[MD] Quality and the Higgs Field: An Analogy

[ADRIE KINTZIGER]

Ham
"Demonstrably" only in the sense that it is realized by the sensible agent.

To say that Morality "exists" independently of sensibility (i.e., as an

intrinsic feature of the universe) is to posit a myth.  Without conscious

sensibility there is no morality.  Morality is a code of social behavior

instituted by man to reflect his value sensibility.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

comment , Adrie.
i placed some parts of lila , Ham.
my remarks are in the end.

That's why Phædrus got such a weary feeling from all this. All the way
back to the beginning. That's where he had to go.
Because Quality is morality. Make no mistake about it. They're identical.
And if Quality is the primary reality of the world then that means
morality is also the primary reality of the world. The world is primarily
a moral order. But it's a moral order that neither Rigel nor the posing
Victorians had ever, in their wildest dreams, thought about or heard about.


--
The same is true of subjects and objects. The culture in which we live
hands us a set of intellectual glasses to interpret experience with, and
the concept of the primacy of subjects and objects is built right into
these glasses. If someone sees things through a somewhat different set of
glasses or, God help him, takes his glasses off, the natural tendency of
those who still have their glasses on is to regard his statements as
somewhat weird, if not actually crazy.
But he isn't. The idea that values create objects gets less and less weird
as you get used to it. Modern physics on the other hand gets more and more
weird as you get into it and indications are that this weirdness will
increase. In either case, however, weirdness isn't the test of truth. As
Einstein said, common sense-non-weirdness-is just a bundle of prejudices
acquired before the age of eighteen. The tests of truth are logical
consistency, agreement with experience, and economy of explanation. The
Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these.

-----------------
The Metaphysics of Quality has much much more to say about ethics, however,
than simple resolution of the Free Will vs Determinism controversy. The
Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgments are essentially
assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the
world, then moral judgments are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world.
It says that even at the most fundamental level of the universe, static
patterns of value and moral judgment are identical. The "Laws of Nature"
are moral laws. Of course it sounds peculiar at first and awkward and
unnecessary to say that hydrogen and oxygen form water because it is moral
to do so. But it is no less peculiar and awkward and unnecessary than to
say chemistry professors smoke pipes and go to movies because irresistible
cause-and-effect forces of the cosmos force them to do it. In the past the
logic has been that if chemistry professors are composed exclusively of
atoms and if atoms follow only the law of cause and effect, then chemistry
professors must follow the laws of cause and effect too. But this logic
can be applied in a reverse direction. We can just as easily deduce the
morality of atoms from the observation that chemistry professors are, in
general, moral. If chemistry professors exercise choice, and chemistry
professors are composed exclusively of atoms, then it follows that atoms
must exercise choice too. The difference between these two points of view
is philosophic, not scientific.

------------------

Comment , Adrie.
okay, this is the fork , the junction,as were Pirsig is setting the flag.
and it is a red flag...


=>two camps,one follows the philosophical line of reasoning
(Ham on his own).

=>the other camp , Mark and John, following the scientifical line of
reasoning.


at first we have to pay attention to the red flag.
Pirsig>"The difference between these two points of view
is philosophic, not scientific."end.
Apparently it is Pirsig himself declaring the value of all statements
mentioned above as philosophical value's (man induced), and declaring

furthermore, that....
"(pirsig)""NOT SCIENTIFIC".......

Keep in mind that this is a concluding endsentence written in context
declaring value's (intellect induced).

i'v never agreed with Pirsig on this postulate that the laws of nature are
moral laws,because i strongly believe that as wel nature as the universe
are completely indifferent towards morality.I don't have to agree,Pirsig
himself is providing the red flag to me,"The difference between these  two
points is philosophical, not scientifical....";=> Pirsig himself stays on
the philosophical field in the endstatement,..developing the metaphisikal
branch of morality, not the scientifical one.
I think this is the correct choice to make for a Philosopher.
The scientifical path , however,is clearly unlocked by the statement, and
open for development.

------------------
so concluding, Ham, on his own,is still on top of the case, declaring
himself in conflict with pirsig, but flawlessly in tune with the author
to stay on the philosophical side of the flag, trying to recognise value's.
The scientifical path, left open by the author,(John and Mark) is not of
lesser value,and open.They need to be aware of the flag, and the possible
implications.


Coming back on Phaedrus'' statement now.
I think it only misses clarity, i think it is extremely sharp to recognise
this , but it is very easy to misread,to follow his line of reasoning.

------------------
Pirsig

"That's why Phædrus got such a weary feeling from all this. All the way
back to the beginning. That's where he had to go.
Because Quality is morality. Make no mistake about it. They're identical.
And if Quality is the primary reality of the world then that means
morality is also the primary reality of the world. The world is primarily
a moral order."

-------------------
Very thin ice to step on, but i'll try, keep in mind however,(imho)!!, i'm
only speaking for myself, and i am not representing Pirsig's opinion in any
way.

This is how i should write it.(i took the complete content of lila in
consideration)


"Back to the beginning.That's where he had to go.
Because quality is morality.Make no mistake about it.
They're identical."

