[MD] Relativism

[Steven Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Steve replied:
> I don't think you've added anything to conversational constraints on knowledge by talking about "the epistemic value of experience." It's not like Rorty can't justify a belief by saying talking about his experience. Experience is included in "conversational constraints." Its just that talk about experience when providing a rationale for a belief is still talk. It's not that Rorty "rejects the epistemic value of experience," it's just that he gets all that we can get from experience in justifying beliefs by talking about conversation.
>
> dmb says:
> You've only reiterated my point about Rorty's bias toward talk and conversation. Talking is a subset of experience, not the other way around. One of the main points of the MOQ is that you can NOT get all we want from experience by talking about it. Thinking that you can is what we mean by a discursive bias. And may I remind you for the tenth time that Rorty think we ought not be doing epistemology at all. He is convinced that empiricism is dead. Period. How could that possibly be consistent with your claim that he doesn't reject the epistemic value of experience? It can't, obviously.

Steve:
Your confusion here lies in the fact that you forget that we are
talking about justification of beliefs rather than just any response
of an organism to its envirnoment (how Pirsig said it is easiest to
understand Quality). Sure, there are lots of other human practices
besides justifying beliefs, but the practice of justification is
linguistic. It is done with words. That doesn't mean that people don't
do lots and lots of things without linguistic justification.



> Steve said:
> If there really is something that Rorty is missing as far as epistemology, then you should be able to tell me the sort of argument that James and Pirsig could use to justify a belief that Rorty is unable to use. You never have offered such an argument, and I don't think you ever will because I don't think you can. Go ahead. Prove me wrong.
>
>
> dmb says:
> You're asking for an argument, which means words, which means you're still not getting the difference between  experience and language.

Steve:
No, you are just not getting the difference between the practice of
justifying beliefs and other practices.


> dmb said:
> He [Rorty] tells us that his position against slavery, fundamentalism and Nazism has no ground whatsoever. It would be a significant improvement for Rorty to be a shaky ground.
>
>
> Steve:
> Well that's just it. If you are looking for a foundation for claiming that slavery is bad and are unsatisfied with really good arguments that slavery is bad, then you might start talking about absolutism/relativism. But if you are then you aren't doing pragmatism.
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Oh, now you've switched back. Sometimes you like to say that slavery was always bad no matter what anybody thought, the earth was round no matter what anybody thought and then sometimes you stuff like this. I guess you're arguing with your self?

Steve:
The two points have nothing to do with one another. I still say (pace
DMB)  that slavery was wrong wherever and whenever it was practiced
without regard to whether or not the belief in slavery "worked" for
anybody. My point above is that (again, pace DMB) I don't think we
need something called a philosophical foundation to say so. I think
all we need are good arguments against slavery. You seem to think that
we ought to have something more than a good argument., What else do
you think we ought to have?


Steve, previously:
Below Pirsig talks about the epistemology and says that the harmony
between our reasonings and those of others is the only basis for
claims to objectivity. He knows of no "empirical constraints" on our
reasoning beyond our communications with other humans. It is  such
communication--such conversational constraints--that are the only
basis for knowledge claims.

ZAMM: "What guarantees the objectivity of the world in which we live
is that this world is common to us with other thinking beings. Through
the communications that we have with other men we receive from them
ready-made harmonious reasonings. We know that these reasonings do not
come from us and at the same time we recognize in them, because of
their harmony, the work of reasonable beings like ourselves. And as
these reasonings appear to fit the world of our sensations, we think
we may infer that these reasonable beings have seen the same thing as
we; thus it is that we know we haven't been dreaming. It is this
harmony, this quality if you will, that is the sole basis for the only
reality we can ever know."


DMB:
> Also, I'll remind you that the pragmatic theory of truth is not mentioned in ZAMM, nor is James. Quoting from ZAMM can work because he was already a radical empiricists but the most relevant evidence is going to come from Lila and the quotes from ZAMM can't rightly be used to unsay what he said later.

Steve:
When did Pirsig "unsay" that "It is this harmony [between the
reasonings of ourselves and others], this quality if you will, that is
the sole basis for the only reality we can ever know"? I don't think
he ever did. I don't think Pirsig ever said that there is a basis for
empistemology beyond such conversational constraints. Remember, we are
talking about epistemology--about intellectual justification of
beliefs--not just any response of an organism to her environment like
hopping off of a hot stove.

Best,
Steve