[MD] Relativism

[X Acto]

Steve,
Dave has provided several quotes over the course of this arguement. Which 
stated that Rorty felt that any epistomologial theory of truth is meaningless,
Dave points out that this is true if one is speaking to the context of objective
truth in an ontological way.
Objective truth is culturally derrived. Pirsig and James remark how truth
is a species of the good. Connecting truth and experience, that is why
everyone can agree to "the good" but disagree over the truth.

Which is one good reason Bo's SOL fails to explain how DQ/SQ has greater
explanitory power.





----- Original Message ----
From: Steven Peterson <peterson.steve at gmail.com>
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Sent: Tue, May 18, 2010 7:13:05 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Relativism

Hi DMB,

Steve said:

... It is easy to see how an SOMer would call Rorty and James
relativists since they deny ontological objectivity, but I can't see
how you can give a pragmatic account of relativism that condemns Rorty
and not James and Pirsig.

dmb says:

I doubt that Rorty denies that there is an objective reality. He just
thinks we can't have access to it.


Steve:
I suppose it wouldn't even matter if I provided 10 Rorty quotes that
contradict this claim. You'll just keep saying it.


DMB:
That's why, for Rorty, justification strictly discursive and has
nothing to do with experience per se. But that doesn't matter because
the pragmatic theory of truth rejects the idea of objective reality
WITHOUT also rejecting the epistemic value of experience. It is
empiricism without SOM. So, if you understand what empirical
restraints are and you understand what conversational restraints are
then you should be able to understand how James and Pirsig differ from
Rorty.


Steve:
I don't think you've added anything to conversational constraints on
knowledge by talking about "the epistemic value of experience." It's
not like Rorty can't justify a belief by saying talking about his
experience. Experience is included in "conversational constraints."
Its just that talk about experience when providing a rationale for a
belief is still talk. It's not that Rorty "rejects the epistemic value
of experience," it's just that he gets all that we can get from
experience in justifying beliefs by talking about conversation.

If there really is something that Rorty is missing as far as
epistemology, then you should be able to tell me the sort of argument
that James and Pirsig could use to justify a belief that Rorty is
unable to use. You never have offered such an argument, and I don't
think you ever will because I don't think you can. Go ahead. Prove me
wrong.





>
> Steve said:
> Is his position against slavery somehow on shakier ground than yours? I can't see how.
>
> dmb says:
>
> He tells us that his position against slavery, fundamentalism and Nazism has no ground whatsoever. It would be a significant improvement for Rorty to be a shaky ground.


Steve:
Well that's just it. If you are looking for a foundation for claiming
that slavery is bad and are unsatisfied with really good arguments
that slavery is bad, then you might start talking about
absolutism/relativism. But if you are then you aren't doing
pragmatism. You, Dave, are a closet foundationalist, and you think
radical empiricism can give you an empirical foundation. Pirsig never
thought it could. He appeals to his hierarchy of value patterns rather
than radical empiricism to make moral arguments and says that James's
radical empiricism and pragmatism alone could be used by the Nazis to
defend their beliefs.

Below Pirsig talks about the epistemology and says that the harmony
between our reasonings and those of others is the only basis for
claims to objectivity. He knows of no "empirical constraints" on our
reasoning beyond our communications with other humans. It is  such
communication--such conversational constraints--that are the only
basis for knowledge claims.

ZAMM: "What guarantees the objectivity of the world in which we live
is that this world is common to us with other thinking beings. Through
the communications that we have with other men we receive from them
ready-made harmonious reasonings. We know that these reasonings do not
come from us and at the same time we recognize in them, because of
their harmony, the work of reasonable beings like ourselves. And as
these reasonings appear to fit the world of our sensations, we think
we may infer that these reasonable beings have seen the same thing as
we; thus it is that we know we haven't been dreaming. It is this
harmony, this quality if you will, that is the sole basis for the only
reality we can ever know."

Best,
Steve
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