[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Ham,

Steve:
>> I actually want to like tea, especially iced tea since it is so often
>> offered this time of year, but I just don't.  That wouldn't even be
>> a problem if I could just will myself not to want to want to like
>> iced tea which I can't do even if I want to want to want to like
>> iced tea.  Do you see the problem of regress inherent in asserting
>> freedom of will?

Ham:
> Not really.  I used to smoke cigarettes and suck on a pipe.  It was a habit
> I enjoyed, until I developed a cough and willed myself to stop.  I now smoke
> an occasional cigar, which I found more enjoyable and less cough-producing.
> But should this prove to be detrimental to my heath, I'm convinced that I
> could will myself off cigars, too.

Steve:
You didn't will yourself to not want to smoke which was what was
required in the example I gave. Your value of smoking can be trumped
by your value of personal health if you happen to value one over the
other, but you can't will yourself to value one over the other. Either
you do or you don't. Your are not free to value smoking over your
health if you actually value your health more than smoking.

Steve:
>> Einstein made the same point:
>>
>> "Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they
>> talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling,
>> for instance, that I will something or other; but what relation
>> this has with freedom I cannot understand at all. I feel that I
>> will to light my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this
>> up with the idea of freedom? What is behind the act of
>> willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing?"
>>
>> Schopenhauer once said: Der Mensch kann was er will;
>> er kann aber nicht wollen was er will (Man can do what he
>> will but he cannot will what he wills).

Ham:
> Man cannot will what he wants, but he can will what he intends.  I think
> there's a distinction to be made between "wanting" and "willing" that these
> men overlooked.  Willing expresses "intention" but is not necessarily what
> we want.  I may want to sleep past ten in the morning, but knowing that I
> have work that won't wait, I exercise my free will to set the alarm for
> eight instead.


Steve:
If you agree with me that "Man cannot will what we wants..." as you
say above, then what does it mean to say that his will is free? Man
wills things but saying that not only does he have will but that this
will is also free doesn't seem to mean anything. All you are saying
then is the obvious claim that man has preferences and acts on them.
These preferences often conflict and one preference often takes
precedence over another in given situations. Where exactly does
freedom come into this?

Best,
Steve