[MD] a-theism and atheism

[rapsncows at fastmail.fm]

Ham,
clarification.  and...
Tim


> [Ham] Last, but not least, Tim declares himself an "ignostic".  (Might he have
> meant "Agnostic"?)

[Tim]
no, I meant ignostic, with an 'i'; I was mainly trying to introduce it
into the mix.  It is a term for one who does not recognize the questions
about theism unless things are nailed down with definitions.

> > [Tim] Though I am taking it under reconsideration at the moment, I have
> > been in the habit of referring to myself as 'ignostic...'.  This term
> > is fatal to a belief in 'quality' though - so it seems.

[Tim]

so this (insistance on definition) is why ignostic may be fatal to
quality.  But, my "..." meant that I would usually go on to say "but I
believe in 'something' ", or, even that I was an "acolyte of
____________ justice", where in the blank I was trying to decide on how
I would differentiate this religious-like justice from common courtroom
justice (I had been saying 'objective', but perhaps this needs some
tightening up).  Anyway, I think the similarities between quality and
'something', and between morality and justice, show why I was so smitten
with Lila.

 
> Since this appears to be an open discussion, let me make a few points 
> regarding the conclusions asserted here.
> 
> First, a question to John: Why should the MoQ, or any other philosophy,
> be 
> "non-theistic" so that it can ask "what good is your god"?  Since when is
> it 
> necessary that proponents of a philosophy slander theists "as a tool" of 
> their credibility?  Isn't it more logical for the author to establish in
> his 
> thesis whether his philosophy is based on god or not?
> 
> Calling oneself a "theist" or an "atheist" is more than choosing a label. 
> Ian has nailed the terminology problem, I think, by pointing out that 
> "atheism" objectifies reality "just as much as any theism" does.  And I 
> believe Pirsig would agree with Tim that agnosticism "is fatal to a
> belief 
> in 'quality'."   Mark, who confesses he has nothing "deep to draw on"
> from 
> his upbringing, is obviously not yet decided on the nature of Pirsig's 
> Quality.
> 
> The real question, it seems to me, is whether "Quality is everything", as 
> Mark suggested, in which case it is absolute and primary by definition. 
> Pirsig wrote in LILA that "... if Quality or excellence is seen as the 
> ultimate
> reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to
> exist." 
> Aren't we supposed to infer from this statement that Quality is the 
> metaphysical equivalent of God?
> 
> Metaphysically an absolute source is necessary for there to be anything. 
> Whether you call it God, Supreme Being, the All-Encompassing, the Divine 
> One, Dynamic Quality, or Essence matters only to the context in which it
> is 
> conceptualized.  I prefer "Essence" because metaphysics is a
> "non-theistic" 
> approach to reality and because it is not dependent on "beingness" as its 
> fundamental principle.
> 
> Here's the way I see it:
> 
> We are all "created in God's image" because we are immersed in its 
> omnipresence, but we are neither its identity nor its essential nature. 
> Instead, we stand before this absolute source in awe and total
> dependency, 
> tasting of its essence as the value of what is greater than ourselves. 
> We 
> are embraced by the "beingness" that is a valuistic representation of our 
> substantive nature; yet being is not Essence, because it is delineated by 
> nothingness, whereas Essence has no "other".  We are caught up in a
> stream 
> of relational events which is our experience of value in time and space. 
> These, too, are appearances of  our "being-aware" -- of value perceived 
> objectively as an ordered, evolving, pluralistic universe.  While all of 
> this constitutes our existential reality, only Value itself is essential, 
> and our sensibility of it is subjective, finite and incremental.

[Tim]
Ham, the main thing I want to challenge: "...because it is delineated by
nothingness...".  For me, "nothing" has no place, because if it did, it
would be 'something'.  So, I don't really know what you mean here.  On
the other hand, I thought you captured this thought by saying "Essence
has no 'other'".  Anyway, an explanation might be helpful.

I don't know if "essence" imprints any flavor to 'something'; I prefer
'something', concrete but undifferentiated, but perhaps all 'essence'
implies is: essential.  Also, in my thinking, the 'essence' which "has
no other", might have to give something of itself for us to be here. 
"Something is" seems to be, to the best of my capacity, true absolutely.
 However, this may contrast with you when you say "I prefer "Essence"
because ... it is not dependent on "beingness" as its fundamental
principle."  RMP ends 'lila' with the idea that good is a noun.  I liked
this in contrasting it with an adjective, but I don't like it in
connection with verbs.  I see 'something' as inherently noun-verb --- at
minimum, and even this might be too simple  --- perhaps I should say
'something-is'.

 
> [Ham] This lays out the premise for the metaphysical thesis I've called 
> "Essentialism".

[Tim]
this guy that Mark suggested, J. Kaipayil (relationalism.org), suggests
that reality is fundamentally unitary and plural at the same time.  I
think we might all be in agreement here.  Perhaps it is that I am trying
to see why it MUST BE plural by focussing on the aspect of unity, while
you, might, maybe?, bee thinking of the simplest plural: as essence
(essential).  If this is so, I like the terminology - from that
perspective.

> [Ham]  You can see that it goes beyond the MoQ conception of 
> ultimate reality.  Is it theistic, a-theistic, or anti-theistic?  Is 
> "essential value" the equivalent of Pirsig's Quality, or is it something 
> different?

[Tim]
I came here having a problem with pirsig's 'Quality'.  For one, it
seemed too simple to produce contradiction, theoretically.  For two,
even though he asserted that quality was synonymous with morality, we
have no way of determining these things objectively, so, for instance,
when tehre is contradiction in real life, one can side with what some
would call high quality activities, while others call them criminal,
sinful, etc.: criminal syndicates, corrupt schemes, assassinations, etc.
and etc.  The levels don't provide a means to distinguish immoral from
moral quality, but I won't rehash this.

> [Ham]  Can a moral philosophy based on the universe's evolution to 
> 'betterness" accommodate a metaphysical ontology founded on an unmoved 
> source?

[Tim]
might not they even be inescapably liked?  Unavoidable?  Essential even?


> I think you can see where I'm coming from.  The ball is in your court. 
> Only 
> you folks can answer these questions to your satisfaction.
> 
> Respectfully submitted,
> Ham
> 


Thanks Ham,
Tim
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