[MD] Fw: The Dynamics of Value

[John Carl]

Greetings Ham,

> Don't tantalize me with thoughts of California weather -- one of the few assets that your bankrupt state can still claim.  As you are well aware, the East Coast is in the midst of a deep freeze.
>

John:

Yes, I was aware.  Perhaps you are aware of a post a while back of a
quote from Royce regarding the differing philosophic temperments as
governed by climate - how metaphysics is governed then by
psychological-environmental input, which is a theme of our recent
discussion.


Ham:

> The need for a primary source has nothing to do with the dependency of my 'I' or its way of seeing.

John:

Are you sure?  How can you be sure?  Isn't "need" entirely a function
of dependency (of an implied self)?

Ham:


>
> Things don't come into being by themselves.  The first postulate of metaphysics is 'ex nihilo nihil fit'.  Nothing comes from nothingness.  No matter how infinitely you regress this universe, or any others that may be presumed to have originated before it, simple logic tells you there must be a creative source (or 'first cause', if you are a causalist.).

John:

But then we're led by your premises, around in a circle to bite
ourselves on the butt.  For what was the cause of this first cause?
What was the source of the primary source?  If everything requires a
source, then nothing is, but we can plainly see that existence IS,
therefore we have to conclude that something doesn't need a source or
a cause.

I think the trouble is with "causes" and "sources" which are
intellectual constructs which can only be relatively true, never
absolutely.  Thus construing causation absolutely, is a logical
fallacy.  The search for a plausible explanation of this, is why I
postulated a psychological dependency stemming from a self with a
beginning, as opposed to  an ultimate truth revealed by simple logic.

Ham:

> John, Absolute Essence is as "all-inclusive and universal" as any entity conceivable.  And it certainly doesn't depend on the existence of an analytical self.
>


John:

But a realization of this essence, certainly does depend upon an
analytical self.  And since a thing apart from our perception of it,
is meaningless, its difficult to understand how come we'd
conceptualize something independent of our conceptualization.

Ham:

>
> Is basing metaphysical fundamentals on betterness your idea of an "all-inclusive and universal" approach?  You assume that "betterness" (Quality) is universal.  But how do you know that my realization of betterness is the same as yours?

John:

It doesn't have to be the same as mine, Ham.  It can be quite
different.  It can be better, or worse - it is thus that "betterness"
transcends difference.

Ham:

>
>  I enjoy listening to classical music and smoking cigars.  (Do you?)

John:

Sure!  Depends on what kind of leaf goes into the cigars... but yeah.

Ham:

>
> I'll vote next year for a conservative president who can most effectively reduce the size of government.  (Will you?)

John:

I always vote for Ralph Nader, but perhaps this isn't so far from your
stance.  I believe Ralph would attack the vast govt./industrial
complex and reduce it's size far more effectively than any
republicrats or demicans.   Do you think Bush did a good job?  Hah!
It's going to take a real outsider to attack the vast mechanisms that
are in place now.

Ham:

> I value these things because they mean "betterness" for me, not necessarily for you.  Value is relative to the individual self, so its realization is a subjective phenomenon.  That's why the valuing agent is individuated and divided from the Source.

John:

Individual valuations do vary, but valuation itself, is constant.
That which does not value, is not cognizant..
>
> [John]:
>>
>> Well consider my above and get back to me if you still wonder.
>

Ham:

>
> I have, and I'm still wondering.  Mark explained your "dependency' syndrome as follows:
>
> [Mark]:
>>
>> It was my understanding that John was talking about the need to
>> include a creator in our analysis of reality or metaphysics was based
>> on our having been created at birth.  Your use of dependency is a
>> little more in the metaphysical realm, and would only be of high
>> quality if what Sartre said appealed to me.  Since I don't understand
>> it, such quality has not been created yet (for me).

John:

I would modify it only the extent that "source" has many analogies,
many differing religious interpretations.  But otherwise, yes, I think
Mark captured my meaning.  We have a source (birth) so we want to
construe a source cosmologically. That's our psychological motivation
to view a source, but I don't see it as metaphysically necessary.

Ham:

>
> I don't assume, as you apparently do, that the dependence of my existence on an impregnated mother and a relational world in any way infers that existence is dependent on a creator.  I don't even believe cause-and-effect is a valid metaphysical principle.  But I do believe the rejection of a primary source is illogical and nihilistic.

John:

Fair enough.  I wouldn't necessarily reject a primary source, either.
But neither would I assert one.  I hold such a belief as "mere belief"
and not to be construed universally.

Ham:

>
> John:

>> Distinct "otherness" would hold no interest for us if we had no way of
>> relating ourselves to it.  We value otherness for it's entanglement and
>> enlargement of our own being.  But I do believe you (and Sartre) are
>> making my point eloquently about the nature of our emotional
>> attachments to our ways of seeing.
>
> I totally agree with this conclusion.  "Interest", "desire", "attraction", and "fulfillment" all relate us to an otherness defined by our value realization.  The illusion is that this other (the beingness we actualize) is reality, whereas the true Reality is the source of our realization.
>
> Stay warm while you can, John.  It has been known to snow in California, too.

We usually get hit the hardest in the spring.  I've known many a 70
degree day in Feb, followed by blizzards in March.

The following is a little something I came across while meandering
through the archives.  I thought it bore some interest to our current
discussion since it contained a previously leveled charge of
psychologically motivated metaphysics.



