[MD] Capitalism: my experience

[plattholden at gmail.com]

On 2 Mar 2010 at 13:36, Ham Priday wrote:

Hey, Platt --

> Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O. This is all
> basic MOQ stuff. No wonder others question whether you
> have read Lila.

I own a copy of Lila and have read it.  I just don't happen to agree with 
the implied ontology, at least as it has been interpreted.  When I 
suggested 
that there is no such thing as "direct experience", that all experience is 
subject/object experience, you said:

> Wrong. Prior to "differentiation of values into things and events,"
> we experience "value per se." You can't differentiate something
> that hasn't been experienced first.
> That's just common sense. ;-)

Okay, since "common experience" isn't good enough for you, let's see if 
what 
you say makes common sense.

You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O."  But if there 
is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience.  Does it make 
sense 
that there can be experience, "direct" or otherwise, without a subject?

Platt
Yes it make sense when you see that named objects and divisions like 
"Self" and "Subject" are not part of direct experience but are conjured up 
afterwards. A baby enjoys direct experiences but has no concept of self, 
subject or object. Please review Chapter 9 of Lila for a complete 
explanation.     

Ham
You say "You can't differentiate something that hasn't been experienced 
first."  I say you can and you do. That's exactly what esperience does: It 
differentiates Value into finite 'beings' -- something here, something 
there, something now, something then.  It even defines the attributes 
and 
properties of the things experienced.  Does Pirsig not call these 
phenomena 
"patterns of value"?

Platt
Pirsig makes it clear that the experience comes prior to differentiations 
of "being." Please review Chapter 5 of Lila for a complete explanation. 

Platt
> Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe
> the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in
> your head, like sugar plum fairies.

Ham
That's an ad hominen argument, Platt. 

Platt
Well, calling me a liar like Iago who "deceives" I took to be an ad 
hominem argument on your part. So I guess we're even. . . . 

Ham
Value is neither subjective nor 
objective, as your revered author made clear.  I don't quarrel with this. 
Sensibility is not a subject or object either.  And even a sugar plum fairy 
can have value for a child who believes in it.  (Incidentally, this 
demonstrates the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no 
experiential justification.)

My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual 'selves' 
in order to have experience.  To make his theory work, Pirsig has 
externalized experience to the insentient world.  You seem to have 
accepted 
the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks are experiential 
entities.  This doesn't make sense to me, and it certainly is not a 
common 
sense notion.

Platt
Molecules and trees, yes.  They respond to their environments. Rocks, 
being conglomerates, no. We've been over this many times.

You've made it abundantly clear that the MOQ holds little appeal to you. 
I and others have made it equally clear that your Essentialism likewise 
lacks allure. As my Dad used to say, " 'Everyone to their own taste,' said 
the old lady as she kissed the cow."  I can only conclude that you stay 
interested in this site because you find more intelligence per contributor 
here than other philosophy sites on the web. I know I do, with few 
exceptions, of course.. 

Best regards,
Platt