[MD] Freedom within structure.

[david buchanan]

dmb said:
If Pirsig can reject the Cartesian self or SOM's self and STILL say that one's behavior is free to some extent, then why can't we?


Steve replied:
Sure, one can _say_ it, but is it true, and what does it even mean to say so?

dmb says:
You don't know what it means and you want to know if it's true? Do you realize that this is the MOQ's reformulation of the free will/determinism dilemma, the reformulation about which you have been making claims for months. And now you're telling me that you don't know what it means? Shall I consider this a confession? Are you now admitting that you don't understand what you've talking about for all this time?


Steve continued:
I noticed that quote too when I read the NY Times article, and I was struck by the fact that he doesn't talk about choice but rather perception.


dmb says:

Yea, in terms of the free will debate you've been participating in, that quote is the most relevant one because it recapitulates the reformulation we find in Lila. It makes the same point that we find in Lila. I would have thought that putting them side by side made that parallel very obvious.
>From the NY Times interview:"To the extent that you perceive dynamic quality, you make your own life," Mr. Pirsig suggested, "and to the extent you cling to static quality, you are the victim of fate. But dynamic quality is disruptive and I have been moved increasingly to appreciate the merits of the static. I'm becoming less radical, coming round to old institutions and finding within them tremendous dynamic value. The key is to see the dynamic within the static."
>From Lila:"To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."

dmb continues:
These are probably the two pieces of textual evidence that are most directly relevant to the long debate about the MOQ's reformulation of free will and determinism. Like I said, since Pirsig can reject SOM's self and STILL say that one's behavior is free to some extent, then we can too. These Pirsig quotes prove that the question of free will can be answered without committing yourself to objectionable metaphysical assumptions. They show that the question of freedom is still a question about you and your life. 


Steve replied:
Well now you slipped free _will_ into this picture where Pirsig talked behavior and perception rather than _will_ being free.


dmb says:
Slipped free will into this picture? Not at all. Pirsig's claim is the MOQ's reformulation of free will and determinism. That is the context of Pirsig's remarks. And the term "will" does not have to be used as some kind of metaphysical claim. We are simply taking about the status of "one's behavior", your behavior, your aims, goals, wants, choices and your ability to act on them. As I've come to expect, you're defying the evidence and completely missing the point.


Steve confessed:
I can't make much of his claim "To the extent that you perceive dynamic quality, you make your own life." To what extent _do_ we perceive dynamic quality?


dmb says:
Well, you have issued a lot of strong opinions about this claim. If you can't make much of it and you don't know what it means, don't you think it's a bit foolish to be pontificating upon it for several months? It truly seems that you've been faking your way through this topic the whole time. If that's the case, it's no wonder I'm so often frustrated!


Dan addressed Steve's confession:


To the extent that we put static patterns to sleep by learning to ignore them. Meditation is one possible path.


dmb says:
I wouldn't put it that way, Dan. The NY Times quote has Pirsig putting a lot of emphasis on the static side as a key ingredient. He says, "I have been moved increasingly to appreciate the merits of the static," where he says he finds, "tremendous dynamic value". Pirsig says, "The key is to see the dynamic within the static." This is consistent with the central analogy in ZAMM, with the artful mechanic. He can't afford to "ignore" static patterns, not if he wants to get his bike out of the garage and out onto the road. Like I said, Pirsig is telling that the key is to see the dynamic within the static. To ignore the static is to misunderstand what freedom is, I think. The artful mechanic doesn't reject the static patterns. He puts them to use. This is also consistent with his treatment of DQ in Lila, wherein DQ is the force behind all evolution as well as "the value-force that CHOOSES an elegant mathematical solution to a laborious one", and "an integral part of science. It is the cutting edge of scientific progress itself." (Lila, 366) 


Steve asked:
How could we behave so as to perceive more or less of it? If dynamic quality is the leading edge of experience, how does anyone _not_ perceive it? Why does he see perception rather than will as the key to human freedom where most philosophers of the past have been concerned with a particular sort of the capacity to choose? Unfortunately, rather than shed light one the matter, for me this quote just muddles things further.


dmb says:
I think Pirsig's comments only clarify and illuminate the very issue we've been debating for months and I think it is your questions that just muddle things. Pirsig says that one's behavior is free to the extent that we can perceive and follow DQ. Your question construes that backwards, as if we could behave our way to free behavior. This perception and following of DQ is not opposed to freedom of the will. It is his description of freedom within the MOQ. He is only talking about one's capacity to decide upon or choose a course of action. There is no good reason to keep loading one's "will" with all sorts of objectionable metaphysical claims. He's just talking about people, about your freedom and your life. This baggage is not only unnecessary and unwanted, it's a wrench in the gears of your thinking. It's got you jammed up quite badly.