[MD] Free Will

[Dan Glover]

Hello everyone

On Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Matt Kundert
<pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hey Dan,
>
> Matt said:
> I didn't mean a textual ambiguity on Pirsig's part, but an idea I've
> before called the indeterminacy of Dynamic Quality thesis.  I think
> Pirsig is more or less clear about the difference between Dynamic
> Quality and chaos.  What I meant is that the distinction between DQ
> and chaos _comes along with necessarily_ the ambiguity between
> them in the present felt experience of a person.  That's how I've
> interpreted Pirsig's discussion of degeneracy on Lila 255-59.  Pirsig
> asks the question, "how do you tell the saviors from the degenerates?"
>  And then he moves back to descriptions of New York.  As far as I can
> tell, he doesn't give that question an answer, nor anywhere else that
> doesn't appeal back to the felt experience of betterness.
>
> Dan said:
> "It's the freedom to be so awful that gives it [New York City] the
> freedom to be so good." [Lila]
>
> I know he's talking about a city but he could just as well be talking
> about degenerates and and saviors... the Zuni brujo, for instance.
> In the midst of the darkness there is a Dynamic sparkle. What tells
> them apart? I would posit the narrative of life; the stories they tell
> (of) themselves. Isn't that what LILA is all about?
>
> Matt:
> Yes, but you aren't awful and good at the same time (at least, I don't
> think that's what Pirsig is saying here).  Pirsig at that moment has
> moved to talking about providing a structure that accommodates DQ.
> And, he says, the only way to do that is to allow the good and the
> awful (and hence, New York).

Dan:

Lila kills her baby, breaks up a marriage, and turns to prostitution.
She is a karma dump... someone to blame and hate. That's pretty awful
stuff in anybody's book. Yet, when asked by Rigel, Phaedrus says, yes,
she has Quality. Or rather, Quality has her. That is the one moral
thing Phaedrus did during the whole trip. So Lila (or any of us) can
be seen as both awful and good at the same time, right?


>Matt:
> What Pirsig doesn't answer is how _you_ know for sure _you_ are
> being Dynamic and not Awful.  I don't think Pirsig has an answer that
> gives that certainty, I think giving an answer that gives that certainty
> would be antithetical to Pirsig's project, and so therefore I codified
> that thought as "the indeterminacy of Dynamic Quality thesis": in the
> moment, there is no certain way to be sure whether you are acting
> Dynamically or degenerately (i.e. tending toward chaos).

Dan:

Not beforehand, no. Not statically. And yes, I see what you mean by
the indeterminacy of Dynamic Quality. That's what's there "before" the
intellectualized moment. It's a feeling we get... what we call
intuition, gut instinct, premonition.

>Matt:
> Your answer (which is my answer) is "the narrative of life."  This,
> however, is a not a good answer to the question "how do you _know_
> you are a savior and not a degenerate?" because it is a
> _retrospective_ answer.  It says that experience gives you your idea
> of when you are behaving well or awfully.  It says that only after
> you've found out the consequences of your actions can you be in a
> position to tell whether it was good or awful.  I think this is the right
> answer, but it is also consistent with the indeterminacy of DQ thesis.

Dan:

Yes, that seems right to me as well.

>
> Dan said:
> You seemed to be saying karma (karmic delusions, evolutionary
> garbage) plays as a primitivistic notion. I tend to disagree. But at the
> same time, I see a need to at least lean in that direction, at least in
> the beginning. But of course I am not privy to your "non-Pirsigian
> qualms." I was rather hoping you might expand on that.
>
> Matt:
> I don't have any more readily explicable thoughts about the dangers
> of metaphysical primitivism.  In your reply, I didn't understand how
> you were hooking up with any of those thoughts, so I have no sense of
> what more should be said.  I also don't know what it means to
> disagree with a "primitivistic notion" and at the same "lean in that
> direction."  For "primitivism" to be a useful polemical concept, I would
> not want to confuse it with the value of simplicity.  You might say that
> primitivism is what you get when you start with the (laudable) value of
> simplicity and (riskily) make it your only value.  Something like that.
>
> The main thing that I avoid is the rhetoric of "delusions" and
> "garbage."  It's those pieces of your vocabulary that make me think
> something bad is going on (e.g., perhaps primitivism).  I don't see
> the point in calling history/evolution/karma delusory or garbage.
> There might be delusions and garbage floating around _in_ history,
> but I don't understand the point of calling all of reality an
> illusion/delusion (much like the concept of maya seems to).

