[MD] Free Will

Steven Peterson peterson.steve at gmail.com
Tue Jun 14 05:15:33 PDT 2011


Hi Ron,

On Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 10:27 PM, X Acto <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:
> "It is, again, the capacity for choice that makes us accountable for
> our own actions and states. Epictetus is particularly fond of
> exploring the implications of this essentially Stoic conception.
> In studying his usage it is helpful to remember that his favored
> term prohairesis refers more often to the capacity for choice than
> it does to particular acts of choosing. The word is variously
> translated; the rendering “volition” is adopted here as in Long 2002.
> The volition, Epictetus argues, is “by nature unimpeded” (1.17.21),
> and it is for this reason that freedom is for him an inalienable
> characteristic of the human being. The very notion of a capacity
> to make one's own decisions implies as a matter of logical necessity
> that those decisions are free of external compulsion; otherwise they
> would not be decisions. But humans do have such a capacity and are
> thus profoundly different from even the higher animals, which deal
> with impressions merely in an unreflective way..."

To quote The Dude, "that's just, like...your opinion, man."

I think we would be more loving compassionate people if we dropped the
dubious notion of free will.

Best,
Steve



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