[MD] Awareness and consciousness in the MOQ

[118]

Hi Arlo,
You bring up some good questions.  What they reveal to me is my
inability to form strict boundaries around the terminology I am using.
 I am sure I will learn something from the discussion as it moves
forward.  With that in mind I will continue in good faith (heh, heh),
and hopefully become more in tune with your presentations.

On 4/10/12, Arlo Bensinger <ajb102 at psu.edu> wrote:
> [Mark]
> Here we try to separate "belief" from "faith".  "Belief" would be
> something that we continually need to justify, whereas "faith" we do not.
>
> [Arlo]
> This is interesting, would you say then that 'doubt' is a part of
> 'belief'? That is how I read this, that 'certainty' would be 'faith',
> whereas anything 'uncertain' would be 'belief'. Am I reading that right?

Mark:
Yes, doubt is part of belief.  The analogy would be the Yin Yang.  In
every Yin there is a bit of Yang.  In any belief there is a bit of
doubt.  It is the doubt which defines the belief.  For belief cannot
exist alone otherwise I would call it faith.
>
> [Mark]
> We have science, which is done when one puts his hand in the shower to
> see if it is hot enough.  Then there is Scientism which is a religion.
>
> [Arlo]
> This would indicate a process/content distinction, or one where
> 'science' becomes a verb rather than a noun (I like that, personally,
> the same way I think 'art' is better thought of as a verb rather than a
> noun or, worse, an adjective).

The verb could be "using the scientific method".  This method is based
on empiricism or experience, and has its rules.  What results from the
dynamic is the static "current science".  Science is always moving
towards “betterness” (theGgood?).  We gain footholds (placeholders) as
we move along.  Everything we know about science today will be shown
at some time to be incorrect.  This is what the history of science
teaches us.  This is exceptionally true in the areas of cosmology and
quantum physics, which is more alchemy than anything applied science.
>
> Given the above, this would suggest to me that as soon as we achieve
> 'certainty' in our thoughts, the content of those thoughts become
> religious? You can likely guess my next question, and that is does the
> 'certainty' which we hold our beliefs differ in kind? Is there a
> distinction (in this scenario) between 'psychological certain',
> 'pragmatic certainty', etc. I hold, for example, that the 'moon orbits
> the earth' and I don't actively investigate that, so I'd assume you see
> that as 'faith', something I hold 'religiously'. And yet this
> 'certainty' is never far removed from doubt as new experiential data
> comes in (whether from personal experience or trusted authority).

The term "religious" has its own baggage.  Let us look into the
etymology where http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=religion
can be seen as useful in this discussion.

Religion can come from "to read again” (and again).  This professes
the power of the word in terms of providing meaning.  Alternatively,
"religion" can come from "religare "to bind fast" (see rely), via
notion of "place an obligation on" (reference is the web address
above).  This binding may be akin to what Dave talks about in terms of
practice.  Many would say that Zen is religious.  Of course there are
many negative connotations of "religious", so it would depend on how
one is using the word.

Faith can come under question, and it always does in science.  What
were once unquestionable truths become questions.  It is interesting
to try to distinguish between types of certainty.  That is, is there a
certainty which is knowledge based and is there a certainty which is
intuitive?  Often it is hard to distinguish between the two; often it
is difficult to know which one to go by.  Much of science is
intuitive.  That is, jumps are made with little logic in between.  It
is only later that the logic is filled in.  We do this as well when an
intuitive appreciation of something (following DQ) is subjected to
"understanding" after the fact.  Like:  "Oh, I jumped off that stove
because it was hot!"

So, I would say that the faith about the moons orbit could be
construed as religious since we read about it again and again.
However, there are those who question this paradigm, and they are not
wrong to do so.  It all depends on where one wants to focus one's
attention, I guess.

> I guess what I'm saying is some forms of 'certainty' are entrenched so
> deeply that they are inflexible even in the presence of conflicting
> data. Other forms are more 'loose' in that they can change rapidly as
> experience changes. Peirce (if I read him correctly) believed that on
> the one end, tenacity, belief was fixed very rigidly, it was very
> difficult for a person to move from belief to doubt (a state he believed
> was a necessary transitional state to change), whereas beliefs fixed on
> the other end, scientific methodology, were more apt to change (enter a
> state of doubt) when confronted with contradiction.

I can agree with Pierce here.
>
> Do you see this axis as irrelevant to something being 'faith' or
> 'religion'? Or would there be no fundamental distinction between the
> beliefs "God hates fags" (Wellsboro religious faith) and "the moon
> orbits the earth" (Arlo's religious faith)? Are they both examples of
> religious faith?

