[MD] Betternes - 4 levels of!

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Platt --


> Hi Mark, All:
>
> Dynamic Quality isn't concept free. Once you name something,
> it becomes a concept. But it's a concept like "ineffable" is a concept
> -- pointing to something that cannot be defined.  And that leaves
> intellect impotent. Intellect can only deal with defined terms. Pirsig
> admitted as much.  But, he said go ahead anyway: "Getting drunk
> and picking up bar-ladies and writing metaphysics is a part of life."
> (Lila, 5)  So, yes. Even though we can't think about DQ, go ahead
> and think about it - another paradox illustrating critical thinking's
> feet of clay.

I realize that you respect Pirsig's philosophy and feel obliged to follow 
his precepts to the letter.  However, Pirsig called his thesis the 
"Metaphysics of Quality", and a metaphysical exposition should properly 
include both an epistemology (to explain how we know) and an ontology (to 
explain what we experience).  Without theoretical support for these 
components, a philosophy is merely a euphemistic paradigm or, as some regard 
the MoQ, an anological perspective of reality.   One might as well say, as 
Marsha often has, "Everything is analogy".  I don't know about you, Platt, 
but that's not my idea of a metaphysical concept.

Also, I have to disagree that "once you name something, it becomes a 
concept."  If I name the "quadratic equation" to you, does it become a 
concept?  Is "antidisestablishmentarianism" a concept?  Is even the simple 
noun "Quality" a concept?

In a previous post to Mark, I distinguished "concept" from "conception" in 
this fashion:

> A "concept" must be defined in words in order to be conveyed to others.
> (That's why metaphysics is "nothing but definitions," as Prisig 
> complained.)
> But a "conception" is one's conceptual understanding, whether it is set in
> words or equations, analogized, or merely described.  This, I submit, is 
> what
> we are after.  The rest is typically philosophology, opinion, polemics, or
> anecdotal "what I read last night" commentary.

If we intend to expand our understanding of philosophy and metaphysics, it 
seems to me we need to do it conceptually, rather than just throwing words 
around as so much  poetic metaphor.  Even a conception that seems 
indefinable can be communicated as a principle or functionally described. 
I'm reminded once again of Cusa's First Principle: the 'not-other'.  It's 
only the hyphenated conjunction of two simple words, but it expresses his 
conception that the primary source (however you choose to name it) is an 
undifferentiated whole.  Meister Eckhart's concept of "total IS-ness" and 
the 'ex nihilo' principle also effectively convey related concepts.

More typically, a metaphysical conception requires a number of postulates, 
the author's specially defined terms, and a logical rational to support the 
overall concept as a cogent theory.  I side with Mark on this issue. 
Ridiculing the critical thinking that is necessary for metaphysical 
exposition is a lame excuse for intellectual oversight, in my opinion.

Essentially speaking,
Ham