[MD] a-theism and atheism

[Ham Priday]

John, Mark, Ian, Tim and All --

John introduced this thread with a personal retrospective . . .
> I believe I have peace of mind, at last.  I was thinking last night that
> while I can't see the MoQ as either atheistic anti-theistic, I do think it
> is and should be, non-theistic.  For one thing, as a tool, it'd be
> completely useless if it couldn't ask, "what good is your god?"

Mark responded by giving us his own . . .
> I do not disagree with you, but non-theism does not mean anything
> to me.  Unlike you I have no childhood roots in any religion.  I guess
> I was brought up pragmatically or whatever.  I simply read what theism
> is supposed to be from books and discussions with intelligent people
> who have thought it out and chosen theism.  I really do not have
> something deep to draw from.  This may put me at a disadvantage,
> but it may also give me some perspective.

Ian offered a more "objective" rationale with much the same sentiment . . .
> The trouble as I see with labeling the MoQ plainly atheist, is as I told
> Dan, the MoQ is no more anti-theistic than it is anti-theory-of-gravity.
> People come up with ideas to deal with their world. The MoQ says
> they do this as a function of Quality. What the MoQ is against, is
> assigning objectivity to subjective ideas about reality. Or reification,
> in simpler term. And what usually goes by the name "atheist" does this
> just as much as any theism you can name. Which is why I have no
> peace of mind with the term "atheist".

Last, but not least, Tim declares himself an "ignostic".  (Might he have
meant "Agnostic"?)
> Though I am taking it under reconsideration at the moment, I have
> been in the habit of referring to myself as 'ignostic...'.  This term
> is fatal to a belief in 'quality' though - so it seems.

Since this appears to be an open discussion, let me make a few points 
regarding the conclusions asserted here.

First, a question to John: Why should the MoQ, or any other philosophy, be 
"non-theistic" so that it can ask "what good is your god"?  Since when is it 
necessary that proponents of a philosophy slander theists "as a tool" of 
their credibility?  Isn't it more logical for the author to establish in his 
thesis whether his philosophy is based on god or not?

Calling oneself a "theist" or an "atheist" is more than choosing a label. 
Ian has nailed the terminology problem, I think, by pointing out that 
"atheism" objectifies reality "just as much as any theism" does.  And I 
believe Pirsig would agree with Tim that agnosticism "is fatal to a belief 
in 'quality'."   Mark, who confesses he has nothing "deep to draw on" from 
his upbringing, is obviously not yet decided on the nature of Pirsig's 
Quality.

The real question, it seems to me, is whether "Quality is everything", as 
Mark suggested, in which case it is absolute and primary by definition. 
Pirsig wrote in LILA that "... if Quality or excellence is seen as the 
ultimate
reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist." 
Aren't we supposed to infer from this statement that Quality is the 
metaphysical equivalent of God?

Metaphysically an absolute source is necessary for there to be anything. 
Whether you call it God, Supreme Being, the All-Encompassing, the Divine 
One, Dynamic Quality, or Essence matters only to the context in which it is 
conceptualized.  I prefer "Essence" because metaphysics is a "non-theistic" 
approach to reality and because it is not dependent on "beingness" as its 
fundamental principle.

Here's the way I see it:

We are all "created in God's image" because we are immersed in its 
omnipresence, but we are neither its identity nor its essential nature. 
Instead, we stand before this absolute source in awe and total dependency, 
tasting of its essence as the value of what is greater than ourselves.  We 
are embraced by the "beingness" that is a valuistic representation of our 
substantive nature; yet being is not Essence, because it is delineated by 
nothingness, whereas Essence has no "other".  We are caught up in a stream 
of relational events which is our experience of value in time and space. 
These, too, are appearances of  our "being-aware" -- of value perceived 
objectively as an ordered, evolving, pluralistic universe.  While all of 
this constitutes our existential reality, only Value itself is essential, 
and our sensibility of it is subjective, finite and incremental.

This lays out the premise for the metaphysical thesis I've called 
"Essentialism".  You can see that it goes beyond the MoQ conception of 
ultimate reality.  Is it theistic, a-theistic, or anti-theistic?  Is 
"essential value" the equivalent of Pirsig's Quality, or is it something 
different?  Can a moral philosophy based on the universe's evolution to 
'betterness" accommodate a metaphysical ontology founded on an unmoved 
source?

I think you can see where I'm coming from.  The ball is in your court.  Only 
you folks can answer these questions to your satisfaction.

Respectfully submitted,
Ham