[MD] Quality and the Higgs Field: An Analogy
Ham Priday
hampday1 at verizon.net
Wed Feb 9 22:18:37 PST 2011
Welcome again, John --
By the way, one of us should change the subject line. (What more can we say
about the Higgs Field?)
[Ham previously]:
> Morality is a precept of social behavior sanctioned by
> the society or culture.
[John]:
> Ok, that seems like a worthy distinction that I hadn't really
> considered. But my problem with your epistemology remains,
> for how does socially-defined morality arise if not from the
> context of a society's relationship with its environment?
I don't see any conflict here. Society is comprised of individuals
collectively relating with one another and their common environment.
Therefore the morality of a society reflects the individual values shared by
the members. They won't agree on every issue, but where there is sufficient
agreement to achieve consensus, those issues will become part of the
society's moral code.
> We are so intertwined with our cosmic context, that it seems plain
> to me, as Pirsig postulates, that all our morality is ultimately derived
> from Nature and thus claiming the universe is "amoral" completely
> side-steps this all-important consideration that Man's morality
> comes from the relation with Nature, and doesn't just spring up from
> nothing. I mean, what happened to "ex niliho niliho fit"? Or however
> it was that you spelled the fact that there isn't anything that just pops
> up out of nothingness.
What is Nature but an intellectual construct of essential value? That
construct comprises both the good and the bad. It is man, the measure of
all things, who distinguishes what is good (for him) and establishes a moral
system that will foster it. Like everything else in our experiential
reality, morality is a representation of our sensibility to Value, which is
an aspect of the Absolute Source. So, why do accuse me of positing Value as
springing from nothing? The primary source may not be an 'existent', but it
is far more real than man's concept of morality.
> Ok, so morality arises from values. Why the distinction then?
> We're back to the fact that its just differing terms for the same
> phenomenon, and calling the universe "amoral" is identical to
> calling it "non-valuable".
I assume you're asking why I distinguish morality from Value. For the same
reason that I distinguish intellection from sensibility. Precepts like
causality, contrariety, and justice are intellectualized from experience,
whereas Value is our primary connection with the Source. The individual is
a sensible agent of Value. Everything he experiences is a differentiated
representation of Value. Likewise, everything he creates -- art, music,
literature, architecture, and morality -- are morivated by his value
orientation.
> A lot of things that make no sense at all are quite "universal",
> so that really doesn't address the logic of your proposition.
> To my analysis, it is the Pirsigian equation of Value with Morality
> that ultimately makes more sense than your postulation of man's
> morality springing up by magic.
There is no "magic" to my ontology. If it doesn't make sense to you, it's
because either you misconceive it or are attempting to force it into
Pirsig's "Quality universe" paradigm. That won't work, because if Quality
were "all goodness", as the MoQ suggests, there would be no measure of value
available to man, no way for him to recognize inferiority from excellence
and choose accordingly. But that, in fact, is man's role as the free agent
of value. In my opinion, the concept of the unverse as exclusively moral is
a serious flaw in Pirsig's ontology; it overlooks the significance of man's
Freedom as the choice-maker of existence.
[John on 2/8]:
>> You think value-sensibility is proprietary to the self, but how
>> can sensibility be proprietary when we only sense some *thing*.
[Ham's response]:
>> Your interpretation of sensibility as sensing some "thing" is
>> off the mark. We sense Value differentially and actualize
>> 'things' experientially.
> It is confusing using the word "thing" the way that you do.
> Is Value a "thing" or isn't it?
Value is most definitely not a "thing".
> However if I construe generously, and squint real hard,
> I think I can get what you mean. However I believe you're
> led astray with "his own private universe". I don't believe
> such actually exists. The universe of experience is that which
> is agreed upon socially. If it weren't for a social disposition
> to see things a certain way, the Inuit and the South Seas
> Islander would view snow exactly the same. They don't,
> because they are attuned to their environment through
> cultural training. The definition of a person locked in his
> own private universe is called "insanity".
I'll overlook the "insanity" clause, except to say that anyone who can't
accept his own experience without society's endorsement has a huge authority
problem. I don't seek society's agreement on what I experience, nor do I
believe you do. I experience snow exactly as the Inuits do (although I
doubt that the South Sea Islander has much the opportunity to experience
snow). The difference lies not in the experience but in the language used
to communicate it, and semantics is of socio-cultural origin.
> Well, it needs sour cream and salsa to be more palatable,
> but basically I think I comprehend the ingredients in your
> formulation and could digest it if there wasn't anything better
> on the menu. I choke over "a relational world in which we
> are the cognizant locus", however as it seems plainly to me
> to be undigestible SOM, through and through. There's the
> world out there, and we're in here, always viewing it
> objectively. It might be a universally held truism, but that
> doesn't mean it makes sense metaphysically.
I'm sorry about your digestive problems, but it is you who are still tauting
the SOM view with your "world out there, we're in here" description. Apart
from acknowledging subjects and objects as what we experience, I've
maintained all along that everything is "in here" in that the universe is a
proprietary value construct. I'm not responsible for how you interpret this
statement. Nor do I see any need to defend the fact that my beliefs are
"psychologically motivated". How, does that differ from being "psychically
motivated"? Indeed, what belief isn't?
That's enough for now. I would comment on your (erroneous) statement
relating "the proper laws of Nature" to morality, and the fatal "hubristic
excesses" that befall those who "cheat or break those laws," except I fear
that would lead us into social polemics which is not my cup of tea.
Try a little sodium bicarbonate, John. It's good for what ails you.
Best regards,
Ham
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