[MD] Pirsig's theory of truth

[Ham Priday]

Hi Steve (David and Matt mentioned) --

On May 13, you asked DMB:

> Can you please, please, please define relativism with respect to truth,
> so I can know what you mean when you say (pace Ant) that Pirsig
> can't rightly be called a relativist with respect to truth?

DMB responded (in part):
> Again, the Wiki article explains why Rorty is seen as a relativist.
> "Thus his position,.. adds up to relativism." You deleted the Wiki quote
> and now you're accusing me of refusing to define it?
> Kinda slap-stick sloppy, don't you think?

Now Matt has produced more definitive information from the Wiki article on 
relativism:
"Philosopher Richard Rorty has a somewhat paradoxical role in the debate
 over relativism: he is criticized for his relativistic views by many naïve
 commentators, but has always denied that relativism applies to much 
anybody,
 being nothing more than a Platonic scarecrow. Rorty claims, rather,
 that he is a pragmatist, and that to construe pragmatism as relativism is
 to beg the question."

Steve, I can well understand your confusion as to how relativism applies to 
truth, but don't expect the MoQists to say anything comprehensible on this 
subject.  Their denial of S/O experience as anything but "patterns of 
Quality" prevents them from acknowledging existence the way normal people 
do.  I could care less about Rorty; but when he says "to construe pragmatism 
as relativism is to beg the question," it is clear to me that he doesn't 
want "what works" to be demeaned as relative truth.

Here's an earlier paragraph from this article which I think is more aligned 
to your question:

"Moreover, relativism also presupposes philosophical realism in that there 
are actual objective things in the world that are relative to other real 
things.[citation needed].  Additionally, relativism assumes causality, as 
well as a problematic web of relationships between various independent 
variables and the particular dependent variables that they 
influence.[citation needed]."

My interpretation of this reviewer's explanation is that Realism, as opposed 
to Idealism, presupposes "real" objects and events in space/time existence. 
Existence is relational.  When you posit a truth you are defining relations 
(X=Y, B>A, C<B, etc.) that exist between experienced phenomena.  Our 
knowledge of existence is empirical, which means simply that a "truth" is a 
premise that holds for a particular set of conditions involving two or more 
objective entities.

Now, of course, if you don't believe in "real" subjects and objects, or 
causal events, you will dismiss relations as illusionary and meaningless. 
This leads to illogical conclusions, such as DMB's insistence that 
"justification is justification to an audience, for Rorty. Thus his 
position, in the view of MANY COMMENTATORS, adds up to RELATIVISM," as if 
the acceptance of "many" (society? social level?) is what makes a truth 
"relational".  That's nonsense.

What makes truth relational is the differentiated nature of existence.  You 
can't assert a truth without referring to some kind of relationship between 
entities or their conditions.in time and space.  Thus, cause-and-effect is 
relational.  The evolutionary process is relational.  Birth and death are 
relational.  You and I are relational.  Even Pirsig's "Quality=Reality" 
equation expresses the condition of equivalency that exists between these 
two entities.  Only in metaphysics, which is open to theories that cannot be 
posited as truth, is the philosopher free to develop concepts that overcome 
the relational conditions of existence.

Sorry to interrupt your discussion, but it pains me to see ordinary precepts 
being twisted into complicated sophistry simply to justify one philosopher's 
need to be identified as a radical empiricist.  Anyway, I hope this helps to 
clarify the relativism issue.

Essentially speaking,
Ham