[MD] Natural Law

[John Carl]

Matt,

I'm intrigued by the phenomenalists and their reducing all objects of
thought to phenomena.  I've got some more to share on this subject in my
Copleston Anotations Anotations.

But I'm intrigued by how close it seems to radical empiricism and wondering
if this has been discussed before.

And yes, I noticed before that construing objects to be material things
underlies the premise of assigning the two lower levels to objective and the
two upper levels to subjective.  I deal with that in the post I'm working on
now.

Take Care,

J


> I'm glad you said this, John, because it highlights the _ambiguity_ in the
> very notion of subject/object.  It is not conceptually necessary for one to
> hold a subject/object distinction _and thus_ to claim that "there is no
> such
> thing as objective morality."  You need _additional_ premises to do so,
> thus making Pirsig's "SOM" a _particular strand of reasoning about subjects
> and objects_.  The _two_ additional premises that Pirsig uses are 1)
> "object" is construed as _material_ and 2) the metaphysics is
> reductionistic
> in reducing everything that is (thereby) real to objects.
>
> It's fine to tinker with different versions of the subject/object
> distinction
> (Pirsig does), but the confusion on just what people are saying by
> taking different stances towards SOM or SOL or whatever stems from
> leaving too many of these premises in the train of thought cloudy and
> obscure.
>
> Matt
>
> p.s.  I'm glad people read other books and come back and link them
> up to Pirsig.  A distinct intellectual sterility sets in when you don't.
>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org/md/archives.html
>