[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[craigerb at comcast.net]

[Ant]
> theories of empirical science are concerned with corresponding experiences that are...not
> particular 
 
[Pirsig]
> “In the MOQ repeated experience of the pattern gives it its “thingness.”

[Tuukka]
> It is very unclear, how theories of empirical science should have no corresponding 
> *repeated* experience, as the whole branch of science is based on such experiences.

A distinction is needed:
We can only talk about a particular raven because we are able to (in Strawson pere's
terminology) "reidentify" it as the SAME raven.  For instance, that raven is flying when
the SAME pattern (in Pirsig's terminology) occupies successively contiguous places in space. 
What makes 2 distinct patterns both ravens (birds of the same kind)?
Because they are both the same KIND of pattern.
Science is concerned with KINDs of patterns.  The data is the reidentified patterns;
the theory is the generalization about those kinds of patterns.
"If you can't generalize from the data, you can't do anything else with it either" (Pirsig)  

Craig