Dan:

RMP seems to mention this only in passing, towards the end of LILA.
But it seems to me that tying together an understanding of karma, the
differing spin that causality vs B values precondition A puts on
things, and a positive outcome on the narrative of one's life is of
paramount importance to the whole book. To do as one pleases doesn't
mean to run wild in the streets. It means moving from something to
nothing. And that is all we can say, basically, though I'll try a
little later to better explain what I mean...

>
> Matt said:
> I don't think what I said about primitivism clouds anything you said
> here about karma.  But I also don't think anything you said here
> justifies the description of (karmic) history as a "delusion."
>
> Dan said:
> I am sure you are much more familiar with Hegel than I. And
> whether anything I say is justified, well, I leave others to decide that.
> If you don't think I have explained my position adequately, then I
> haven't. But it seems as if you agree with what I am saying, but are
> using different words to do it.
>
> Matt:
> These are odd responses, Dan.  The sense of "justification" you're
> talking about is, yes, of course others decide whether one is justified
> in what they believe, but if the others don't think so--for a "talking
> about" to count as conversational inquiry--they push back by pointing
> to the places that need more/different justification (from their lights).
> Pointing this general fact out about "whether anything I say is
> justified" is a non sequitor in our focused conversation.  As is
> whether you've "explained your position adequately."  It seems from
> both of our standpoints, now, after a few turns of the email-exchange
> wheel, that we both think that we agree with what each other is
> saying but each of us is using different words.  However, above just
> now in this email, and in the previous email's "But I also don't think
> anything you said here justifies the description of (karmic) history as
> a 'delusion,'" I've pressed you on a _specific_ item that I happen to
> think calls for more justification _even given our agreement_.
> _Those_ words, so I think, require more to be said about why one
> would use them to make the point we agree on.  You are largely
> saying the same thing as I would want to say with different words,
> but part of what you're saying I wouldn't want to say at all.

Dan:

Fair enough. And while working out an explanation (for myself as well
as in response to your query) may not satisfy either of us, it seems
worthwhile.

What RMP seems to be saying in LILA is that it isn't necessarily
history itself that is karmic delusion, but the pain and suffering of
clinging to static patterns that make up a culture, or the world, if
you will. I think this aligns well with Buddhist beliefs that life is
"dukka," often translated as suffering but better thought of as a
wheel out of kilter, or a continuous stutter. Something that doesn't
seem too bothersome at first, but over time, tends to wear on a
person. And finally, it is all a person can discern.

Karma can be seen both as a result of causal relationships and as a
set of preconditioned responses (values) to a given situation. Within
the context of the former, we become pawns hopelessly trapped in
events beyond our control. That makes us feel better. And by passing
along all the hurt and suffering to others, we make ourselves a little
less crazy. That's the way things work. That's normal.

Within the context of the latter, by valuing the not passing on of all
the hurt and suffering to others, we somehow make the world (our
culture) a better place. This Dynamic undertaking means letting go of
all static patterns, or more properly, all intellectual quality
patterns that inform us. We come to see those static intellectual
patterns we hold so dear are merely a delusion, albeit a high quality
delusion, that makes up the world as we know it. And we let go of them
so that morality can be served.

Does that help? Or am I only muddying the waters?

>Matt:
> It's perfectly fair not to have any more conversational justification at
> this moment.  That's kind of what I just said with respect to
> primitivism.  I don't use a strong version of "justify what you say" in
> my conversations with people.  I think one of the oddities of this
> discussion group is that people use stronger versions of "justify what
> you say" requirements on _other_ people than they do on
> _themselves_.  (So it seems to me after having watched the
> discussions for these many years.)  I try (try!) largely to hold myself
> to stronger requirements than I do my interlocutors, and that way at
> least avoid looking like a hypocrite.  I think the best use of this
> discussion group is just making as much explicit as you can at the
> moments that you can.  I don't think we need to make rhetorical
> flourishes like "I'll leave others to decide" because I think everyone
> should just be taking that as a given.  If we took each other seriously
> but lightly, I think people would get a lot better thinking done in the
> confines of the MD and it would look a lot less like a bloodbath.

Dan:

Yes, we all tend to hold our beliefs as sacrosanct. I also attempt to
hold myself to a higher standard (although I don't always succeed, to
be sure) in these discussions. There are times when I hold this
discussion group in higher esteem than others and I am not sure why
that is. Perhaps the quality of discussion varies, or perhaps it is
only my perception of the discussions that varies.

