[MD] Capitalism: my experience

[Ham Priday]

On 2 Mar 2010 at 6:20 PM, Platt responded to Ham who wrote:

>> You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O."
>> But if there is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience.
>> Does it make sense that there can be experience, "direct" or
>> otherwise, without a subject?

[Platt]:
> Yes it make sense when you see that named objects and divisions
> like "Self" and "Subject" are not part of direct experience but are
> conjured up afterwards. A baby enjoys direct experiences but has
> no concept of self, subject or object. Please review Chapter 9 of
> Lila for a complete explanation.

A baby may not have a "concept" of self, which is an intellectual construct, 
but it is nonetheless an experiencing self (i.e., proprietary 
value-sensibility) by the time it is born into the world.

I dislike quoting Pirsig to support my arguments, but you leave me no 
choice.  Following are Phaedrus's statements that reveal how the MoQ was 
"designed" to overcome metaphysical objections. These quotes also show why 
the author had to develop the paradigm I'm challenging as a contrivance to 
make his thesis work.

"Sooner or later he was going to have to come up with a way of dividing 
Quality that was better than subjects and objects."

"A subject-object metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in whjich the first 
division of Quality - the first slice of undivided experience - is into 
subjects and objects.  Once you have made that slice, all of human 
experience is supposed to fit into one of these two boxes. The trouble is, 
it doesn't.  What he had seen is that there is a metaphysical box that sits 
above these two boxes, Quality itself."

Now, do you suppose this top box of Quality was an intuitive insight on 
Pirsig's part?  No.  He had arbitraily chosen Quality as the leitmotif of 
his thesis, and he needed to posit this Quality outside the box to establish 
"a Catechism of Quality" by which he could refute the Rigels of the S/O 
world.  The "extra box" was an invention, and (I'm sorry but) the assertion 
that all of human experience doesn't fit into subjects and objects was a 
self-serving deception on the author's part.  All experience is an S/O 
relation.

> Pirsig makes it clear that the experience comes prior to
> differentiations of "being." Please review Chapter 5 of Lila
> for a complete explanation.

"The statement that values are vague and therefore shouldn't be used for 
primary classification is not true.  There's nothing vague about a value 
judgment. ...It was this conclusion that placed him right in the middle of 
the field of philosophy known as metaphysics. ...Metaphysics was an area of 
study that had interested him more than any other as an undergraduate 
student in the United States and later as a graduate student in India. ...He 
had finally landed in his own briar patch."

"The central reality of mysticism, the reality that Phaedrus had called 
'Quality' in his first book, is not a metaphysical chess piece. Quality 
doesn't have to be defined.  You understand it without definition, ahead of 
definition.  Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to 
intellectual abstractions."    --Lila, chpt. 5

Do you not see the strategy here?  Quality was Pirsig's grand theme.  In 
order to market this non-entity to both objectivists and mystics, he had to 
posit it out of the bounds of definition and intellection.  Quality thus 
became a mystical concept of its own, a primary source beyond description. 
It was the author's non-theistic God.

Still, Quality had to relate to Experience, and that was the "briar patch" 
Phaedrus had landed on.  He resolved the paradox by positing Quality as the 
'first cause' -- as  independent of and prior to everything else, including 
experience.  The single thorn remaining in this scheme, and IMO its Achilles 
Heel, is that it defies epistemology.  Quality (Value) is perceptual, which 
means that it cannot precede sensible experience but must be contiguous with 
it.

By the way, Platt, I would never call you a "liar".  What I said was that 
the distinction between "common experience and "direct experience" was a 
deception, and the Sir Walter Scott quote was directed at MoQ's author whose 
worldview you appear to have succumbed to.

But I don't hold this against you, because conversing with you is always a 
pleasure.

Kindest regards,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

> Platt
>> Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe
>> the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in
>> your head, like sugar plum fairies.
>
> Ham
> That's an ad hominen argument, Platt.
>
> Platt
> Well, calling me a liar like Iago who "deceives" I took to be an ad
> hominem argument on your part. So I guess we're even. . . .
>
> Ham
> Value is neither subjective nor objective, as your revered author
> made clear.  I don't quarrel with this.  Sensibility is not a subject
> or object either.  And even a sugar plum fairy can have value
> for a child who believes in it.  (Incidentally, this demonstrates
> the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no experiential
> justification.)
>
> My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual 
> 'selves'
> in order to have experience.  To make his theory work, Pirsig has
> externalized experience to the insentient world.  You seem to have
> accepted the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks
> are experiential entities.  This doesn't make sense to me, and it
> certainly is not a common sense notion.
>
> Platt
> Molecules and trees, yes.  They respond to their environments. Rocks,
> being conglomerates, no. We've been over this many times.
>
> You've made it abundantly clear that the MOQ holds little appeal to you.
> I and others have made it equally clear that your Essentialism likewise
> lacks allure. As my Dad used to say, " 'Everyone to their own taste,' said
> the old lady as she kissed the cow."  I can only conclude that you stay
> interested in this site because you find more intelligence per contributor
> here than other philosophy sites on the web. I know I do, with few
> exceptions, of course..
>
> Best regards,
> Platt