[MD] Nonrelativizably Used Predicates

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

All,
I was suspended for accidentally posting too much, so I sent these 
answers to Craig privately, but here they are for all.



4.4.2012:

Hi Craig,
Thank you for your interest. I am currently suspended for a week for 
accidentally posting five messages per day, so I will reply personally. 
You said:

"Tuukka, I understand the kind of language used in the text, but without 
some examples I don't get an idea of what it's about. Craig"

A common fallacy in metaphysics, at least among amateurs, is that we 
have a predicate, which is expected to mean something, that is not 
defined. One such predicate would be "everything that exists". We might 
define this predicate to have a certain property, such as that of being 
physical. In this case we would have constructed an ontology known as 
physicalism.

Let's say a physicalist encounters an idealist, who asserts, that 
"everything that exists" is mental, and speaks of mental objects. In 
this case the physicalist would make a logical error, if he would speak 
of mental objects, like the idealist, with the implicit assumption that 
they are speaking of the same thing. In the language of SOQ, the 
physicalist would be using nonrelativizably the concepts that refer to 
the mental objects. He would detach them from their context.

Generally speaking, our findings are not new. They can be read from this 
article: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ . Also 
Carnap's "Überwindung" touches the issue, but Carnap asserts that 
metaphysics should be discontinued because of this kind of problems, 
which is an exagerration.

However, we place special emphasis on the concept of "nonrelativizably 
used predicate", which may be a new idea. Understanding the concept of 
"nonrelativizably used predicate" is necessary for understanding Dynamic 
Quality. Even though Dynamic Quality cannot be defined, the expression 
"Dynamic Quality" can be identified as a nonrelativizably used predicate.

In addition, we argue that the nonrelativizable use of predicates is not 
a bad thing, if one does so knowingly. While I have found some 
philosophers to implicitly do so, a professional referee told me that it 
is completely obvious that all predicates must be used relativizably. I 
disagree, and this is a controversial assertion. But the merit in our 
logical work is, that we can express exactly, what this assertion is.

Buddhists have used many predicates nonrelativizably, such as 
"Buddha-nature". The nonrelativizable use of that predicate is the 
reason why the question "Does a dog have Buddha-nature?" can only be 
given ambiguous or contradictory answers. Western academy cannot 
understand Eastern philosophy as long as it disallows the 
nonrelativizable use of predicates.

I hope this provided some insight. I wish to assist you more if you have 
any questions.

Best regards,
Tuukka



6.4.2012

Craig,
>> Craig: Let's say a physicalist encounters an idealist, who asserts, that
>> "everything that exists" is mental, and speaks of mental objects. In
>> this case the physicalist would make a logical error, if he would speak
>> of mental objects, like the idealist, with the implicit assumption that
>> they are speaking of the same thing. In the language of SOQ, the
>> physicalist would be using nonrelativizably the concepts that refer to
>> the mental objects. He would detach them from their context.
> So the physicalist is making a logical error in using a predicate nonrelativizably.
> Do you have an example where using a predicates nonrelativizably is not a logical error?
> Craig

Tuukka:

In this case, the error can be found in the materialist's assumption, 
that he is speaking of the same thing as the idealist. If the 
materialist did not make that assumption, but instead, perceived himself 
as only mindlessly repeating concepts used by the idealist, his behavior 
might be a bit silly, but he would not be making a logical error.

I am fairly certain, that when small children begin learning language, 
they initially use predicates nonrelativizably. This is not yet a 
logical error. As their grasp of language improves, they intuitively 
relativize predicates to each other. By doing so, they obtain the 
ability to form a static network of interrelated dialectical truths. But 
this network makes it possible for them to use predicates 
nonrelativizably with the erroneous assumption that they have 
relativized those predicates to the dialectical truths they already have.

