[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Ham Priday]

Howdy, Mark --

> We seem to be talking across each other here.  A universe
> can be absolutely moral, but have different types of morals, no?
> When we create a spectrum of quality or value, we tend to
> observe a hierarchy of such.  That is something can have more
> value than another thing.  That is all that I mean by level of
> goodness (i.e. how good is it). This was in response to your
> comment from March 3 "In an all-good universe, goodness
> would be undetectable."  So, in response to this I state that
> goodness can be detected in an all good universe, or a
> universe composed of morality, because of the dynamic nature
> of such. Perhaps these conversations are getting too disjointed.

Too disjointed, yes, because we are each hung up on terms that have 
different meanings and convey different concepts to the other.  Let me try 
to clear up some of the semantic confusion by presenting my "conceptual 
model" of reality, which you can then modify as necessary.

First of all, I'm talking about two kinds of reality: experiential, and 
ultimate.  The former is created or synthesized, transitory, individuated, 
and relational.  (I would use "dynamic" instead of transitory, except that 
it conflicts with Pirsig's "Dynamic Quality".)  The latter is fundamental, 
uncreated, immutable, and unified, i.e., Absolute.  (Again, I use 
"immutable" to avoid confusion with Pirsig's reference to "static 
patterns".)   While I call these two "realities" Existence and Essence, 
respectively, they can also be regarded as "differentiated" and "holistic" 
modalities of reality.  That avoids having to ask whether, technically 
speaking, Essence "exists" or not.

> In terms of what Pirsig states, please remember that he provides
> analogies.  He doesn't mean that there really are levels such as you
> state.  He simply says that Quality can be viewed as such.  I think
> you may be trying to find truths here, rather than rhetoric, and you
> mistake these levels for reality.  Just try to keep in mind what the
> metaphysics of quality is, before you apply a logical knife to it.

Well, as you probably realize by now, I'm a 'literalist'; so I tend to use 
analogy only to illustrate or clarify abstractions that are difficult to 
describe in words.  From what I've observed here, most folks seem to take 
the hierarchy levels as literally as they do the "quality" abstraction. 
Perhaps I'm naive, but if some of Pirsig's metaphysical pronouncements are 
merely rhetorical analogies, wouldn't he have been wise to designate them as 
such?

[Ham, previously]:
> What is the "essence" (if I may) of Pirsigian reality if it is
> not Quality?

[Mark]:
> It must be the way I write for you to interpret me as what you state
> above.  So, once again, let me be clear.  Quality creates the relative
> measurements.  First comes Quality, then comes our humans
> measurements.  Measurements are imaginary and depend on what
> we perceive of Quality.  Quality is what allows us to differentiate.
> Let me use the example of a bad apple and a good apple, once again.
> The only reason there is a bad one and a good one, is because of
> Quality.  We do not create the difference between these apples,
> it already exists.  It is interpreted in our minds as a difference in
> Quality. So rather than look at the two apples, what I am suggesting
> is looking at what makes them distinct.  This can be done with everything.

I find the assertion "first comes Quality, then come human measurements" 
somewhat problematic, especially when examined apropos your apples example. 
You say "The only reason there is a bad one and a good one, is because of 
Quality."  We can deal with difference as a physical attribute, but your 
epistemology is incomplete until you tell me WHAT the apple IS.  Is it 
because of Quality that we have apples at all, or do we convert "bad 
quality" into a rotten apple and "good quality" into a whole one?  Is an 
apple an existent in its own right, as in the objectivists view?  Is it a 
pattern or 'apparition' of Quality, as the MoQist views it.  Or is it an 
experiential phenomenon created by the observer, as I posit it?

> Your stating that Value is the essence of experience, would be the
> same thing that I am saying.  Value makes experience, not the other
> way around.

Good!  Then we're at least on the same page ontologically.  But if Quality 
is primary to experience, what makes the OBJECT?

[Ham]:
> If we are one part of the primary source, and the objective universe
> constitutes the remainder, then you are equating existence to the source.
> The net result of this premise is that there is no source, and no need for
> Quality. (No need for philosophy, either, I would assume.) Essentially you
> have posited the universe as empirical science describes it.

[Mark]:
> I do not ascribe the source as something other than what we are
> present in.  I cannot conceive of some mysterious side.  We make up
> the source, it is not separate from us.  The philosophy is a reflection
> of how we interpret what we see.  Mine is a practical philosophy,
> and empiricism plays a part, however learning plays a part as well,
> since empiricism must be interpreted.  The interpretation is a creation.

Okay, let's nail down the epistemology of experience before heading off in 
other directions.  I'll tell you my concept if you tell me yours.  How do 
you explain creation by "interpretation"?  Since you say Quality comes 
first, are you interpreting pure (homogeneous) or differentiated Quality to 
create your apples.for example?  Or, are the apples already there, in the 
objective world, waiting for you to interpret them?

Essentially curious,
Ham