Well I hate hyperbole since it distracts from the conversation, but I
will deal with the questions.  Does Arlo believe in evolutionary
theory?  Does Arlo believe in freedom?  Does Arlo believe that all men
are born equal?  If Arlo were to use his theory of the moon to subject
others to his belief, then I would say it would be similar to the fag
hating you reference.  The problem with religion throughout the ages
is that it was used for purposes of control and domination.  The same
can be said for science today.  For example the theory of global
warming can have far reaching personal consequences.  While I have my
own opinions on this theory based on knowledge, the point is that
there is personal religion or faith and there is coercive religion or
science.  I find the latter to be misguided.
>
> I think Peirce may have argued that 'religious belief' is a function of
> both non-experientiality and inflexibility to experiential data. Thus it
> is not 'certainty' that would define something as 'religious', but
> whether or not it the basis for it is rooted in experiential activity
> and whether or not it is adaptive to changes that arise from
> contradictory or conflictional experiential activity. Thus a book about
> astronomy would not be a 'religious' text, and my understanding that
> Pluto is a sub-planetary body that orbits the sun at the reaches of our
> solar system would not be a 'religious belief' as it is rooted in
> experience and flexible to ongoing experiential contradictions (Poor
> Pluto...). I take it you would disagree?

I have to assume that Pierce has not had any thought changing
religious experiences.  Or any "spiritual awakenings" as is presented
in ZAMM.  For many religion is based entirely on experiential data.
This is difficult to describe unless you have been there.  However,
look to ZAMM for an example of this.  I am not saying that MoQ is
religious.  What I am pointing to is the fact the Phaedrus was
subjected to the same world as everyone else, but he interpreted it
differently.  Somebody may see an ocean as simply a body of water;
others may see it entirely differently as, say, the "Mother of all
things".  The second could be considered as religious, but both can be
considered as truthful.

A book about astronomy is a "religious text" if it is used that way.
Lila can also be considered as a religious text, if the words therein
are seen as dogma and must be parced for "true meaning".  I find
"Alice in Wonderland" to be a religious text and could spend the rest
of my days "figuring it out".
>
> [Mark]
> That policies are made based on such book readings in order to control
> human behavior is not different from the inquisitions of old.
>
> [Arlo]
> Are you suggesting that policies derived from the constitution are
> fundamentally similar to the inquisitions?

Yes, they could be.  If the opinions of a few control the many then
they could be considered as inquisitions.  For example if people are
destroyed because of freedom of speach, then those who destroy them
could be subjected to an inquisition (trial).  We have many
inquisitions in the US, and many who profit from them like the priests
in Spain did many years ago.  One could also say that the current
presidency has its own inquisitions as presidents of the past have.  I
do not need to go into examples there.
>
> A further point, if I (a policy maker) conduct an experiment (defined
> any way you wish) and find clear evidence that roadways without enforced
> central lines demarking directional flow leads to greater death, injury
> and damage, and implement a policy to 'control' driver behavior by
> enforcing adherence to directional flow, would this- at this point- be
> no different than an inquisition?

The inquisition would be to bring all those people that designed the
roads to court and determine if they are guilty or innocent of perjury
by a juryless court.  These people could then be burned at the stake.
I have lived in countries with no enforced central lines, such as
Argentina, and the accident rates are lower there since people have to
take responsibility for their own safety and don't simply rely on the
government (and paint their nails or text while driving).  There is
something to be said for that.
>
> Now, a few years later, after I leave office, someone reads my research
> findings and decides that this law is worth renewing, does it at this
> point become an inquisition (because this person is deriving his policy
> from reading my words rather than carrying out his own empirical study)?

I am not sure if you are using the word "inquisition" correctly here.
If the person forced others to follow the central line rule based on
your paper, then that would be dogmatic.  Sometimes dogma is good,
sometimes it is bad.  The fact that the lines were removed would
indicate that such dogma was deemed bad at some point, don't you
think?  Unless, of course, there was a ruler who made decisions
without conversing with Congress or the Supreme Court.  Then such
decisions would not need any support what-so-ever.  This is why we
have a balance of power.
>
> Would you say here, in the same vein as above, that there is no
> fundamental distinction between a law enforcing driving regulations and
> a law enforcing that women are not to be schooled?  They are both
> 'inquisitional'? (Would you say Pirsig might characterize one as an
> intellectual pattern, and the other as a social pattern, and draw a
> moral distinction there?)

Well, I do not know if your analogy stands.  There are finer points to
be considered than to immediately come to such a conclusion.  I
believe you understand these finer points, for that is what makes us
human.  I do not think I need to address that hyperbole except to say
that there is a distinction, I am not sure how fundamental you want to
get here.