Nonrelativizable use of predicates is usually not considered an error in 
dadaistic poetry. But to give a more scientific example, 
nonrelativizable use of predicates is not an error in tentative 
speculation, which usually precedes major breakthroughs. In Aristotelian 
physics, "force" was defined as something that causes movement. Galileo 
Galilei observed, that cannon balls continue to move even though the 
explosion, that sent them to motion, no longer effects a force to them. 
After investigations, he concluded that "force" causes changes in 
acceleration and velocity, but is not a necessary condition for 
sustaining movement. But during these investigations, the notion of 
"force" was at flux. Galilei had to use the predicate "force" 
nonrelativizably for a while in order to relativize it in a new way, and 
this was not a mistake, but a part of his scientific method.

In the field of philosophy, the problem of induction has been studied 
for centuries. I assume you already know, what inductive reasoning is, 
and that it has nothing to do with mathematical induction, as the latter 
proof method is not inductive but deductive. The problem of induction 
has been broken down to two constituent problems, one of which could be 
called the problem of relevance. In the problem of relevance, we suppose 
our original objective is to arrive at true and/or rational predictions, 
and we are to deem the conclusions of inductive arguments true, if they 
are relevant for achieving that objective, and false, if they are not.

It is well-known, that no proper definition of relevance is known. 
Eintalu writes so in his doctoral dissertation. Yet the problem of 
induction is approached as if an essential part of the problem is, that 
relevance is undefined. The concept of relevance is also frequently 
used, and as it has no known proper definition, this usage is 
nonrelativizable. Is this an error or not?

The question sheds light on what is the purpose of academic philosophy. 
If we use a predicate nonrelativizably in the definition of the problem 
of induction, and then approach the problem of induction as if we knew 
what it is and wanted to solve it, we would be making a logical error. 
We would not know what problem we are trying to solve. Normative 
problems, that are subjected to academic work, are usually not like 
that. For example, in the case of the Goldbach conjecture, we know what 
problem we are trying to solve, but not how to solve it.

However, if we were scholastics, solving the problem of induction would 
not necessarily be our goal. Wikipedia says:

"*Scholasticism* is a method of critical thought which dominated 
teaching by the academics <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academics> 
(/scholastics,/ or /schoolmen/) of medieval universities 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval_university> in Europe from about 
1100–1500, and a program of employing that method in articulating and 
defending orthodoxy in an increasingly pluralistic context. It 
originated as an outgrowth of, and a departure from, Christian monastic 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monastic> schools.^[1] 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism#cite_note-0> Not so much a 
philosophy or a theology as a method of learning, scholasticism places a 
strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_reasoning> to extend knowledge 
by inference <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inference>, and to resolve 
contradictions <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradictions>."

If we were philosophical scholastics, "orthodox" works would be those of 
Plato and Aristotle, and their most prestigious successors, who have 
continued their tradition. In this case, it would already be a problem 
that these orthodox philosophers have spoken of a problem, of which we 
do not know, what it is. Therefore, instead of not having a problem of 
induction, our goal would be to create one. We would have such a goal 
because we'd want to defend orthodoxy, which says there is such a problem.

Defining the problem of induction in terms of a nonrelativizably used 
predicate will make the entire concept of "the problem of induction" a 
nonrelativizably used predicate. If the "problem of induction" is a 
nonrelativizably used predicate, it cannot be logically demonstrated to 
have, or to not have, any property. Therefore, defining the problem of 
induction this way makes it impossible to logically argue, that there is 
no problem of induction. Even though this does not necessarily extend 
our knowledge, it could be the only way to resolve a contradiction in 
Western philosophical orthodoxy. This contradiction is, that orthodox 
authors have written about a problem of induction, yet the problem has 
never been adequately expressed.

In the context, that orthodoxy may not be abandoned, it is not an error 
to define the problem of induction nonrelativizably. Rather, it seems 
like the only thing that still can be done. But this gives rise to the 
question of why should we stick to orthodoxy.

I appreciate your interest to our philosophy, and am available for 
further inquiry.

Best regards,
Tuukka



8.4.2012

Hi Craig,
> [Tuukka]
>> In this case, the error can be found in the materialist's assumption,
>> that he is speaking of the same thing as the idealist.
> Berkeley says the rock is a mental object.
> Samuel Johnson kicks the rock.
> Did Johnson kick a mental object?
> Berkeley says "Yes"; Johnson says "No".
> Are they talking about the same object?
> Yes, the rock.  No, a mental object v. a physical object.
> In the above scenario, where is relativizably/nonrelativizably involved?

