[MD] Free Will

[Dan Glover]

Hello everyone

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:24 PM, Steven Peterson
<peterson.steve at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
>
>>>Steve:
>>> For what practical reasons do we want to know whether we are
>>> responsible or determined? We would still need to condemn the
>>> intention to do harm and praise the intention to do good whether or
>>> not we think of people as subject to a chain of causality or free of
>>> such chains (for the practical reason that we think that doing so has
>>> predictable effects on others).
>>
>> Dan:
>>
>> If you've been following the discussion between Matt and myself, in my
>> last post I wrote about considering karma from both a causal and a
>> preconditional point of view. I think this has repercussions with what
>> you seem to be saying. From a practical (conventional) point of view,
>> you are right. But for a Dynamic point of view, consider this quote
>> from the Bhagavad Gita: "Action is thy duty, reward not thy concern."
>
>
> Steve:
> I don't know what you mean by "Dynamic point of view" which I think
> you are equating with a "preconditional point of view." Can you
> explain further.

Dan:

No, I am not equating a Dynamic point of view with preconditions. I am
saying that in the MOQ, there are both conventional points of view and
Dynamic points of view. If a person understands B values precondition
A, there is a better possibility that they will also consider the
Dynamic point of view. Does that help?

>
> As for the Gita quote, I never followed the argument. What could
> anyone be concerned about in deciding on an appropriate action besides
> the possible consequences of the action?

Dan:

Remember the quote about Hector from ZMM?

``What moves the Greek warrior to deeds of heroism,'' Kitto comments, ``is
not a sense of duty as we understand it...duty towards others: it is rather duty
towards himself. He strives after that which we translate `virtue' but is in
Greek areté, `excellence' -- we shall have much to say about areté. It runs
through Greek life.''
"There, Phædrus thinks, is a definition of Quality that had existed a thousand
years before the dialecticians ever thought to put it to word-traps."

Dan comments:

Duty towards oneself. Quality... not to impress others... not to
achieve fortune or fame... but a striving towards excellence, even
though the goal itself is impossible, and what's more, we know it is
impossible.

Does that help you see how one can act without thought of reward or punishment?

>
>
> Dan:
>> From a conventional, causal chain-of-action point of view, we come to
>> believe our intentions have certain predictable outcomes, while from a
>> point of view based on B valuing precondition A, we come to understand
>> the certainty implied by causality is a dysfunctional narrative we've
>> built up during a lifetime of practical thinking. Condemnation and
>> praise are not preconditions for action. They are the result of the
>> dysfunctional narrative of causality.
>
> Steve:
> I don't think that uncertainty is a problem for causality so long as
> we can try to predict probabilities. It certainly wouldn't in any way
> imply that what cannot be predicted with precision is best explained
> by the existence of a metaphysical entity called "the will."

Dan:
What is "the will"? Can you point to it? Or is it a high quality idea?
I would say the will is an idea and not anything that anyone has ever
seen. That's what I mean by a dysfunctional narrative. Practically
thinking, I can will myself to type this post. But what am I saying?
There is no will here other than the idea that I am willing myself to
type this post. And granted, it is a high quality idea, but one that
cannot be examined in any way other than to continue with the
dysfunctional narrative that claims I "have" a will.

>Steve:
> I guess I'm not really getting what you are arguing here.

Dan:

I am not arguing. Maybe that's why you don't get it.

Thank you,

Dan