[MD] Rorty and Mysticism

[John Carl]

dave,


> dmb says:
> Well, no.
> We CAN think about it and talk about it. That's what we're doing right now,
> in case you hadn't noticed. But talking and thinking isn't it. There must
> always be a discrepancy between the two. One is not the other.
>
>
John:

Well since there must be a discrepancy, in your view, why not focus then on
that which is realized and we can talk about?  Where's the value in effing
the ineffable?

Is the question/point I'm driving at.


dmb:


> But you know it in experience.


John:

Anything I know is conceptualized.  Therefore, talking about
"pre-conceptualized" is the same as talking about "before I know".  But
"before I know" is unknown, and if we're talking about the unknown, then
we're talking about nothing at all.  What's the use in that?  Pragmatically
speaking, there is none.

dmb:

It is direct and immediate experience. In what sense is that not real? As a
> matter of fact, another name for this pre-conceptual experience is "the
> primary empirical reality". The primary empirical reality isn't real?
>

John:

I'm paused at the moment.  You've just paused me in my tracks.  I guess I'd
have to agree.  The primary empirical reality isn't real.  Realization is
the process of becoming real.  Until that process hits, there's no such
thing as reality.

I think QM and Biocentrism have something along these lines to say, and imo,
that's the most fruitful direction to go, metaphysically.

dmb:


>
> According to Pirsig, that's as real as it gets. (William James calls it
> "pure experience".) To say that it doesn't exist because it's not conceptual
> is to say that conceptual reality is the only reality there is.
>
>
John:

The first of biocentrism's seven principles:

"What we perceive as reality is a process that involves our consciousness.
An "external" reality, if it existed, would by definition have to exist in
space. But this is meaningless, because space and time are not absolute
realities but rather tools of the human and animal mind."

dmb:


> Pirsig is saying there certainly IS more than conceptual reality. In fact,
> he's saying that conceptual reality is secondary, that all concepts are
> derived from this immediate experience and they should be subordinated to
> this primary empirical reality.
>
>
>
John:

Well, I guess I'm arguing that point.  Is that ok dave?  Can we challenge
and test these ideas or is this all just a dogma that has to be accepted at
the hands of the high priest?