[MD] Relativism

[MarshaV]

Ron,

How does James represent a greater explanatory power for the MoQ?


Marsha 



On May 19, 2010, at 9:49 PM, X Acto wrote:

> Steve,
> Dave has provided several quotes over the course of this arguement. Which 
> stated that Rorty felt that any epistomologial theory of truth is meaningless,
> Dave points out that this is true if one is speaking to the context of objective
> truth in an ontological way.

> Objective truth is culturally derrived. Pirsig and James remark how truth
> is a species of the good. Connecting truth and experience, that is why
> everyone can agree to "the good" but disagree over the truth.
> 
> Which is one good reason Bo's SOL fails to explain how DQ/SQ has greater
> explanitory power.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: Steven Peterson <peterson.steve at gmail.com>
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Sent: Tue, May 18, 2010 7:13:05 PM
> Subject: Re: [MD] Relativism
> 
> Hi DMB,
> 
> Steve said:
> 
> ... It is easy to see how an SOMer would call Rorty and James
> relativists since they deny ontological objectivity, but I can't see
> how you can give a pragmatic account of relativism that condemns Rorty
> and not James and Pirsig.
> 
> dmb says:
> 
> I doubt that Rorty denies that there is an objective reality. He just
> thinks we can't have access to it.
> 
> 
> Steve:
> I suppose it wouldn't even matter if I provided 10 Rorty quotes that
> contradict this claim. You'll just keep saying it.
> 
> 
> DMB:
> That's why, for Rorty, justification strictly discursive and has
> nothing to do with experience per se. But that doesn't matter because
> the pragmatic theory of truth rejects the idea of objective reality
> WITHOUT also rejecting the epistemic value of experience. It is
> empiricism without SOM. So, if you understand what empirical
> restraints are and you understand what conversational restraints are
> then you should be able to understand how James and Pirsig differ from
> Rorty.
> 
> 
> Steve:
> I don't think you've added anything to conversational constraints on
> knowledge by talking about "the epistemic value of experience." It's
> not like Rorty can't justify a belief by saying talking about his
> experience. Experience is included in "conversational constraints."
> Its just that talk about experience when providing a rationale for a
> belief is still talk. It's not that Rorty "rejects the epistemic value
> of experience," it's just that he gets all that we can get from
> experience in justifying beliefs by talking about conversation.
> 
> If there really is something that Rorty is missing as far as
> epistemology, then you should be able to tell me the sort of argument
> that James and Pirsig could use to justify a belief that Rorty is
> unable to use. You never have offered such an argument, and I don't
> think you ever will because I don't think you can. Go ahead. Prove me
> wrong.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Steve said:
>> Is his position against slavery somehow on shakier ground than yours? I can't see how.
>> 
>> dmb says:
>> 
>> He tells us that his position against slavery, fundamentalism and Nazism has no ground whatsoever. It would be a significant improvement for Rorty to be a shaky ground.
> 
> 
> Steve:
> Well that's just it. If you are looking for a foundation for claiming
> that slavery is bad and are unsatisfied with really good arguments
> that slavery is bad, then you might start talking about
> absolutism/relativism. But if you are then you aren't doing
> pragmatism. You, Dave, are a closet foundationalist, and you think
> radical empiricism can give you an empirical foundation. Pirsig never
> thought it could. He appeals to his hierarchy of value patterns rather
> than radical empiricism to make moral arguments and says that James's
> radical empiricism and pragmatism alone could be used by the Nazis to
> defend their beliefs.
> 
> Below Pirsig talks about the epistemology and says that the harmony
> between our reasonings and those of others is the only basis for
> claims to objectivity. He knows of no "empirical constraints" on our
> reasoning beyond our communications with other humans. It is  such
> communication--such conversational constraints--that are the only
> basis for knowledge claims.
> 
> ZAMM: "What guarantees the objectivity of the world in which we live
> is that this world is common to us with other thinking beings. Through
> the communications that we have with other men we receive from them
> ready-made harmonious reasonings. We know that these reasonings do not
> come from us and at the same time we recognize in them, because of
> their harmony, the work of reasonable beings like ourselves. And as
> these reasonings appear to fit the world of our sensations, we think
> we may infer that these reasonable beings have seen the same thing as
> we; thus it is that we know we haven't been dreaming. It is this
> harmony, this quality if you will, that is the sole basis for the only
> reality we can ever know."
> 
> Best,
> Steve
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