Re: MD Theism, Non-Theism, Anti-Theism, Nihilism

From: hampday at earthlink.net
Date: Sun Jul 17 2005 - 19:39:29 BST

Michael, MSH, Scott, Arlo, Matt, Reinier --

I'm indebted to Michael and Scott for injecting some moderation into what
has thus far been an unnecessarily heated debate concerning the "religious
issue" vis-a-vis Pirsig's MoQ. Although I'm surprised by the intensity of
the comments, I'm not at all offended. Actually, their emotional tone and
hasty conclusions indicate that I've touched a sore spot that needs to be
addressed.

Since I bear responsibility for having sparked much of the controversy from
the minority side, I'd like a final rebuttal to the comments made about my
statements of 7/15 in the exchanges of Mark with Scott and Michael during
the past week. (I may also want to comment briefly on some of Matt's
comments in a later post.)

MSH wrote on 7/16/95:
> Gentlemen. You are all assuming the reality of a transcendent
> Source, then bending over backward to wedge it into your metaphysics.
> The interesting psychological question is why?

Michael answered:
> Perhaps they were persuded by Pirsig's argument for a transcendent
> source in ZMM?

Scott answered (in part):
> And it is interesting to ask why you see it as a psychological question.
> Are we back to the "religion is for wimps" business? You don't accept
> the possibility that God, or Nothingness, or the Tao, or whatever, might
> not serve one as an intellectual hypothesis?

Scott expresses my reaction exactly. I think Mark's appraisal was a fair
one, and his point that we may be "begging the question" of a transcendent
source deserves a forthright answer. However, I agree with Scott that it is
absurd to suggest that seeing the need for a transcendent source in
the MoQ is the result of a psychological hangup.

I think we all agree that Robert Pirsig has expressed a less than favorable
opinion of metaphysics. One of the Lila paragraphs that struck me on first
reading
was this one from Chpt. 5:
"Historically mystics have claimed that for a true understanding of reality
metaphysics is too 'scientific'. Metaphysics is not reality. Metaphysics is
*names* about reality. Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a
thirty-thousand-page menu and no food."

Well, some of us are hungry for that "food". More than that, we know that
the
food is there; we just don't know how to get at it. Before leaving the
restaurant in disgust, maybe we should ask for another menu. Dagobert Runes
defines metaphysics as "Any scheme of explanation which transcends the
inadequacies or inaccuracies of ordinary thought." It is not easy reading,
and it can often be intimidating; but if answers to what reality is are to
be found anywhere, Metaphysics is the place to find them.

Assuming a "transcendent source" isn't a religious belief any more than it's
a scientific viewpoint. It's the bottom line on the philosophical account
sheet. To get there requires a balance of reason, logic, and intuition.
And I'll be the first to admit that we won't be able to prove it when we do.
But some of us here feel that until we arrive at a theory that accounts for
a transcendent reality, our philosophy is incomplete.

Concerning what I called the challenge of a workable metaphysics,
MSH responded on 7/15/05:
> All of the the above assumes the reality of God

Scott replied:
> I would say that we also cannot attribute to it Unity or "Oneness".
> It is not One, not Many, not One and Many, not neither One nor
> Many.

MSH replies:
> This assumes the reality of God, then tries to provide a logical
> basis for talking about God. BTW, as suggested above, this logical
> theory of "otherness" is unintelligible to me. But let's just assume
> I suffer from some sort of genetic mental deficiency which prevents
> me from understanding something that Ham and Scott are able to grasp.

Michael adds ("sympathetically"?):
> The first few times I saw Ham and Scott using the logic of "not-other"
> and of "contradictory identity", I too found it impenetrable. MSH, you
> say it strikes you as "gibberish" - the point is, from the standpoint
> of conventional logic, it is *complete* gibberish. It's the exact
> equivalent of Pirsig's "definition" of Quality in ZMM:
>
> "Quality is a characteristic of thought and statement that is
> recognized by a nonthinking process. Because definitions are a product
> of rigid, formal thinking, quality cannot be defined."

MSH continued:
> If the theory of "otherness" or "contradictory identity" allows you
> to incorporate an assumed primary source into your metaphysics, why
> won't the same theory support Pirsig's assumption of Quality as the
> primary source?

The Cusan "Not-other" allows the concept of God to be logically defined
without the usual "contradition" or assumption of contrariety. One might
regard it as "essential logic" as opposed to Cartesian logic. If Mr. Pirsig
assumes a primary source, and prefers to call it Quality, it will support
that also. My point, however, is that the MoQ author has NOT DECLARED such
an assumption. He has said only that "Quality is the primary empirical
reality of the world". I submit that "empirical reality" is not
transcendent reality. So, Mark, I'm totally with you in theory, but we
simply don't have it in the MoQ.

Michael says:
> These theories, to me, pervert traditional logic so that logic can
> deal with an ineffable entity such as Quality, God, Tao or whatever.
> They don't "support" the assumption of the existence of such an
> entity, they merely describe the entity. They are not arguments, but
> analogies - analogies for any Western intellectual reader with a
> grounding in formal logic (and an ability to understand rather strange
> grammatical structures, I think!)

Michael, if by "support" you mean "proof" for the assumption, you are
correct. They do, however, provide logical support for belief in a
transcendent source. They are not intended to "describe" that source,
since, as was explained in my first paragraph, no such description is
possible:

"Any assertion about God would [then] be only metaphorical and would not
serve as an established basis of knowledge." --Andrey Smirnov

Again, my point was that by using Cusa's theory we are able to deal with the
transcendent source as a logical premise. The question then becomes either:
Why shouldn't we? or Why should we? -- depending on the metaphysical
viewpoint we are expounding.

In my philosophy of Essence, a transcendent source is a necessary
assumption. In the MoQ it is assumed to be unnecessary and is discouraged.

Thank you all for the chance to clarify my position.

Regards,
Ham

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