[MD] The Color of Perception

MarshaV valkyr at att.net
Tue Nov 22 21:42:44 PST 2011



Sent from my iPad
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Carl:
>>> To disagree for the sake of argument, we have the concept of "red" as a part of our consensual reality.  Within that, the concept of "red" is different. If someone describes their car as "red" it will mean different things to different people.  To you, it might be a fire-engine red, to someone else, it may be a darker, more maroon color.  i.e. specific information is NOT shared with the descriptor of "red."  Using that as a basis of argument, I think it is located specifically in the external world.  Like Don's dog dish, the concept of "red", much like the concept of "dog dish" exists as a thought form, not as a reality.  Does it change when we experience it directly?  Our concept of it might.  We might see that the car is in fact of the shade we describe as "fire-engine red" rather than as "daker, more maroon."  Is that important?  I don't know. We have to deal with each other directly, if we correspond, and meaning is important in that context.  i.e. is Don's dog dish ro
>> und or square?  Is it's physical manifestation even relevant?
>>> 
>>> I specifically disagree with Wallace's assertion that the images we see lack physical attibutes.  In fact, that may be all they have.  The color red is a real concept, whether we perceive it or not.  The first four people who experience it agree that it's the color red.  The fifth is blind, and can't see it at all.  Does that mean it's no longer red?  I don't think so.  As you say, the concrete and abstract patterns must come from pure experience to have any real meaning.  The color red has meaning to the first four, but is meaningless to the blind guy.  Now, would Pirsig say that the color "red" has value, or would the value inherent in the color be that which it invokes in the person experiencing it?
>> 
>> 
>> What first four people?  What red?  What blind guy?
> 
> The point would be the first four were sighted, and able to experience the color directly through their senses, and the blind guy couldn't.  The specific red is irrelevant.  The first four would be able to arrive at an intellectual  consensus that the color was indeed red, while the blind guy could never be certain.  Would the blind guy experience the same "value" as the other four?

Carl,

If you are looking for a conventional answer, my only answer could be: I don't know.


Marsha


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