[MD] self: agent of action & thinker of thoughts

[Horse]

Hi Arlo

On 17/08/2011 15:30, Arlo Bensinger wrote:
> [Horse]
> And if this 'autonomous individual self ' is illusory then the 
> conventional way of looking at free will is also illusory.
>
> [Arlo]
> The way I see it, "free will" is intellectual pattern we use in an 
> attempt to describe experience. Like "polar coordinates", it can be 
> useful or not, and should be evaluated by how valuable a description 
> it provides (is it pragmatically useful? or something like that).
>
> As such, I think the "free will/determinism" patterns are far less 
> useful (valuable) than "agency/structuration", also intellectual 
> patterns we use to describe experience. Both are, of course, 
> analogies, like "Cartiesian" versus "Polar" they are attempts to map 
> experience.
>
> The question I ask is, what is valuable about describing experience 
> using "free will"? And can a better description (agency, for example) 
> be more useful.

I'm not sure that using either free will or agency in MoQ terms is 
useful as both would appear (to me) to implicitly refer back to the 
'autonomous individual self ' - which seems to be a major bone of 
contention.
As I see the problem - similarly to you I think - it is when we are 
describing a facet of one system in terms of another 
opposed/antagonistic system. The MoQ, as Pirsig appears to describe it, 
has no 'autonomous individual self ' to which a will (free or otherwise) 
is attached. But, in order to relate the MoQ to the dominant SOM world 
view something is needed to which will can be attached. So we can attach 
will, agency, disposition, intent or some other label to this self as 
long as it is remembered that the self, within the MoQ, is illusory and 
is there purely for a means of relating to a position that the MoQ does 
not see as primary.

>
> [Ian]
> Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory 
> nature of the autonomous individual self.
>
> [Arlo]
> I'm going to take exception to the term "illusory" and suggest instead 
> that the concept of "self" has staying power because it is 
> pragmatically valuable. It is an "illusion" only in response to the 
> idea that it is some existential existant (is that redundant?). You 
> sign your posts "Marsha" for a reason. From within a MOQ, a "self" is 
> not an illusion OR an existant, it is a pattern of value, and should 
> be evaluated as such.

The original quote above was from Ian to Marsha so I've changed it.
I don't have any problem with the idea of a self in the sense that it is 
a useful and familiar way of dealing with the world as we are taught to 
believe it exists.
I would disagree with you, to an extent, about the self not being an 
illusion but a pattern of value, as I'm still unconvinced that static 
patterns of value are not illusory. At least in the sense that SPOV's 
are primarily intellectual.
SPOV's are a taxonomy imposed on the world by intellect - they are one 
way of defining and ordering data. Admittedly a very good way of doing 
it but not necessarily thee best that will ever be - just the best so far.
The taxonomy is good but not perfect so, at best, we work with 
incomplete/imperfect data and extrapolate from that position to how we 
view the world. So what's illusory about SPOV's is that they are the 
"correct" way of viewing the world. As I think you've said, this alludes 
to their practical application, but it just needs to be remembered, as 
with subjects and objects, that our view of the world is based on 
incomplete information - hence illusory!

>
> So the "existential self" would be an illusion fostered by a concept 
> such as "free will". And that's one reason why I think "free will" is 
> not as valuable as term as "agency" (keeping in mind that "agency", 
> like "free will" is also an intellectual pattern of value).
>
> "Agency", I hold, is a term that we can use to describe the range of 
> potential responses any pattern has to its environment. It can apply 
> to rocks (very, very, very little agency) and dogs (a greater range of 
> agency) and humans (the greatest range of agency within a MOQ view). 
> Whereas "free will" is a term that makes sense only (really) on the 
> "human" or "self" scale, "agency" can apply across the MOQ hierarchy 
> in a quite sensible way.

Yes, if what I think you're saying is what you are saying!! I said a 
while back that we have more freedom the further up the static pattern 
hierarchy we go but various other folk appeared to disagree. So if by 
agency you mean that we are better able to respond to choice and that 
there is a greater variety of choice/agency among (f.ex.) intellectual 
patterns than social patterns or more choice/agency within social 
patterns than biological patterns then I agree.

Cheers

Horse

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