[MD] Natural Law

[Matt Kundert]

> Bo writes to Steve:
> 
> Have you read something again Steve? Kant tried to rescue moral
> > FROM reason's a-morality. The empiricists had found that there was
> > no qualities, values (and consequently) morals "out there", all such
> > were only  in our subjective minds and thus not real. Finding a  base
> > for morals from SOM's (intellect's) premises is futile.
> >
> >
> John butts in:
> 
> Here is why your formulation of SOM=intellect falls flat, Bo.
> 
>  Finding a base for morals in SOM is futile, because SOM is the metaphysical
> stance that there is no such thing as objective morality.  Its all
> subjective and relative.

I'm glad you said this, John, because it highlights the _ambiguity_ in the 
very notion of subject/object.  It is not conceptually necessary for one to 
hold a subject/object distinction _and thus_ to claim that "there is no such 
thing as objective morality."  You need _additional_ premises to do so, 
thus making Pirsig's "SOM" a _particular strand of reasoning about subjects 
and objects_.  The _two_ additional premises that Pirsig uses are 1) 
"object" is construed as _material_ and 2) the metaphysics is reductionistic 
in reducing everything that is (thereby) real to objects.

It's fine to tinker with different versions of the subject/object distinction 
(Pirsig does), but the confusion on just what people are saying by 
taking different stances towards SOM or SOL or whatever stems from 
leaving too many of these premises in the train of thought cloudy and 
obscure.

Matt

p.s.  I'm glad people read other books and come back and link them 
up to Pirsig.  A distinct intellectual sterility sets in when you don't.