[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

Steve, Craig, Matt and All --

On Wed, June 22, 2011 7:31 PM, "Steven Peterson" <peterson.steve at gmail.com> 
wrote to Matt:

> Matt:
> ... if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up in causal
> chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because
> moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_ of
> causal chains.  Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains.  And
> if that's the case, why on earth would determinism destroy
> moral reasoning?
>
> Steve:
> That's basically what Dennett said in the interview Ham and Craig
> referenced, and it's a great point. Dennett reformulates free will as
> the human capacity to play out scenarios in our heads before acting
> them out and then asks, what good would free will be without
> determinism? If we didn't think that our actions had at least somewhat
> predictable effects (including effects on other people and what we
> think they will do in response to what we do), what good would it be
> to be able to choose among possible actions?  Instead of free will
> opposing determinism, free will depends on determinism.
>
> As you point out above, the same goes for the notion of moral
> responsibility. Moral responsibility cannot be threatened by
> determinism when moral reasoning can only make sense in the context
> of determinism.

Free will depends on determinism.  A seminal point, indeed, and you've 
developed it brilliantly, Steve.
I'm glad the links to this philosopher's interviews proved worthwhile.  As 
Reason's science correspondent Ronald Bailey noted in the preface to his 
interview, "Dennett maintains that to whatever extent we were ever at the 
mercy of our genes and biological evolution, we no longer are.  Instead our 
genes are now at the mercy of our brains."  And that should effectively 
resolve the age-old determinism vs. free will controversy, but for one 
additional issue: agency.

Unless we grant that the Will referred to in this dialectic is that of an 
independent agent, the principle of Free Will is a meaningless neurological 
phenomenon.  Unfortunately Dennett couched the subject of his concept in 
mechanistic terms, referring to the human 'willer' as a "choice machine." 
While this enabled him to contrast the free agent with a "situation-action 
machine", his analogy misses the 'noumenal' aspect of Freedom.  Making genes 
subservient to brains is a biological proposition.  Only when we understand 
Will as the "intent" of a cognizant being can we realize the metaphysical 
significance of free agency.

Admittedly this is a difficult concept to get across to people who reject 
proprietary awareness and individual autonomy, even if the denied "subject" 
is presented in terms of "spov".  Yet, the fact remains that you and I are 
active agents of this phenomenal reality which, without our awareness, would 
have no empirical (i.e., experiential) validity.  But this argument will 
have to be a topic for another discussion.

> In that interview Dennett also clears up confusion between fatalism
> and determinism which I think have been confused in this thread.
> Fatalism means that whatever we do we cannot avoid a given outcome
> whereas determinism says that what we do matters.  Different actions
> have different consequences.
>
> Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a
> concern if you imagine an omniscient super-being, but it still manages
> to keep James and dmb awake at night.

There's no need to lose sleep over this issue, Steve, if you understand that 
teleology, unlike space/time existence, is not a cause-and-effect phenomenon 
but the end that is immanent in the cosmic design itself. As you know, I 
happen to believe in an Absolute Source that's not a "super-being" but whose 
omniscience is not limited to sequential events but transcends both 
evolution and individuality.  At least one person I know (a former MD 
participant) attributes creation to an "idea" (I AM).  Although Essence is 
an idea (in my mind), it is also the Absolute Reality that accounts for all 
finite difference and appearance -- including free agency.

But this topic, too, shall have to be the subject for another day ... if not 
some other forum.

Essentially speaking,
Ham