[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Ham,


> Steve --
>> How is the preference in intellectual preferences different
>> in kind from biological preferences? I can't simply decide
>> by force of will to prefer 2+2=5 over 2+2=4 any more than
>> I can will myself not to bleed when stabbed through the heart.

Ham:
> I'm not distinguishing biological preferences from intellectual preferences.
> Preferences are volitional responses to value sensibility.  They can be
> emotional, physical, aesthetic, social, or intellectual.  Mathematical
> "values" are a horse of a different color.  We don't respond valuistically
> to numbers or equations any more than to the fact that Paris is a city in
> France, or that the sun rises in the morning.  So, I fail to see why you
> would suppose that equations had any relevance to sensible value or personal
> preference.

Steve:
In the MOQ, every response is a "valuistic" one, but, whatever.


Ham:
> Why do you insist on complicating what amounts to exercising your will?
>
> Do you prefer coffee or tea?  Do you like pop music or the classics?  Are
> you more attracted to blondes or brunettes?  Do you support liberal or
> conservative candidates?  THESE are preferences, Steve.  They are all based
> on your personal values.


Steve:
Sure, these are preferences, but I don't recognize any freedom to not
value what I now value. I am a collection of such values. (I don't
have such values, such values have me.)

I prefer coffee to tea, and I can choose coffee over tea or tea over
coffee in any given situation if I want, but my preferences simply are
what they are. They aren't "free" as far as I can tell. I can't change
what I want as a simple matter of will. I am not free to prefer tea
over coffee. If my preferences change over time (which is to say, if
the collection of patterns of value referred to as "I" changes over
time), it will not be a matter of will but of having new experiences.

I actually want to like tea, especially iced tea since it is so often
offered this time of year, but I just don't.  That wouldn't even be a
problem if I could just will myself not to want to want to like iced
tea which I can't do even if I want to want to want to like iced tea.
Do you see the problem of regress inherent in asserting freedom of
will?

Einstein made the same point:

"Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they talk about
the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling, for instance, that I
will something or other; but what relation this has with freedom I
cannot understand at all. I feel that I will to light my pipe and I do
it; but how can I connect this up with the idea of freedom? What is
behind the act of willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing?
Schopenhauer once said: Der Mensch kann was er will; er kann aber
nicht wollen was er will (Man can do what he will but he cannot will
what he wills). (Planck, M. Where is Science Going?, p. 201)"

Best,
Steve