>
> Dan said:
> Whatever you think I am, or wish me to be, I am. I am defined by
> family, friends, co-workers, everyone I know. Or better, who knows
> me. That is how the narrative of my life is grounded.
>
> It is  important to understand that I am not talking specifically about
> me as an individual or you as a person. I am talking about social
> patterns of quality and how those values inform us on who we are
> and our place in the world.
>
> That there is a dysfunctional narrative that informs us that we are
> free to choose who we are and what we do doesn't mean that
> there is a "correct" narrative, however. Is that what you are asking?
>
> Matt:
> I'm not sure anymore what I was asking.
>
> I'm not saying there is a "correct" narrative.  However, I think we
> should be able to agree that there are better and worse narratives
> (by Pirsigian lights), right?

Dan:

Yes, I would say so.

>Matt:
> Given that there are better and worse narratives, I think I was talking
> about changing from a dysfunctional narrative that uses a notion of
> free will to suggest to people that changing everything about one's
> life is as easy as waking up in the morning--to a functional narrative
> that doesn't do that (options being Pirsig, or Dennett, or Hegel, etc.).

Dan:

That is a good way of putting it. A functional narrative doesn't
necessarily constitute a correct narrative. It is just better.

>Matt:
> So, even if one grants that "the narrative of my life is grounded" in
> the community one finds oneself (a preeminently Hegelian point of
> view), that still leaves open the question about whether one can
> change their narrative.  All your story did was punch up that it is
> harder than Tony Robbins sometimes would lead you to believe to
> change your life (though Robbins, in a reflective "off" moment would
> probably agree, but respond that--in his "on" moments--his job is to
> instill in his audience the _confidence_ that change is _possible_).
> That you failed, when you got home, to become a mouse-like
> vigilante just means that you were unwilling to break the (large
> volume of) expectations other's put upon you by thinking they know
> who you are (it could mean other things, too: like that you forgot
> all about the fact that in Hawaii you desired to be Mighty Mouse).
> That doesn't mean that you don't have the practical freedom to
> choose to be someone else.  It just means that, on reflection, you
> weren't willing to break all of those social proprieties.

Dan:

What (I think) the story of Hawaii and Tony Robbins was meant to say
was that the narrative of my life isn't mine to change. What I call
"my" life is a collection of static patterns of quality that cements
"me" into a place I am comfortable being. And that cement is like an
iceberg... the largest part of it unseen and below the surface. So,
practically, I can chip away at the surface by following the advice of
people like Tony Robbins and other self-help gurus, but the only way
to really effect change in the narrative of what I call "my" life is
to kill (or put to sleep) those patterns that are so deeply entrenched
as to resist any freely-sought-after alterations.

Those patterns consist of not only what I know, but of what everyone
else who knows me knows. It is like seeing a tee shirt and jeans kind
of guy we know well suddenly walking around in a four thousand dollar
tailored suit and four hundred dollar shoes. We automatically want to
know "what's up?" We search for reasons to put things back into
perspective. Failing to do that means that fellow is liable to be
shunned by all those who once "knew" him. While this isn't necessarily
a "bad' thing, it means killing, or putting to sleep, all those social
quality patterns that once held that fellow into place.


>
> Dan said:
> Value implies preference while causation implies certainty, and if we
> are looking at philosophy as predicated on every day life, nothing is
> certain. So to use a causal chain of events to explain that philosophy
> lacks the necessary grounding in what we are seeking to explain,
> doesn't it?
>
> Matt:
> Oh.  I guess I don't think causation implies certainty.  You might say
> that in my set-up of how stuff works, I incorporate "the uncertainty
> of life" at a different level.  A causal relationship itself doesn't imply
> certainty, because certainty only comes up for persons attempting
> to adjudicate questions of causality.  "Hey Bob, did Sally cause
> Steve's death?"  "Oh, yeah, I'm certain of it because I saw her do
> it!"  The causal relationship itself doesn't establish certainty, but
> rather the certainty of a causal relationship is established by
> something else (e.g., observational evidence).

Dan:

Aren't you using conditions here, though, rather than causality? What
I mean to say is, Bob seems certain that Sally caused Steve's death
(he is an eye-witness). But you're saying this certainty is
preconditioned by the observation, not by the actual cause.

