[MD] Fw: The Dynamics of Value

[Ham Priday]

John, from a snowed-in poster --


Ham:
> The need for a primary source has nothing to do with the
> dependency of my 'I' or its way of seeing.

John:
> Are you sure? How can you be sure? Isn't "need" entirely
> a function of dependency (of an implied self)?

Forget about "dependency".  Try need as a NECESSITY.  As I said before:
> Things don't come into being by themselves. The first postulate of
> metaphysics is 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. Nothing comes from nothingness.
> No matter how infinitely you regress this universe, or any others that
> may be presumed to have originated before it, simple logic tells you
> there must be a creative source (or 'first cause', if you are a 
> causalist.).

John:
> But then we're led by your premises, around in a circle to bite
> ourselves on the butt. For what was the cause of this first cause?
> What was the source of the primary source? If everything requires a
> source, then nothing is, but we can plainly see that existence IS,
> therefore we have to conclude that something doesn't need a source or
> a cause.
>
> I think the trouble is with "causes" and "sources" which are
> intellectual constructs which can only be relatively true, never
> absolutely. Thus construing causation absolutely, is a logical
> fallacy. The search for a plausible explanation of this, is why I
> postulated a psychological dependency stemming from a self with a
> beginning, as opposed to an ultimate truth revealed by simple logic.

If you didn't believe there is such a thing as "absolute truth", you 
wouldn't be philosophizing.
Psychology is the science of mind and human behavior.  You can't build a 
metaphysical ontology on psychological dependency.  Your comments above are 
not related to a search for truth or logic but to suppositions about the 
psychology of beliefs.

John:
> But a realization of this essence, certainly does depend upon an
> analytical self. And since a thing apart from our perception of it,
> is meaningless, its difficult to understand how come we'd
> conceptualize something independent of our conceptualization.

I disagree.  One can have a conception about something without actually 
perceiving it.  This is intuitive logic, I concede; but in the case of 
Essence, the concept of an "uncreated source" resolves the issue of first 
cause without introducing the paradox of infinite regression.  Eckhart 
achieved this with his conception of total 'IS-ness', as did Cusa with his 
principle of the 'Not-Other'.  Note that neither solution is descriptive, 
yet both afford logical solutions to the 'ex nihil nihilo fit' logic.

Ham, previously:
> Value is relative to the individual self, so its realization is 
> subjective.
> That's why the valuing agent is individuated and divided from the Source.

John:
> Individual valuations do vary, but valuation itself, is constant.
> That which does not value, is not cognizant.

It is the subjective self which values.  If the valuation is different from 
one individual to the next, and does not apply in some instances, I don't 
see how it is "constant".

John:
> We have a source (birth) so we want to construe a source
> cosmologically. That's our psychological motivation to view
> a source, but I don't see it as metaphysically necessary.

Our motivation, psychologically or desideristically, is to "seize the 
Essence" -- to have the "Being" of the Source for ourselves (to paraphrase 
Sartre).  This is of course impossible for a finite creature.  But that fact 
doesn't invalidate the necessity of a Primary Source.

> Fair enough. I wouldn't necessarily reject a primary source, either.
> But neither would I assert one. I hold such a belief as "mere belief"
> and not to be construed universally.

That's taking an equivocal position, John.  Why equivocate on a fundamental 
premise?  It's hardly what one would expect of a philosopher.

By the way, your "archived" post is a gem, if I do say so myself.

[Ham, from July 2005]:
> I think we all agree that Robert Pirsig has expressed a less than 
> favorable
> opinion of metaphysics. One of the Lila paragraphs that struck me on first
> reading was this one from Chpt. 5:
> "Historically mystics have claimed that for a true understanding of 
> reality
> metaphysics is too 'scientific'. Metaphysics is not reality. Metaphysics 
> is
> 'names' about reality. Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a
> thirty-thousand-page menu and no food."
>
> Well, some of us are hungry for that "food". More than that, we know that
> the food is there; we just don't know how to get at it. Before leaving the
> restaurant in disgust, maybe we should ask for another menu. Dagobert
> Runes defines metaphysics as "Any scheme of explanation which transcends
> the inadequacies or inaccuracies of ordinary thought." It is not easy 
> reading,
> and it can often be intimidating; but if answers to what reality is are to
> be found anywhere, Metaphysics is the place to find them.
>
> Assuming a "transcendent source" isn't a religious belief any more than 
> it's
> a scientific viewpoint. It's the bottom line on the philosophical account
> sheet. To get there requires a balance of reason, logic, and intuition.
> And I'll be the first to admit that we won't be able to prove it when we 
> do.
> But some of us here feel that until we arrive at a theory that accounts 
> for
> a transcendent reality, our philosophy is incomplete.

If I really said all this, why are you folks still demanding more arguments?

Essentially curious,
Ham