[MD] The Color of Perception

[Carl Thames]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "MarshaV" <valkyr at att.net>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2011 4:51 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] The Color of Perception


> Hello Carl,
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Nov 22, 2011, at 5:33 AM, "Carl Thames" <cthames at centurytel.net> wrote:
>
>>> Marsha:
>>> Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons:
>>>
>>>  "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature 
>>> of perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see 
>>> images, such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes.  The 
>>> visual image of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or 
>>> atomic structure.  It isn't located in the external world, for it arises 
>>> partly in dependence upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, 
>>> the optic nerve, the visual cortex.  There are clearly brain functions 
>>> that contribute to the generation of red images, but no evidence that 
>>> those neural correlates of perception are actually _identical_ to those 
>>> images. So there is no compelling reason to believe that the images are 
>>> located inside our heads.  Since visual images, or qualia, are not 
>>> located either outside or inside our heads, they don't seem to have any 
>>> spatial location at all.  The same is true of all other kinds of sensory 
>>> qualia, including sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations
>>> ."
>>>
>>> (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and 
>>> Consciousness',p.50)
>>>
>>> Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from 
>>> the pure experience.
>>
>> Carl:
>> To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a 
>> part of our consensual reality.  Within that, the concept of "red" is 
>> different. If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different 
>> things to different people.  To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to 
>> someone else, it may be a darker, more maroon color.  i.e. specific 
>> information is NOT shared with the descriptor of "red."  Using that as a 
>> basis of argument, I think it is located specifically in the external 
>> world.  Like Don's dog dish, the concept of "red", much like the concept 
>> of "dog dish" exists as a thought form, not as a reality.  Does it change 
>> when we experience it directly?  Our concept of it might.  We might see 
>> that the car is in fact of the shade we describe as "fire-engine red" 
>> rather than as "daker, more maroon."  Is that important?  I don't know. 
>> We have to deal with each other directly, if we correspond, and meaning 
>> is important in that context.  i.e. is Don's dog dish ro
> und or square?  Is it's physical manifestation even relevant?
>>
>> I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see 
>> lack physical attibutes.  In fact, that may be all they have.  The color 
>> red is a real concept, whether we perceive it or not.  The first four 
>> people who experience it agree that it's the color red.  The fifth is 
>> blind, and can't see it at all.  Does that mean it's no longer red?  I 
>> don't think so.  As you say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come 
>> from pure experience to have any real meaning.  The color red has meaning 
>> to the first four, but is meaningless to the blind guy.  Now, would 
>> Pirsig say that the color "red" has value, or would the value inherent in 
>> the color be that which it invokes in the person experiencing it?
>
>
> What first four people?  What red?  What blind guy?

The point would be the first four were sighted, and able to experience the 
color directly through their senses, and the blind guy couldn't.  The 
specific red is irrelevant.  The first four would be able to arrive at an 
intellectual  consensus that the color was indeed red, while the blind guy 
could never be certain.  Would the blind guy experience the same "value" as 
the other four?