>
> Matt said:
> Now, given that's the case about that paper, it is also the case that
> all of the reasoning is in the vocabulary of causation.  And you want
> to press the point that using a vocabulary of preconditional valuation
> would open up new lines of thinking about moral reasoning.  I'm still
> not sure what they are, but the above at least serves to set straight
> what I was trying to do with the vocabulary of causation.
>
> Dan said:
> Well, again, only the wording is different. I wouldn't want to press
> the point further than that.
>
> Matt:
> I'm confused by what we've concluded about our conversation.  It
> sounds like you've just suggested that you knew all along that we
> are _just_ and _only_ using different wording, different vocabularies.

Dan:

Fair enough. Perhaps I am just being intellectually lazy by not
wanting to press on here.

Matt:
> But if that were the case, why were your pressing any point at all?  I
> assumed, because you were initially pressing a point, that there was
> a difference somewhere, or rather, that using the vocabulary of
> preconditional valuation wasn't _only_ different wording, but a
> different wording that _makes_ a difference (to something).  I was
> probing to see where that was.

Dan:

I was pressing the point of B values precondition A to avoid the
certainty that causality entails, thereby opening the possibility of
expanding our narrative of life. You seem satisfied with the notion of
causality (to the point of certainty), from what I can gather from our
discussion, and it seemed (to me) rather pointless to press on.
Looking (briefly) into causality and the complexity of the problem, it
appears to be an argument that I am not qualified to continue. I can
only rely on RMP's statements in LILA.

>
> Matt said:
> The only way to articulate why I don't see the expansion is to say that
> Pirsig isn't the only person to have given us a vocabulary in which to
> talk about us as not only individuals.  The entire edifice of
> post-Hegelian philosophy is directed at understanding humans as
> culturally constituted, which is to say, as a set of patterns.  And none
> of them has had to abandon the vocabulary of causation to make
> sense of this expansion.
>
> Dan said:
> Interesting. So are you saying RMP is original on this point? And if so,
> why is that a bad thing?
>
> Matt:
> Well, I guess two things: 1) I don't think Pirsig _has_ abandoned the
> vocabulary of causation (which was what I meant before about "I
> think it's a mistake to think that the MoQ 'does away with cause and
> effect'").  I think he's merely shown an ingenious way of redescribing
> causation in terms of value to help ease us out of a bad
> substance-metaphysics.

Dan:

Perhaps it is better to say RMP does away with the primacy of
causation, just as he does away with the primacy of subject and object
(substance-metaphysics).

Matt:
>But I don't think rejecting
> substance-metaphysics entails rejecting the vocabulary of causation,
> nor do I think Pirsig thinks so.  However, if I'm wrong about what
> Pirsig thinks (particularly given that I haven't really studied him in a
> long time), then I'd have to say that Pirsig is wrong, because I don't
> think there's anything wrong with the vocabulary of causation once
> one does away with SOM.  And, on top of this, if you really do think
> that "only the wording is different," then you too functionally have
> not abandoned the vocabulary of causation: you've simply given it a
> different name.

Dan:
>From what I understand, he really doesn't do away with SOM (that is
impossible), but rather the idea that subjects and objects are
primary. And when I say only the wording is different, what I am
pointing out is that the end result is still the same, but our
expanded vocabulary enables us to go beyond the confines of causation
and substance-based metaphysics in ways that isn't possible otherwise.
Functionally, though, we have to be willing to do so. Otherwise, it is
all rather pointless.


>Matt:
> And 2) my point wasn't that Pirsig's notion of preconditional valuation
> was bad because it was different, but that it doesn't seem to be the
> case that one _needs_ an alternative to the vocabulary of causation
> to understand that we are not only individuals, but
> individuals-grounded-in-communities.  That's why I don't see the
> expansion.  If "only the wording is different," then the vocabulary
> functions the same as before, does the same things, and hence
> doesn't really expand anything.  There needs to be a difference that
> makes a difference for a vocabulary-change to expand our range of
> possibilities, and it's that difference I'd still press for.

Dan:
But the wording is the vocabulary. And so by changing the wording, we
change the vocabulary. The difference lies in the expansion of
possibilities heretofore eliminated by the certainty causation
implies.

