[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Dan,


>>Steve:
>> For what practical reasons do we want to know whether we are
>> responsible or determined? We would still need to condemn the
>> intention to do harm and praise the intention to do good whether or
>> not we think of people as subject to a chain of causality or free of
>> such chains (for the practical reason that we think that doing so has
>> predictable effects on others).
>
> Dan:
>
> If you've been following the discussion between Matt and myself, in my
> last post I wrote about considering karma from both a causal and a
> preconditional point of view. I think this has repercussions with what
> you seem to be saying. From a practical (conventional) point of view,
> you are right. But for a Dynamic point of view, consider this quote
> from the Bhagavad Gita: "Action is thy duty, reward not thy concern."


Steve:
I don't know what you mean by "Dynamic point of view" which I think
you are equating with a "preconditional point of view." Can you
explain further.

As for the Gita quote, I never followed the argument. What could
anyone be concerned about in deciding on an appropriate action besides
the possible consequences of the action?


Dan:
> From a conventional, causal chain-of-action point of view, we come to
> believe our intentions have certain predictable outcomes, while from a
> point of view based on B valuing precondition A, we come to understand
> the certainty implied by causality is a dysfunctional narrative we've
> built up during a lifetime of practical thinking. Condemnation and
> praise are not preconditions for action. They are the result of the
> dysfunctional narrative of causality.

Steve:
I don't think that uncertainty is a problem for causality so long as
we can try to predict probabilities. It certainly wouldn't in any way
imply that what cannot be predicted with precision is best explained
by the existence of a metaphysical entity called "the will."

I guess I'm not really getting what you are arguing here.

Best,
Steve