[MD] Capitalism: my experience

[Ham Priday]

Hey, Platt --

> Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O. This is all
> basic MOQ stuff. No wonder others question whether you
> have read Lila.

I own a copy of Lila and have read it.  I just don't happen to agree with 
the implied ontology, at least as it has been interpreted.  When I suggested 
that there is no such thing as "direct experience", that all experience is 
subject/object experience, you said:

> Wrong. Prior to "differentiation of values into things and events,"
> we experience "value per se." You can't differentiate something
> that hasn't been experienced first.
> That's just common sense. ;-)

Okay, since "common experience" isn't good enough for you, let's see if what 
you say makes common sense.

You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O."  But if there 
is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience.  Does it make sense 
that there can be experience, "direct" or otherwise, without a subject?

You say "You can't differentiate something that hasn't been experienced 
first."  I say you can and you do. That's exactly what esperience does: It 
differentiates Value into finite 'beings' -- something here, something 
there, something now, something then.  It even defines the attributes and 
properties of the things experienced.  Does Pirsig not call these phenomena 
"patterns of value"?

> Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe
> the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in
> your head, like sugar plum fairies.

That's an ad hominen argument, Platt.  Value is neither subjective nor 
objective, as your revered author made clear.  I don't quarrel with this. 
Sensibility is not a subject or object either.  And even a sugar plum fairy 
can have value for a child who believes in it.  (Incidentally, this 
demonstrates the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no 
experiential justification.)

My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual 'selves' 
in order to have experience.  To make his theory work, Pirsig has 
externalized experience to the insentient world.  You seem to have accepted 
the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks are experiential 
entities.  This doesn't make sense to me, and it certainly is not a common 
sense notion.

But then, I don't base my philosophy on the inferences of a metaphorical 
book.
Best regards,
Ham