>
> Dan said:
> I wouldn't put it that way... good freedom or bad freedom. Freedom
> is without patterns, good or bad. Going against the grain of
> convention is just another way of following static dictates; it is the
> other side of the coin. When we are told what to do, we are also
> informed as to what not to do. Are we not?
>
> Matt:
> I guess I get to easily caught up in thinking that freedom is a
> commendatory term, given how closely people generally want to ally
> "freedom" directly with "Dynamic Quality," which you appear
> (thankfully) unwilling to do.  (I also didn't mean "going against the
> grain" in the narrow sense of doing the opposite of expectation, but
> in the expanded sense, as you roughly put it right before, of "not
> doing what's expected," which is more than just the opposite.)

Dan:

>From what I understand, in the MOQ freedom means the absence of
patterns, or as Janis Joplin lamented, freedom is just another word
for nothing left to lose. I don't think freedom is inherently good or
bad. If life can be seen as a migration of static patterns towards no
patterns at all, as the MOQ indicates, it is out of the static
patterns we fashion the notion of good and bad. Dynamic Quality is
kept concept-free to avoid being used as a commendatory term, as you
put it.

>
> Dan said:
> You say: "people today are less concerned..." but how do you know
> that? Is it something you've read? Something you've come to
> understand by talking to others? And how does one determine who
> is competent (and who isn't)?
>
> I take it your claim rests on socially accepted norms reported in the
> media. But the media is biased too. A website like Beliefnet is liable
> to report differently than MSNBC. So I am unsure why you say my
> statement seems like a non sequitur. I am not saying you're right
> or wrong, mind you. I am saying yours is an opinion based on the
> opinion of others who may (or may not) be right.
>
> Matt:
> One determines competence by hopefully competent methods.  I'm
> not trying to offer a method for any of these meta-determinations, but
> make distinctions between different pieces of an equation (if you will).
> For example, the distinction between how one lives their own life
> (e.g., monogamously, polygamously, etc.) and how one thinks the
> course of cultural history charts how people have thought about how
> they should live their lives.  I was talking about cultural history and
> you brought up asking Tiger's wife.  I'm suggesting that's a non
> sequitor, because that merely tells us a little something about the
> present and I want to talk about the present's relationship to the
> past.

Dan:

Okay, I see. Still, my point about Tiger's wife does have to do with
the present's relationship with the past... she had expectations of
monogamy based on the vows man and wife make to sanctify a marriage.
These expectations aren't something new... they are firmly rooted in
cultural history. I guess my point was that another person (or
culture) might not take such a stance if they didn't entertain those
expectations. So while I still don't really see that I am being
illogical, I suppose within a certain context, I am.

>Matt:
> As for my own justifications for my claim (which one could judge me
> incompetent), it is a vague assessment based on reading about the
> past and talking to people (much less on mainstream media outlets,
> which I have a slim intake of).  Amongst younger folks, it appears
> that people care less about marriage than older generations do now,
> and have in the past.  Here are my credentials: As a teacher, I
> hobnob with a range of 18-year-olds.  Then there's my friends
> (though that's a pool of limited generalizability).  But probably best
> in my corner about the present is the fact that I've recently gone
> through the process of getting married, and in talking to the (limited
> number of) marriage industry people I encountered, they seem to
> add evidence to the claim of less concern (based on trends they've
> seen in couples getting married, particularly how they are getting
> married).

Dan:

Point taken. Still, marriage appears to be a huge deal to the gay
community as evidenced by the recent happenings in New York and the
legalization of gay marriage there. To the heterosexual community, the
custom of marriage is a given, a right. And so perhaps we tend to be a
little blasé about it. But to those who are denied this right, it
means a great deal, not only from a financial point of view but to the
possibility of changing a dysfunctional narrative into a functional
one.

>Matt:
> How much justification is that about my perception of the present?
> Well, not nearly enough compared to a sociologist who does
> research on that kind of thing.  And I can't recall reading anything
> about present-day marriage practices that might have impacted my
> from-the-hip-ish claim.
>
> However: say we make the entire 20th century one, big static block
> of nothing-has-changed-in-the-last-100-years-about-marriage.  I
> have read a few books on marriage and related social practices
> about a few different cultures before the 20th century.  (Most
> importantly, Georges Duby's Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages.)
> This was never work done _for_ the discussion of marriage, but
> rather research that was to impact in an acilliary way my real
> objects of inquiry (most recently, Sir Walter Scott's The Bride of
> Lammermoor).  But based on what I've read, I feel comfortable in
> making the broad generalization that "people today are less
> concerned about the practice of marriage than they used to be
> (e.g., 2500 years ago)."

Dan:

Thank you for the book recommendations. I am always interested in what
others are reading. And thank you for the stimulating discussion.

Dan