[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

Hi again, Steve --

> In the MOQ, every response is a "valuistic" one, but, whatever.
>
> Ham:
> Do you prefer coffee or tea?  Do you like pop music or
> the classics?  Are you more attracted to blondes or brunettes?
> Do you support liberal or conservative candidates?
> THESE are preferences, Steve. They are all based on your
> personal values.

Steve:
> Sure, these are preferences, but I don't recognize any
> freedom to not value what I now value. I am a collection
> of such values. (I don't have such values, such values have me.)

That's a Pirsigian parody on value which is deceitful, in my opinion.  Value 
is a reciprocal attribute of existence.  In a metaphysical sense, it is what 
binds us to the Source.  From the existential perspective, value is what one 
wants, loves, or desires.  Human beings don't come with a pre-packaged set 
of values, nor does value itself determine what one's preferences will be. 
Individual sensibility does this in the process of experiencing.

> ...I am not free to prefer tea over coffee. If my preferences change
> over time (which is to say, if the collection of patterns of value
> referred to as "I" changes over time), it will not be a matter of will
> but of having new experiences.

You are free to "choose" coffee, tea, or bourbon, for whatever reason.  Your 
personal preferences, however, are value-driven.  That drive will be 
different for you than for me.  Value-sensibility is prior to both will and 
action.  Because each individual differentiates the range of values by his 
own sensible standards, what he values (or disparages) will vary from person 
to person.  Thus, if you are thirsty (which may serve as a physiological 
example of "hydration value") your will (i.e., intent) is to drink.  The 
action you take in response to this value is your free choice, depending of 
course on the options available at the time.

> I actually want to like tea, especially iced tea since it is so often
> offered this time of year, but I just don't.  That wouldn't even be
> a problem if I could just will myself not to want to want to like
> iced tea which I can't do even if I want to want to want to like
> iced tea.  Do you see the problem of regress inherent in asserting
> freedom of will?

Not really.  I used to smoke cigarettes and suck on a pipe.  It was a habit 
I enjoyed, until I developed a cough and willed myself to stop.  I now smoke 
an occasional cigar, which I found more enjoyable and less cough-producing. 
But should this prove to be detrimental to my heath, I'm convinced that I 
could will myself off cigars, too.

> Einstein made the same point:
>
> "Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they
> talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling,
> for instance, that I will something or other; but what relation
> this has with freedom I cannot understand at all. I feel that I
> will to light my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this
> up with the idea of freedom? What is behind the act of
> willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing?"
>
> Schopenhauer once said: Der Mensch kann was er will;
> er kann aber nicht wollen was er will (Man can do what he
> will but he cannot will what he wills).

Man cannot will what he wants, but he can will what he intends.  I think 
there's a distinction to be made between "wanting" and "willing" that these 
men overlooked.  Willing expresses "intention" but is not necessarily what 
we want.  I may want to sleep past ten in the morning, but knowing that I 
have work that won't wait, I exercise my free will to set the alarm for 
eight instead.

I may want to write more on free will, but my intention is to fulfill other 
commitments right now, so I bid you adieux.

Thanks, Steve,
Ham