[MD] Freewill

[david buchanan]

Steve said:
Where I disagree with dmb is in that I think the MOQ reformulation of the question of freedom DOES significantly alter the basic definitions of free will and determinism. The MOQ rejects both horns of the traditional dilemma and reformulates the problem in a way that is incompatible with the traditional formulation rather than being some middle ground or saying that both sides are partially right.  ...The only similarity is that we have freedom on one side and constraint on the other. ..."To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."

dmb says:

I think your explanation is confused. The MOQ's reformulation says one's behavior is CONTROLLED to some extent. The meaning of Pirsig sentence is going to be exactly the same if we replace "controlled" with "determined". The same is true for Pirsig's second sentence. The MOQ denies the Cartesian self AND also asserts that one's behavior is free to some extent. But clearly, you are insisting that one particular ANSWER to the question of free will and determinism forever defines the QUESTION of whether human action is free or determined. I mean, don't we all understand that the MOQ's reformulation is first and foremost predicated on a rejection of SOM. And doesn't that necessarily mean that the "one" who is free to some and extent and controlled to some extent is NOT an uncaused causer and that "one" is not determined by the mechanical laws of cause and effect? Doesn't that mean we are talking about the extent to which the MOQ's self is free or controlled? The confusion comes when the rejected metaphysical assumptions are reintroduced or inserted back into the conversation... 

Steve said:
To deny free will is to deny the uncaused causer (see also Pirsig's dissolution of the mind-body problem). To deny determinism is to deny the mechanistic universe. There is nothing incompatible with doing both. 


dmb says:
There is a good example. You've equated free will with an uncaused causer and equated determinism with a mechanistic universe. But, again, we are talking about freedom and control as it relates to the MOQ's self , as it relates to "one's behavior" in a universe that is value all the way down. I mean, we are still talking about the extent to which PEOPLE are free to act as they will and the extent to which our actions are determined. To say we are determined by the laws of cause and effect is just one answer to the question, an answer we can reject without also rejecting the question. The MOQ's reformulation is a different answer to the question. I mean, if we are going to discuss the meaning of Pirsig reformulation, we have to be able to talk about freedom and control OUTSIDE of SOM and that means that free will is NOT the free will OF any little god or soul or anything like that. We have to be able to talk about what constraints mean OUTSIDE of mechanistic causal constraints. Isn't that the point of the reformulation? To talk about the extent of human freedom in the absence of those SOM assumptions? 

Since Pirsig says that we are free to some extent, he has denied determinism to some extent. His reformulation says we are controlled to some extent, so he has affirmed determinism to some extent. The point here is simply that one can affirm or deny either position without committing one's self to any particular metaphysical assumption about the nature of the self or the nature of the universe, such as SOM. The fact that Pirsig's reformulation uses the term "controlled" instead of "determined" certainly doesn't mean that he's simply rejected the notion that we could constrained in any way. Pirsig has rejected the notion that we are controlled by mechanistic, causal factors and he rejects the notion that we are entirely determined by anything but his reformulation obviously includes a different kind of controlling factor so that we are determined to some extent. If Pirsig can reject the metaphysical self and still say that one's behavior is free to some extent, then why can't I? I mean, doesn't the Pirsig quote prove that the question of free will and determinism can be answered without committing yourself to the metaphysics of the bad answer, without the metaphysical framework we've already rejected? 


The only similarity is that we have freedom on one side and constraint on the other? What other similarity could we possibly hope for? The MOQ's reformulation is an answer to the question of freedom and constraint. It is different from the traditional answers, of course. But that answer clearly does says that one is both free to some extent and controlled to some extent. I really don't see how you can plausibly deny that EXCEPT by re-inserting the premise of the old formulation into Pirsig's reformulated new answer. So, when I say your explanation is "confused", I'm not insulting you. I'm criticizing your argument and trying to separate things that are tangled up or inappropriately tied to other things. As you can see from this explanation, hopefully, I mean "confused" in a formal or logical sense. To oversimplify it a bit, freedom is the not exclusive property of Cartesians of Christians and scientific materialists are not the only ones concerned with controlling factors. You're letting the question be defined by their SOM answers. As I see it, you're insisting that the baby is metaphysically attached to the dirty old bathwater. And so you end up throwing the good stuff out the window and you end up misreading Pirsig's answer. You know, so that being "controlled" is nothing like being "determined" and "one's behavior is free" to some extent but this has nothing to do with whether or not we can act freely? Huh? It looks to me like you're bending over backwards to deny the obvious. If DQ is the quality of freedom and sq is the quality of order and in the MOQ that's the stuff that everything is made of, including us, then the whole dang shooting match, the whole evolutionary game of living is all about nothing but freedom and constraint. I think this is very, very far away from the conclusion that we ought to reject questions about freedom and constraint as meaningless. We want the bad answers to go away when SOM goes away but the questions and the MOQ does have an answer that says we are both controlled and free to some extent.