electromagnetism, there are only
>> ones and zeros and digital operations like "and" and "or" for the
>> programs and computer viruses living in that universe. Also, it seems
>> Bo is using a human instance, where the first level is simply how a
>> human (or possibly some lower animal) perceives the inorganic world
>> around it.
>>
>> If we can learn to move about between those different stacks freely,
>> with our language, then we might really start getting somewhere here.
>
> By "getting somewhere" do you mean learning (from computers) what the
> nature of cognizance or intellection is? Don't you see that humanly
> programmed digital devices churn out data to correspond with the human
> perspective of reality? The old maxim "garbage in--garbage out" still
> applies to nanotechnology. We're not going to acquire more knowledge
> from a computer than we feed it.
>
>> I would also like to point out that the subject/object world view does
>> not put any real value on biological experiences like taste and smell.
>> According to SOM, the only realness in a smell experience is the
>> underlying inorganic reality of it. The problem I see with such a view
>> is that an inorganic reality is only real until we find a new, lower,
>> reality that explains the inorganic reality. So for example when we
>> know how a smell experience works inorganically, the only reality of
>> it is the inorganic event, but when we later learn how that is
>> supported by quantum physics, we only accept that explanation as
>> really real, and so on.
>
> You see, Magnus, looking for support for a metaphysical theory from
> quantum physics is like confirming that New York exists by consulting a
> roadmap. A product of human thinking can never tell us more about
> reality than the humans who thought it up. Quantum physics is founded on
> the same human perspective as any philosophy must necessarily be. The
> only differences are the conclusions for which we have no proof. For
> those I put no more credibility in physical science than I do in
> philosophy or mysticism.
>
>> Did you read the link Marsha sent us a few days ago about gravity?
>> That's a good example of that. We've always been pretty sure that
>> gravity is real and it keeps us on the ground, we formulated formulas
>> for it and so on. Gravity is real by itself. But now this guy has
>> explained what gravity is in terms of lower processes. In SOM-land,
>> that means that gravity would lose its status as real, but in the MoQ,
>> it doesn't. We can still treat gravity as inorganically real, even
>> though we now know how it is connected, or depends, on the level below.
>
> Yes, I read the article on "weak" and "strong" complementarity and
> entanglement, admittedly without comprehending most of it. But I fail to
> see how connecting gravity to all four MoQ-defined levels advances our
> metaphysical understanding.
>
> Here's what I believe, Magnus. The world of appearances that we call
> "existence" is intelligently designed, evolutionary in development, and
> consistent with intellectually derived laws and equations. The reason
> for this universal harmony and analytical consistency lies not in an
> objective "otherness" but in Sensibility itself. We relate to the
> symmetry and intelligent design of phenomena because these are
> attributes our sensibility reponds to. Sensibility is "valuistic", which
> means that we are drawn to those aspects of existential reality that
> have value to us. As "the cutting edge of reality", human experience
> actualizes its reality to represent the values and relations which have
> meaning for mankind. But because value sensibility is subjective, the
> precise appearance of the reality so objectivized is different for each
> individual.
>
> So you can talk about computers and speculate on the cognitive potential
> of "artificial intelligence" all you want, but it isn't going to bring
> us any closer to metaphysical truth than intuitive concepts and
> logically constructed premises.
>
> And "that is good", in my opinion, because it leaves us free to think
> and act in accordance with our proprietary value-sensibilities.
>
> Essentially speaking,
> Ham
>
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