[MD] Relativism

John Carl ridgecoyote at gmail.com
Mon May 24 08:20:26 PDT 2010


Hi Mary,

On Sun, May 23, 2010 at 10:18 AM, Mary <marysonthego at gmail.com> wrote:[Mary
Replies]

I see again and again how we are all talking past each other.  Would this be
> a good time to back up and refer to the original question?  "What makes the
> Intellectual Level different from the Social?"  If we can't answer that,
> then we can't define the level; and, if we have to conclude that there are
> no discernable differences between the Social and the Intellectual, then
> why
> did Pirsig include it?  Maybe it's all just one big Social Level?  Would
> that idea float anybody's boat?  Maybe John's?
>
>

No, I wouldn't cast off the distinction between social and intellectual
levels.  That's one of the most important insights of the MoQ, imo, that,
all other things being equal, it's more moral for an idea to modify society
than a society to repress an idea.

I see SOM as being formed by a social insight - the self-other dichotomy,
which when transformed into a worldview as the basis of reality, becomes
intellectualized as SOM - the kindergarten of the intellectual level, if you
will.  Where Bo's stuck and yet thinks I am!

Ain't life funny.

And ultimately, intellect is only half the story of 4th level patterning.
It's the classic half.  The artistic, romantically inclined aesthetic half,
which is where realization comes from is the important part - with ineffable
DQ at the very (unobtainable) apex of the level.  Realizations come from the
same mysterious place that hypothesi enter human consciousness, and THEN
become intellectualized.

I also think Ron makes a pretty good point about intellectual wranglin' in
circles over definitions, which will never capture or encapsulate the MoQ as
a whole.  Anymore than memorizing all the possible answers to Zen koans will
ever encapsulate Buddhism.

But hey, knock yerself out, y'all.  Makes for a diverting reading
experience, anyway.







> Ron, I mean, I didn't make up the rules - Pirsig did.  He clearly defined
> the four levels as a hierarchy of values/morals.  He says each successive
> level originated in the one below.  He explains how they are all composed
> of
> static patterns of value - latched in response to Dynamic Quality - yet are
> all in a state of continual tension with each other.  I don't mean to be
> pedantic here, but to answer the question we need to be starting out on the
> same page and with all the too-ing and fro-ing in the forum, I'm not sure
> that we are.  Are these all the basic premises we have?  There's one more,
> but to my surprise I got flack for saying it a while back.  This puzzles
> me,
> so if someone would like to argue it out, we could start here.  Pirsig said
> the levels are discrete sets of patterns of value that took off on a
> purpose
> of their own from their parent.  I think this is pretty clear from the
> literature, but someone, and sorry, but I don't remember who, took issue
> with this.  If they'd like to hash this out now, please do so, because it
> seems to me we've got to agree on our premises before we can even attempt a
> definition.
>



  The 4th level isn't a discrete level at all, since it's unbounded and
mysterious on its upper end (Where hypothesis come from) and theoretically
infinite - that is, you can always objectify the objectivity you've got, ad
infinitum.

John the hasher


(not literally - I like my herb au natural)



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