Tuukka:

I don't think Berkeley always remembers to relativize predicates to 
idealism, even though he claims he is a proponent of idealism. Hence, in 
practical matters, he thinks neither within the context of materialism 
nor the context of idealism. Instead, he forms a temporary ontology 
relevant for the situation, which might only contain three predicates, 
such as "foot", "rock" and "ground".

Only upon being asked whether the rock he kicked was mental, will 
Berkeley remember that he has earlier claimed to subscribe to idealism, 
and would look silly if he now answered "No." Therefore he reminds 
himself of idealism, relativizes the rock to the context of idealism, 
and claims, that the rock he kicked was mental. But when he is no longer 
bothered with philosophical questions, he will again forget to 
relativize everything to idealism.

If Johnson relativizes the rock to materialism during their discussion, 
they are not talking about the same object.

>
> [Tuukka]
>> If the materialist did not make that assumption, but instead, 
>> perceived himself
>> as only mindlessly repeating concepts used by the idealist, his behavior
>> might be a bit silly, but he would not be making a logical error.
> I'm not certain one can "perceive oneself as only mindlessly repeating 
> concepts".
> As soon as one "perceives oneself repeating concepts", it is no longer 
> "mindless"
> (though one may "perceive oneself mindlessly repeating words", i.e., 
> using words
> without regard to their meaning.  Is this what you mean?)

Tuukka:

Why not? Suppose you are learning a new language and are simply 
pronouncing words of the language as practice. If you do this a lot, you 
will not always remember to pay attention to what the words mean.

>
>
> [Tuukka]
>> I am fairly certain, that when small children begin learning language,
>> they initially use predicates nonrelativizably. This is not yet a
>> logical error. As their grasp of language improves, they intuitively
>> relativize predicates to each other. By doing so, they obtain the
>> ability to form a static network of interrelated dialectical truths. But
>> this network makes it possible for them to use predicates
>> nonrelativizably with the erroneous assumption that they have
>> relativized those predicates to the dialectical truths they already 
>> have.
> Language acquisition:
> Step 1: use predicates nonrelativizably.
> Step 2: relativize predicates to each other.
> Step 3: form a static network of interrelated dialectical truths.
> Step 4: use predicates nonrelativizably with the erroneous assumption 
> that
> those predicates have been relativized to the dialectical truths 
> [static network
> of interrelated dialectical truths].
> Do you have an example where our learning language goes through these 
> steps?

Tuukka:

Only steps 1 and 2 are relevant for language acquisiton. Step 3 is the 
same as step 2. The network is formed by relativizing predicates to each 
other. Step 4 is no longer a part of language acquisition.

As for an example, I remember reading a newspaper article about a 
daycare worker, who insisted that if a small child has an opinion of 
something, he should justify it with some kind of arguments. So the 
small children were constantly asked for justification. Later, one of 
the children was observed frantically driving an imaginary buggy, 
yelling to others: "Look how well I'm justifying with this buggy!"

If we suppose the child believed, that what he was doing with the 
imaginary buggy would have been considered "justification" by the 
daycare worker, he had relativized the predicate "justification of 
opinion" incorrectly. His behavior could be perceived as a 
trial-and-error way of relativizing "justification of opinion", which, 
in this case, resulted in error.

>
> [Tuukka]
>> The problem of induction has been broken down to two constituent 
>> problems,
>> one of which could be called the problem of relevance. In the problem 
>> of relevance,
>> we suppose our original objective is to arrive at true and/or 
>> rational predictions,
>> and we are to deem the conclusions of inductive arguments true, if they
>> are relevant for achieving that objective, and false, if they are not.
> Before I consider the problem of induction, what is the other of its 
> constituent problems?

Tuukka:

The other constituent problem is the problem of feasibility. It states: 
"Even if some statement were relevant for our goal of attaining true 
and/or rational predictions, how can we know it's relevant for that?"

Best regards,
Tuukka