[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Matt,

Matt:
> ... if determinism is the
> thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not
> destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is
> something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains.  Moral
> reasoning _needs_ causal chains.  And if that's the case, why on
> earth would determinism destroy moral reasoning?

Steve:
That's basically what Dennett said in the interview Ham and Craig
referenced, and it's a great point. Dennett reformulates free will as
the human capacity to play out scenarios in our heads before acting
them out and then asks, what good would free will be without
determinism? If we didn't think that our actions had at least somewhat
predictable effects (including effects on other people and what we
think they will do in response to what we do), what good would it be
to be able to choose among possible actions? Instead of free will
opposing determinism, free will depends on determinism.

As you point out above, the same goes for the notion of moral
responsibility. Moral responsibility cannot be threatened by
determinism when moral reasoning can only make sense in the context of
determinism.

In that interview Dennett also clears up confusion between fatalism
and determinism which I think have been confused in this thread.
Fatalism means that whatever we do we cannot avoid a given outcome
whereas determinism says that what we do matters. Different actions
have different consequences.

Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a
concern if you imagine an omniscient super-being, but it still manages
to keep James and dmb awake at night.

Best,
Steve