And if Quality is the primary intellectual reality of the human world
then that means that morality is also the primary intellectual reality of
the human world.
The human world is primarily a moral order.
But imho!!!


greetz, Adrie

2011/2/10 Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net>

> Welcome again, John --
>
> By the way, one of us should change the subject line.  (What more can we
> say about the Higgs Field?)
>
> [Ham previously]:
>
>  Morality is a precept of social behavior sanctioned by
>> the society or culture.
>>
>
> [John]:
>
>> Ok, that seems like a worthy distinction that I hadn't really
>> considered. But my problem with your epistemology remains,
>> for how does socially-defined morality arise if not from the
>> context of a society's relationship with its environment?
>>
>
> I don't see any conflict here.  Society is comprised of individuals
> collectively relating with one another and their common environment.
> Therefore the morality of a society reflects the individual values shared by
> the members.  They won't agree on every issue, but where there is sufficient
> agreement to achieve consensus, those issues will become part of the
> society's moral code.
>
>
>  We are so intertwined with our cosmic context, that it seems plain
>> to me, as Pirsig postulates, that all our morality is ultimately derived
>> from Nature and thus claiming the universe is "amoral" completely
>> side-steps this all-important consideration that Man's morality
>> comes from the relation with Nature, and doesn't just spring up from
>> nothing.  I mean, what happened to "ex niliho niliho fit"?  Or however
>> it was that you spelled the fact that there isn't anything that just pops
>> up out of nothingness.
>>
>
> What is Nature but an intellectual construct of essential value?  That
> construct comprises both the good and the bad.  It is man, the measure of
> all things, who distinguishes what is good (for him) and establishes a moral
> system that will foster it.  Like everything else in our experiential
> reality, morality is a representation of our sensibility to Value, which is
> an aspect of the Absolute Source.  So, why do accuse me of positing Value as
> springing from nothing?  The primary source may not be an 'existent', but it
> is far more real than man's concept of morality.
>
>
>  Ok, so morality arises from values.  Why the distinction then?
>> We're back to the fact that its just differing terms for the same
>> phenomenon, and calling the universe "amoral" is identical to
>> calling it "non-valuable".
>>
>
> I assume you're asking why I distinguish morality from Value.  For the same
> reason that I distinguish intellection from sensibility.  Precepts like
> causality, contrariety, and justice are intellectualized from experience,
> whereas Value is our primary connection with the Source.  The individual is
> a sensible agent of Value.  Everything he experiences is a differentiated
> representation of Value.  Likewise, everything he creates -- art, music,
> literature, architecture, and morality -- are morivated by his value
> orientation.
>
>
>  A lot of things that make no sense at all are quite "universal",
>> so that really doesn't address the logic of your proposition.
>> To my analysis, it is the Pirsigian equation of Value with Morality
>> that ultimately makes more sense than your postulation of man's
>> morality springing up by magic.
>>
>
> There is no "magic" to my ontology.  If it doesn't make sense to you, it's
> because either you misconceive it or are attempting to force it into
> Pirsig's "Quality universe" paradigm.  That won't work, because if Quality
> were "all goodness", as the MoQ suggests, there would be no measure of value
> available to man, no way for him to recognize inferiority from excellence
> and choose accordingly.  But that, in fact, is man's role as the free agent
> of value.  In my opinion, the concept of the unverse as exclusively moral is
> a serious flaw in Pirsig's ontology; it overlooks the significance of man's
> Freedom as the choice-maker of existence.
>
> [John on 2/8]:
>
>> You think value-sensibility is proprietary to the self, but how
>>> can sensibility be proprietary when we only sense some *thing*.
>>>
>>
> [Ham's response]:
>
>  Your interpretation of sensibility as sensing some "thing" is
>>> off the mark.  We sense Value differentially and actualize
>>> 'things' experientially.
>>>
>>
>  It is confusing using the word "thing" the way that you do.
>> Is Value a "thing" or isn't it?
>>
>
> Value is most definitely not a "thing".
>
>
>  However if I construe generously, and squint real hard,
>> I think I can get what you mean.  However I believe you're
>> led astray with "his own private universe".  I don't believe
>> such actually exists.  The universe of experience is that which
>> is agreed upon socially.  If it weren't for a social disposition
>> to see things a certain way, the Inuit and the South Seas
>> Islander would view snow exactly the same.  They don't,
>> because they are attuned to their environment through
>> cultural training.  The definition of a person locked in his
>> own private universe is called "insanity".
>>
>
> I'll overlook the "insanity" clause, except to say that anyone who can't
> accept his own experience without society's endorsement has a huge authority
> problem.  I don't seek society's agreement on what I experience, nor do I
> believe you do.  I experience snow exactly as the Inuits do (although I
> doubt that the South Sea Islander has much the opportunity to experience
> snow).  The difference lies not in the experience but in the language used
> to communicate it, and semantics is of socio-cultural origin.
>
>
>  Well, it needs sour cream and salsa to be more palatable,
>> but basically I think I comprehend the  ingredients in your
>> formulation and could digest it if there wasn't anything better
>> on the menu.  I  choke over "a relational world in which we
>> are the cognizant locus", however as it seems plainly to me
>> to be undigestible SOM, through and through.  There's the
>> world out there, and we're in here, always viewing it
>> objectively.  It might be a universally held truism, but that
>> doesn't mean it makes sense metaphysically.
>>
>
> I'm sorry about your digestive problems, but it is you who are still
> tauting the SOM view with your "world out there, we're in here" description.
>  Apart from acknowledging subjects and objects as what we experience, I've
> maintained all along that everything is "in here" in that the universe is a
> proprietary value construct.  I'm not responsible for how you interpret this
> statement.  Nor do I see any need to defend the fact that my beliefs are
> "psychologically motivated".  How, does that differ from being "psychically
> motivated"?   Indeed, what belief isn't?
>
> That's enough for now.  I would comment on your (erroneous) statement
> relating "the proper laws of Nature" to morality, and the fatal "hubristic
> excesses" that befall those who "cheat or break those laws," except I fear
> that would lead us into social polemics which is not my cup of tea.
>
> Try a little sodium bicarbonate, John.  It's good for what ails you.
>
> Best regards,
> Ham
>
>
>
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