They are both social patterns.  The term "moral distinction" is
distinct from the term "moral fabric".  Lila espouses a moral fabric
of the universe.  Such a fabric allows us to choose a moral
distinction.  Some people would say that any regulations are immoral.
This is where society comes in.  If I were living out by myself, I
would care less about driving regulations.  Which reminds me of a
joke:
"The last man on earth walks into a bar.  What does he say?"  He says
"beer get me bartender"
>
> I'm not trying to be overly-hyperbolic, but I'm trying to see if what
> appears to be a pretty absolute charge you're making has nuances or
> distinctions, or if you genuinely mean them as absolute as they read.

What seems to be happening with your examples is deriving arguments
based on Argumentum (Reduction) ad Absurdum.  This technique is well
known for its problems.   Of course nuance is required, too bad you
cannot hear the cadence of my voice or you would not be asking these
questions.  The written word has many problems.
>
> [Mark]
> We certainly have faith that knowledge derived from direct experience is
> real (otherwise we would be considered insane).  However I am not sure
> this can be turned around and stated that faith is the bedrock of
> everything we are.  This would make the concept of faith useless (and
> perhaps this is also what you are saying).
>
> [Arlo]
> Yeah, that's what I'm trying to understand. To me, its part of the 'if
> everything is purple, then the concept of purple (and color!) is
> meaningless'. If we say 'everything is a religion', then the concept of
> religion has no meaning as it has no contrast. Does it completely
> trivialize 'religion' to say that when I open my 'fridge and take out
> some milk, my faith that that milk is not spoiled (prior to opening it)
> is religious faith?

I do not think it trivializes it.  I think it brings about
enlightenment of our existence.  It also puts religion into everyday
context.  To say that this is trivial would be to say that our "every
day" is trivial.  If that is true, then perhaps thinking about it as a
mystical experience will bring one out of the swamp water.  For the
everyday experience have all the symptoms of a mystical experience.
>
> I'd argue that for 'faith' to have any meaning, there has to be a
> 'non-faith' condition, for 'religion' to have any meaning there has to
> be something that is a 'non-religion', and I think you've answered for
> me how you see that (although I might have misread your meaning).

Yes, non-faith comes through the intellect.  The intellect is somehow
able to separate itself from Quality (at least in an illusory
fashion).  Non-religion is a situation where we see ourselves as
accidents and that there is no meaning to life.  We put Chance in
place of Purpose.  The one supposed outcome from dogmatic religion is
to bring about meaning.  Surely you have meaning in your life, so you
are somewhat religious.  This does not mean you have a religion, since
such a thing must be codified to be considered a religion.

Meaning comes from purpose, even if it is to stay alive.  Those
without such meaning kill themselves.  Some want to kill themselves
but something happens in that dark night of their soul, and they
become religious once again.
>
> [Mark]
> I would put the three principles in the following order of importance:
> Tenacity>science>authority.  I am using tenacity in the positive sense
> of Will.  As you know, I cannot stand authority, but it is sometimes
> necessary.
>
> [Arlo]
> I'm not sure how we could function at all without some recourse to
> fixing our beliefs via authority. I think for Peirce a critical point is
> maintaining a 'pragmatic certainty' (not his term). Using Pirsig's
> terms, to be open to Dynamic Quality even as one acts within unavoidable
> static confines. It is the matter of degree we hold onto static
> structures that is of concern, not that we hold onto static structures
> as we necessarily must.

I think we would function just fine, and base our interaction on our
instinctual needs.  With authority comes the need to break such
authority with other authority.  From this come wars because each side
thinks they are different due to authority.  Put to combating soldiers
by themselves on a desert island, and they will live in peace.

We have no choice but to be open to DQ.  It is the intellect which
claims we are not; we are much more than our intellect.  The static
confines are somewhat hallucinatory.  But they do help us coexist.  If
we were to perseverate on the biological confines we must live within,
we could drive ourselves mad with claustrophobia.  Sometime the
confines derived from reason do drive us somewhat mad.  The point is
to see them for what they are.  To put pragmatic certainty into
context, as it were.  Seeing such certainty as analogous to religion
may be one way to do this.  We do not need to fight wars over concepts
since the concepts will change.  Why risk one's life for something
that will change.  The easiest thing to do is not follow authority as
much as is possible.  Don't be a Republican, don't be a Democrat, for
you are simply diminishing your choices and following the mob rule.
>
> [Arlo had asked]
> what would be the value of using 'God' instead of 'Dynamic Quality'?
>
> [Mark]
> I would simply say that by doing so, we get a better understanding of
> what others think of in terms of God.
>
> [Arlo]
> Let me ask you another question, would you say that everything that is
> undefinable is interchangeable with the term 'God'? It seems, from your
> answers and posts, that non-definability is the point of contact that
> makes 'Quality' and 'God' synonomous, and that because 'Quality' is
> indefinable it is therefore the same as 'God', is that right? Therefore
> any concept that is indefinable is 'God'? Yes?

Hmmm...  No.  God is a relationship with the cosmos.  A painting by
Paul Jackson Pollock is just a painting.  Both Quality and God are
used in the same metaphysical way, that is where I draw the
relationship.  They are both words for the same thing in my opinion.
But of course you have no idea what my sense of God or Quality is.
They are probably not the same for you.
>
> [Mark]
> I would see the value added when we try to interpret older texts (such
> as the Gnostic Gospels) and think in terms of Quality.
>
> [Arlo]
> I think such an interpretation would please the Gnostics, as esoteric
> systems tend to be unconcerned with formalizing their structures.
> Indeed, the are esoteric by virtue of suggesting that there are no
> 'literal' truths behind the 'metaphors' that point to the "the one,
> shape-shifting yet marvelously constant story" (Joseph Campbell), or no
> literal hands upon which the fingers pointing at the moon are connected.

Yes, esoterism is subjective and dynamically tuned in to existence.
Any formalization through objectification would not be congruent with
esoterism.  Esoterism is realized through mean other than the
intellect.  The esoterics do subscribe to "Truth" more than the
non-esoteric do.  Just not as a written truth.  MoQ is the same way,
in terms of its "betterness".  Esoteric movements certainly walk hand
in hand, always have.
>
> But I think when you move into the realm of exoteric structures, this is
> more problematic, as built into these is deliberate literalness which
> the adherents' concepts derive. It won't help you understand them to
> revision their words esoterically, even though it may help you,
> personally, in painting your diorama of human existence.

Yes, as I see it this is a good way to distinguish between DQ and SQ,
that is esotermism and exoterism.  Of course there are problems with
this since we reach the indefinability clause.  But what you know free
of thoughts is closer to the static label of DQ, in my opinion.
>
> [Mark]
> Of course MoQ belongs to Pirsig, he made it up.  However, by
> distributing it, he relinquished control over how it would evolve from
> personal pressures.  This is not to say that it does not have some
> fundamental ground which Pirsig is working from.  We all stand on that
> fundamental ground.
>
> [Arlo]
> See, I read the above as "by distributing [his ideas], he relinquished
> control over how [his ideas] would evolve." I'd word this instead, "by
> distributing [his ideas], he relinquished control over the evolutionary
> trajectory that would emerge from [his ideas]".

Yes, I agree with this.  He set the rocket in motion towards the
stars, but adjustments are necessary as they come up.
>
> A lot has grown from Peirce, for example, but I don't think I'd say that
> Peirce's ideas evolved. Unless Peirce changed them, his ideas are his
> ideas. But the body of dialogue of which those ideas are, perhaps,
> foundational has certainly evolved. People have taken his ideas, in
> parts or in whole, in agreement or in disagreement, and rebuilt
> structures according to their ideas.

My ideas evolve as well.  However, there is a foundation for those
ideas that I use to balance myself.
>
> This is, I'm sure to most, a semantic issue, but my point was only that
> it, at times, has been a source of tension-confusion in the dialogue.
> The central question (in seeing this division) is asking 'Can Pirsig
> have been wrong about the MOQ?' If you answer 'yes', then 'the MOQ' is
> not Pirsig's description of Quality, the MOQ *is* the object of
> description itself. Does this make sense? Whereas if you answer 'no',
> then 'the MOQ' is Pirsig's description of Quality. (This may make more
> sense if you consider the other question, 'Can Pirsig have been wrong
> about Quality?', and see that these are very different questions).

Pirsig cannot be wrong about MoQ, he made it up.  He is no more wrong
about Quality than me seeing the ocean as the mother of all things.
The trick is to understand what he is presenting with his words.
Words are a net, and it is what lies within that net that is
important.
>
> Say I propose that Pirsig was wrong, that animals do exhibit social
> patterns of activity. Let's say I convince half of you that I am right.
> Now, which side of this forum is arguing for 'the MOQ'? Both? Let's say
> I convince everyone but you. Would you cede that 'the MOQ' has evolved
> to account for animal socialization? If someone was reading an entry on
> Pirsig's ideas in a philosophy book, should it read "In deny non-human
> social patterns, Pirsig was incorrect about the MOQ?"... Are you
> following me? Or am I now beating a horse that died sometime around the
> end of the Incan civilization? :-)

Well, the devil is in the details.  Pirsig does not present scientific
fact, he presents rhetoric to bring about understanding of what he is
talking about.  Let us not get too dogmatic about his words and make a
religion out of MoQ.  I do not think this thing about socialization
has much relevance to Quality.  The MoQ is a tool towards
understanding what Pirsig sees.  By making metaphysics out of it, he
has put Quality into decline or degeneration, if his words are taken
as dogma.  It is up to us to not let this happen, in my opinion.
>
> This is what I get for ordering a large coffee this morning...

Yeah, I live on the stuff.  Lately I have been drinking Mate. Now that
stuff is wicked!

Cheers,
Mark
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